Updated September 19, 2023
Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues
U.S. policy toward Taiwan has long prioritized the
bureaucratic reasons. The archipelago’s energy, food,
maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
water, internet, and other critical infrastructure systems are
To dissuade the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from
vulnerable to external disruption. According to some
using force to try to gain control of self-governing Taiwan
observers, Taiwan’s civil defense preparedness is
(which officially calls itself the Republic of China or ROC),
insufficient, and Taiwan’s military struggles to recruit,
the United States has supported Taiwan’s military
retain, and train personnel. At a societal level, it is not clear
deterrence efforts. At the same time, the United States has
what costs—in terms of economic security, safety and
been strengthening its ability to deter PRC military
security, and lives—Taiwan’s people would be willing or
aggression in Asia. One challenge for the United States has
able to bear in the face of possible PRC armed aggression.
been how to deepen military ties with Taiwan without
triggering the conflict that U.S. policy seeks to prevent. See
In 2023, U.S. officials have said that a PRC invasion of
CRS In Focus IF10275, Taiwan: Political and Security
Taiwan is “neither imminent nor inevitable.” In February
Issues, for background on Taiwan’s political status, the
2023, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director William J.
unofficial relationship between Taiwan and the United
Burns said that PRC leader Xi Jinping has instructed the
States, and the PRC’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan.
PLA “to be ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion
[of Taiwan]. Now that does not mean that he’s decided to
Taiwan’s Security Situation
conduct an invasion in 2027 or any other year. But it’s a
reminder of the seriousness of his focus and his ambition.”
Advantages
Previously, some U.S. officials had publicly cited specific
Taiwan has a technologically advanced military that is
years in the mid-2020s as possible target dates for a PLA
tasked with deterring—and if necessary, defeating—PRC
attack on Taiwan, sparking alarm and reinvigorating
military aggression against the archipelago. Taiwan enjoys
debates among experts and policymakers about how to
some strategic advantages, including geography and
allocate limited time and resources to shore up Taiwan’s
climate. The Taiwan Strait is 70 nautical miles (nm) wide at
resilience to PRC military aggression.
its narrowest point, and 220 nm wide at its widest. Extreme
weather conditions make the Strait perilous to navigate at
PRC Gray Zone Pressure Against Taiwan
certain times of the year. Moreover, Taiwan’s mountainous
Below the threshold of an all-out attack, the PLA currently
terrain and densely populated coastal areas are largely
is engaging in persistent, low-level, non-combat operations
unsuitable for amphibious landing and invasion operations.
that analysts say are eroding Taiwan’s military advantages
Taiwan’s defense budget is expanding nominally and as a
and readiness. Such PLA “gray zone” actions include:
share of gross domestic product; Taiwan’s 2023 defense
budget of around U.S. $24.6 billion represents nearly a 10%
• large and increasingly complex exercises near Taiwan;
increase from 2022. To increase readiness, Taiwan’s
• near-daily PLA air operations in the vicinity of Taiwan,
leaders are extending compulsory military service and
including frequent sorties across the so-called “median
looking to build robust civil defense capabilities. Taiwan’s
line,” an informal north-south line bisecting the Strait that
defense relationship with the United States (detailed below)
PLA aircraft rarely crossed prior to 2022;
confers political and military advantages as well.
• routine PLA naval patrols on Taiwan’s side of the median
Challenges
line, some as close as 24 nm from Taiwan’s main island;
Taiwan faces an increasingly asymmetric power balance
and
across the Strait. The Communist Party of China’s military,
•
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has undergone a
unmanned combat aerial vehicle flights near and
encircling Taiwan, and reported flights of unmanned
decades-long modernization program focused primarily on
aerial vehicles in the airspace of Kinmen, an outlying
developing the capabilities needed to prevail in a conflict
island of Taiwan located next to the PRC coast.
over Taiwan. Some observers assess that the PLA now is
able, or will soon be able, to execute a range of military
The PRC government often ramps up these gray zone
campaigns against Taiwan. The PLA trains for operations
activities following high-profile engagements between
such as missile strikes, seizures of Taiwan’s small outlying
senior policymakers of the United States (including
islands, blockades, and—the riskiest and most challenging
Members of Congress) and Taiwan. PRC leaders claim that
campaign for the PLA—an amphibious landing and
these engagements are evidence that Washington uses
invasion of Taiwan’s main island.
Taiwan as a “pawn” to undermine and contain China, and
often respond with large-scale military exercises simulating
Taiwan also faces defense challenges at home. Civil-
operations against Taiwan as “a serious warning against
military relations are strained for historical, political, and
Taiwan separatist forces colluding with external forces.”
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues
The normalization of PLA operations ever closer to
military capabilities and use of coercion. They sometimes
Taiwan’s islands in peacetime could undermine Taipei’s
disagree, however, on how to implement such a strategy.
ability to perceive whether the PLA is using “routine”
The U.S. government encourages Taiwan to pursue what it
operations or exercises to obscure preparations for an
calls an “asymmetric” strategy that aims to make Taiwan
attack. If the PLA were to use such operations as cover for
