Updated September 28, 2023
China Primer: U.S.-China Relations
Introduction
suppression of China, which has brought unprecedented
Congressional oversight and legislative activities related to
severe challenges to our country’s development.”
the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) have
expanded as Members’ concerns about PRC policies,
Bilateral Engagement
actions, and intentions have intensified. Upon his election
For the first two years of the Biden Administration,
as House Speaker in the 118th Congress, Kevin McCarthy
publicly-reported in-person interactions between U.S. and
identified the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) as
PRC officials at all levels were limited. That situation was
the second of two U.S. “long-term challenges” for the
related, in part, to the PRC government’s decision to keep
House to address, the first being the national debt. Members
China’s borders mostly closed for nearly three years to
of the 118th Congress have so far introduced more than 400
enforce a “zero-COVID” approach to the COVID-19
bills and nearly 70 resolutions with provisions related to
pandemic. No Members of Congress have visited China
China. Enacted laws include S. 619 (P.L. 118-2), the
since 2019. When Presidents Biden and Xi met in
COVID Origin Act of 2023, requiring the declassification
November 2022 on the sidelines of a gathering of the G-20
of all information related to potential links between the
nations in Bali, Indonesia, it was their first, and so-far only,
PRC’s Wuhan Institute of Virology and the COVID-19
in-person meeting in their current positions.
pandemic. Other adopted measures include H.Res. 11,
establishing a Select Committee on the Strategic
Both governments appeared to see the 2022 Biden-Xi
Competition between the United States and the Chinese
meeting as an opportunity to reduce volatility in the
Communist Party.
bilateral relationship. Biden stated at the time, “We’re
going to compete vigorously. But I’m not looking for
The Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Administration describes the
conflict, I’m looking to manage this competition
United States as engaged in competition with China over
responsibly.” Biden and Xi agreed that Secretary Blinken
the shape of the future global order, part of a broader
would travel to the PRC for further discussions. Public
contest between democracies and autocracies. The
reports of a PRC surveillance balloon flying over the
Administration’s October 2022 National Security Strategy
continental United States led Blinken to call off a planned
describes China as “America’s most consequential
February 2023 trip. Blinken ultimately visited the PRC in
geopolitical challenge,” and outlines a three-part strategy
June 2023. Two other Biden Administration cabinet
for “out-competing” China. That strategy calls for the
members followed him: Secretary of the Treasury Janet
United States to (1) invest in competitiveness, innovation,
Yellen (July 2023) and Secretary of Commerce Gina
resilience, and democracy at home; (2) align U.S. efforts
Raimondo (August 2023). Other senior Administration
with those of allies and partners; and (3) “compete
visitors to the PRC have included Central Intelligence
responsibly with the PRC to defend our interests and build
Agency Director William Burns (May 2023) and Special
our vision for the future.” The document states that the
Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry (April and
Administration also seeks to “engage constructively with
September 2021 and July 2023). High-level engagement
the PRC wherever we can.”
may be building toward a second in-person meeting
between Biden and Xi on the sidelines of a meeting of the
Senior PRC officials have publicly objected to the U.S.
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping’s
framing of relations as driven by geopolitical competition.
leaders in San Francisco in mid-November 2023. Xi has not
In downplaying the competitive dynamics of the
so far confirmed his attendance.
relationship, the PRC may seek to sustain access to the U.S.
market and to complicate U.S. efforts to build international
Critics, including some Members of Congress, have
coalitions to address certain PRC actions. Meeting with
questioned the Biden Administration’s focus on re-starting
Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken in Beijing in June
high-level dialogue. They suggest that the effort may
2023, the PRC’s top leader, CPC General Secretary and
constrain the Administration’s inclination or ability to
PRC President Xi Jinping called for the United States and
address U.S. concerns about such matters as PRC
China to “find the right way to get along based on mutual
surveillance operations directed at the United States,
respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation.”
intelligence operations in Cuba, and cyber hacking of U.S.
agency networks. Critics also suggest that Washington may
When PRC leaders acknowledge the deterioration in
make concessions to secure meetings, such as holding off
China’s relations with other countries, they often portray
on using its authorities to address PRC actions of concern.
China as a victim. Speaking to members of a PRC political
advisory body in March 2023, Xi alleged that since 2017,
In May 2023, Blinken defended the value of dialogue,
“Western countries led by the United States have
arguing, “while we have a real competition with China, we
implemented all-around containment, encirclement and
also want to make sure that doesn’t veer into conflict. And
the most important starting point for that are [sic] regular
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