prohibitively costly for the PRC to annex. This approach
an imminent attack, it could significantly shorten the time
envisions Taiwan investing primarily in capabilities that
Taiwan would have to respond.
would allow it to cripple an amphibious invasion through a
combination of anti-ship missiles, naval mines, and other
PRC gray zone activities provide the PLA with training and
similarly small, distributable, and relatively inexpensive
intelligence gathering opportunities. They also strain
Taiwan’s armed forces, which face growing operational and
weapons systems. Some argue that this approach leaves
Taiwan vulnerable to gray zone coercion short of an
maintenance costs associated with responding to frequent
invasion. Uncertainty as to whether, how, and for how long
PLA activities. Some assess that Beijing also seeks to use
Washington might aid Taiwan in the event of an attack
coercive but nonviolent military operations to sow doubt
informs these debates.
and fear in Taiwan’s elites and population about Taiwan’s
military capabilities and create political pressure for Taipei
Arms Transfers
to acquiesce to Beijing’s insistence on unification.
For decades, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been the most
U.S. Support for Taiwan’s Defense, and
visible U.S. contribution to Taiwan’s defense capabilities.
Congress’s Role
In FY2020-2022 combined, Taiwan was the largest
purchaser of U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS); it was the
The United States has maintained unofficial defense ties
fourth-largest purchaser of FMS from FY1950-FY2022
with Taiwan since 1980, when the United States terminated
combined. Some observers argue that Taiwan’s military
a decades-old U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty. The United
remains insufficiently equipped to defeat a possible PRC
States agreed to withdraw all U.S. military personnel from
armed attack. Further, as the war in Ukraine has illuminated
Taiwan the year before, following the establishment of
vulnerabilities in U.S. and partner defense industrial
U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations in January 1979. This
processes, some observers have raised concerns about
unofficial but robust defense relationship—which includes
obstacles to the timely delivery of U.S. defense items to
arms transfers, training, information-sharing, and routine
Taiwan. To address this, 2022’s TERA
bilateral defense dialogues and planning—substantially
contributed to Taiwan’s ability to deter PRC military
• Authorizes for the first time Foreign Military
aggression in the decades since. Congress aimed to enhance
Financing (FMF) for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan: up to
U.S.-Taiwan defense ties in 2022 when it passed the
$2 billion a year in direct loans and loan guarantees and
Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA; Title LV, Subtitle
up to $2 billion a year in grant assistance through
A of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization
FY2027. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023
Act [NDAA] for Fiscal Year 2023, P.L. 117-263, see
(P.L. 117-328) did not appropriate funds for Taiwan
below).
grant assistance. For FY2023, it made up to $2 billion
available for FMF loans, which Taiwan declined.
U.S. Strategy and Policy
The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C.
• Amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
§3301 et seq.) provides the legal basis for U.S. support for
§2318(a)(3)) to make Presidential Drawdown
Taiwan’s defense. The TRA states that it is U.S. policy to
Authority available to Taiwan, authorizing the
“make available to Taiwan such defense articles and
drawdown from Department of Defense stocks of up to
defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to
$1 billion annually in defense articles, services, and
enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
education and training for Taiwan. In July 2023, the
capability” and “to maintain the capacity of the United
Biden Administration notified Congress of its intent to
States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion
exercise this authority to transfer $345 million in
that would jeopardize the security, or the social or
defense items to Taiwan.
economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”
• Requires the executive branch to develop a list of “pre-
cleared” defense items to “fast-track” FMS to Taiwan.
The TRA does not require the United States to defend
Taiwan, but by stating it is U.S. policy to maintain the
In August and September 2023, the State Department
capacity to do so, the TRA creates “strategic ambiguity”
notified Congress of its intent to obligate a total of $135
about U.S. actions in the event of a PRC attack. Some
million for FMF programs for Taiwan ($80 million from
observers, including some Members of Congress, have
the Continuing Appropriations and Ukraine Supplemental
advocated making a formal commitment to defend Taiwan.
Appropriations Act, 2023 [P.L. 117-180], and $55 million
Supporters of such a shift to “strategic clarity” argue that
from FY2022 FMF funds appropriated for Egypt but not
such clarity is necessary to deter an increasingly capable
obligated due to Egypt’s human rights record).
and assertive PRC. Supporters of maintaining strategic
ambiguity argue that the long-standing policy continues to
• The House and Senate versions of an FY2024 NDAA
encourage restraint by both Beijing and Taipei while
(H.R. 2670 and S. 2226) would include several
incentivizing Taipei to invest more in its own defense.
provisions aimed at facilitating weapons transfers to
Taiwan.
Taiwan and U.S. officials agree that Taiwan’s strategy to
deter a PRC attack needs to account for China’s growing
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues

IF12481


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12481 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED

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