China Primer: U.S.-China Relations
lines of communication.” So far, the main outcomes from
supercomputing and artificial intelligence (AI) applications.
2023’s U.S. cabinet-level visits to China appear to be new
The Department of Commerce retains licensing discretion.
working groups and other dialogue mechanisms under the
The firms Nvidia, AMD, and Intel have announced plans to
Secretaries of State, Commerce, and the Treasury.
produce advanced chips for the China market that may not
be subject to the new controls.
Senior PRC Personnel Issues
In response to legislation that would review and restrict
A challenge for high-level U.S.-China diplomacy is the currently
certain U.S. investment in China, in August 2023, the Biden
depleted ranks of PRC interlocutors.
Administration issued an Executive Order (E.O.) to
•
The PRC removed its second-most-senior diplomat, Qin
establish a process to review certain U.S. investments to
Gang, from his Foreign Minister post in July 2023, without
China in advanced chips, quantum technologies, and AI.
explanation. Qin remains China’s State Councilor for
The Department of the Treasury’s proposed notice on
foreign affairs, but has made no public appearances since
rulemaking indicates the Department may not restrict
June 2023. Top diplomat Wang Yi is fil ing in as Foreign
financial flows, even though the E.O. suggests that venture
Minister.
capital and private equity investments can involve the
•
transfer of knowhow and fund the development of PRC

PRC Defense Minister Li Shangfu has made no public
appearances since late August 2023. Even before then, the
capabilities. See CRS In Focus IF11284, U.S.-China Trade
PRC had insisted he could not meet his U.S. counterpart
Relations, and CRS In Focus IF10964, “Made in China
until the U.S. government lifted its designation of Li for
2025” Industrial Policies: Issues for Congress.
sanctions pursuant to the Countering Russian Influence in
Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (Title II, Subtitle B of P.L.
Taiwan
115-44).
The PRC government claims sovereignty over self-ruled
Taiwan. PRC leader Xi states that the PRC seeks to unify
•
The PRC has yet to name a successor to its former Vice
with Taiwan peacefully, but “will never promise to
Foreign Minister with responsibility for North America,
renounce the use of force.” The U.S. government maintains
Xie Feng, who arrived in Washington, DC, as China’s
unofficial relations with Taiwan and supports Taiwan’s
Ambassador to the United States in May 2023.
self-defense pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-
8). See CRS In Focus IF12503, Taiwan: The Origins of the
Select Issues in U.S.-China Relations
U.S. One-China Policy.
Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids
Trade, Investment, and Technology
China reportedly ceased to be the primary source of illicit
China is a large market for some U.S. firms but is
fentanyl entering the United States after the PRC imposed
characterized by significant trade barriers, unfair trade
class-wide controls over all fentanyl-related substances in
practices, and a lack of reciprocity, particularly in sectors in
2019. The U.S. government’s focus is now on addressing
which PRC firms are expanding overseas. Some Members
flows of uncontrolled PRC-produced precursor chemicals
of Congress have expressed concern about China’s state-
used to make fentanyl in third countries, primarily Mexico,
driven economic, trade, investment, and technology
and stemming illicit fentanyl-related financial flows linked
practices and the challenges they pose to U.S. economic
to the PRC. See CRS In Focus IF10890, China Primer:
and technology leadership. Beijing still requires technology
Illicit Fentanyl and China’s Role.
transfer as a condition to operate in strategic sectors in
China. Experts also assess it to be distorting the traditional
Human Rights
use of economic tools (e.g., antidumping, procurement, and
The Biden Administration and many Members have
antitrust policies) and using economic coercion and
criticized the PRC’s human rights record, particularly its
intellectual property theft to advance industrial policies.
treatment of ethnic and religious minorities in the western
regions of Xinjiang and Tibet. The State Department
In addressing PRC economic practices of concern, the 118th
assesses PRC actions in Xinjiang constitute genocide and
Congress has focused on risks related to PRC digital
crimes against humanity. Secretary Blinken has accused the
platforms operating in the United States, such as TikTok,
PRC of a “crackdown on basic rights” in the PRC’s Hong
and exercised oversight of executive branch decisions on
Kong Special Administrative Region. See CRS In Focus
export control licensing and foreign investment reviews.
IF12265, China Primer: Human Rights.
Congress has also promoted national investment in U.S.
strategic technologies, such as semiconductors, and in
Relations with Russia
emerging technologies, such as electric vehicles. It has also
The United States has pressed China to help end Russian
considered imposing guardrails on some U.S. commercial
President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine. The PRC’s Xi
and research ties with China and restrictions on China’s
has expressed China’s opposition to the threatened or actual
ability to buy U.S. farmland.
use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, but has otherwise
expressed solidarity with Putin. In 2022, China-Russia trade
Between August and October 2022, the U.S. Department of
increased by 29% over 2021. China’s exports to Russia in
Commerce issued controls on design software for advanced
the first 8 months of 2023 were up 64% over the same
logic chips and semiconductor equipment, as well as
period in 2022. Xi and Putin are to meet in Beijing in
services by U.S. persons used to produce advanced logic
October 2023. See CRS In Focus IF12100, China-Russia
and memory chips. The Department also restricted the
export to China of certain advanced chips used in
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10119 · VERSION 69 · UPDATED

---

China Primer: U.S.-China Relations
Relations and CRS In Focus IF12120, China’s Economic
Karen M. Sutter, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance
and Trade Ties with Russia.
IF10119
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs


Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10119 · VERSION 69 · UPDATED

---