Updated September 12, 2023
U.S.-Japan Relations
Overview
fraught because of a territorial dispute and sensitive
Japan, a U.S. treaty ally since 1951, is a constructive U.S.
historical issues stemming from Japan’s colonization of the
partner in several foreign policy areas, particularly security
Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945. Some observers
and trade. Shared security goals include meeting the
question whether this unprecedented arrangement will
challenge of an increasingly powerful People’s Republic of
survive beyond the current leaders, all of whom appear to
China (PRC or China) and countering threats from North
be personally committed to boosting trilateral ties.
Korea. The U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty grants the
United States the right to base U.S. troops—currently
The U.S.-Japan Military Alliance
numbering over 50,000—and military assets on Japan’s
Since the early 2000s, the United States and Japan have
territory in return for a U.S. pledge to protect Japan. The
improved the operational capability of the alliance as a
two countries collaborate bilaterally and multilaterally on
combined force, despite Japanese political and legal
issues such as science and technology, global health,
constraints. Japan has accelerated reforms to make its
energy, and climate change. Japan is the fourth-largest U.S.
military (known as the Self-Defense Forces, or SDF) more
trade partner and the largest source of foreign direct
capable, flexible, and interoperable with U.S. forces. Japan
investment into the United States, and its investors are the
pays roughly $2 billion per year to defray the cost of
largest foreign holders of U.S. Treasury securities.
stationing U.S. military personnel in Japan. In addition,
Congressional oversight of U.S.-Japan relations generally
Japan pays compensation to localities hosting U.S. troops,
focuses on alliance cooperation—particularly on how Japan
rent for the bases, and the costs of new facilities.
and the United States coordinate their China strategies—
and trilateral security relations with South Korea.
About 25% of facilities used by U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ)
and over half of USFJ personnel are stationed in Okinawa,
Within the context of restoring and strengthening U.S.
an island chain that comprises less than 1% of Japan’s total
alliances globally, the Biden Administration positions the
land area. Most Okinawans and Okinawan politicians
U.S.-Japan alliance at the center of its U.S. Indo-Pacific
oppose elements of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa,
strategy, and the two countries coordinate and cooperate on
and Okinawans have long expressed widespread opposition
a range of diplomatic, security, and economic initiatives
to the construction of new U.S. bases in their prefecture.
across the region. Japan has adopted more assertive security
and foreign policy postures since the early 2010s, allowing
Japan Expands Its Defense Posture
more flexibility for the alliance in confronting regional
Japan is constrained in its ability to use military force by its
challenges. Both the U.S. and Japanese governments
U.S.-drafted pacifist constitution, as well as Japanese
distrust Beijing and see China’s rising power and influence
popular hesitation to engage in military conflict. However,
as detrimental to their national security. Japan’s proximity
as perceived threats from North Korea and China have
to China—and the two countries’ maritime and territorial
grown more acute, Japan’s government and populace have
disputes—heightens its concern as well as its incentives to
reconsidered the country’s approach to national security.
manage bilateral tensions. President Biden has embraced
With the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its smaller
the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“the Quad”) with
coalition party Komeito in firm control of the Diet (Japan’s
Japan, Australia, and India as a mechanism to advance
parliament), Kishida has the potential to loosen some of
shared goals in the region and has participated in three
Japan’s long-held restrictions on its military posture.
leader-level Quad meetings. Japan has joined the Biden
Parliamentary elections do not need to be held until 2025.
Administration’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for
Prosperity (IPEF), a regional economic and trade initiative.
In 2022, Kishida’s government released three security
documents that provide a blueprint that could
U.S.-Japan-South Korea Relations
fundamentally reshape the alliance and Japan’s approach to
In August 2023, Biden hosted Prime Minister Fumio
defending itself. The documents label China as an
Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol at
“unprecedented strategic challenge,” declare Japan’s
Camp David for the first-ever summit meeting between the
intention to develop a “counterstrike” capability to attack
leaders of the United States, Japan, and South Korea. At the
enemy missile sites, and outline plans to increase Japan’s
meeting, the three leaders announced several initiatives for
security-related expenditures to 2% of its national gross
a “new era of trilateral partnership” that included pledges to
domestic product (GDP), in line with NATO standards.
convene trilateral meetings at high levels (including an
(Post-war Japan generally has limited defense spending to
annual leaders’ meeting), expand trilateral military
1% of its GDP.) If this increase takes effect, Japan’s
exercises, and abide by a “Commitment to Consult” on
defense budget could become the world’s third-largest. The
regional conflicts and challenges. Biden praised Yoon and
documents do not specify how Japan will implement these
Kishida’s “courageous leadership in transforming relations
goals, or to what extent Japan will pursue them in tandem
between Japan and the ROK,” which have been perennially
with the United States. Japan also has expanded its security
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

U.S.-Japan Relations
cooperation with Australia, the United Kingdom, the
which took effect in 2020, liberalizing some goods trade
Philippines, and India, with the encouragement of the U.S.
and establishing rules on digital trade.
government. Although not as developed or formalized as
the U.S. treaty alliance, these burgeoning relationships
Figure 1. Top U.S. Trade Partners, 2022
indicate efforts by Japan to diversify its defense
partnerships and—potentially—lessen its dependence on
the United States for its security.
Regional Relations
Tokyo is existentially concerned about Beijing’s growing
economic and military power. A perpetual challenge is a

dispute between the two countries (as well as Taiwan) over
Source: CRS; data from Bureau of Economic Analysis.
a group of uninhabited Japan-administered islets in the East
China Sea (known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan, and
Broadly, Kishida’s economic priorities for Japan include
Diaoyu in China). Despite these tensions, which since 2012
supporting supply chain security, broader income
have been fueled in part by frequent operations near the
redistribution, greater use of digital technologies, and green
islands by PRC government vessels, in the 2020s Tokyo
growth. In their first ever “Economic 2+2” meeting in July
and Beijing have largely managed to keep tensions from
2022, U.S. and Japanese officials emphasized shared
escalating. As China has increased economic, diplomatic,
priorities and the need to make their economies more
and military coercion of Taiwan, the Government of Japan
competitive and resilient amid global economic risks and
has framed the prospect of cross-Strait conflict as an urgent
uncertainties. The Japanese government and corporations
challenge. Such a conflict could involve the United States
also have concerns over new mineral-sourcing and
as well as U.S. and Japanese military personnel and assets
localization requirements for electric vehicle (EV) tax
in Japan, especially in Okinawa. China is Japan’s top
credits under P.L. 117-169, commonly referred to as the
trading partner, accounting in 2022 for 20% of Japan’s total
Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA). In March 2023, the
goods trade. (The U.S. share was 14%.)
United States and Japan signed a critical minerals
agreement, which the Administration indicated will qualify
For decades, Japan has pursued productive relations with
Japan as an FTA partner for the purpose of meeting such
Southeast Asian countries, providing official development
requirements. Some Members of Congress have criticized
assistance and earning broadly positive reviews from
the lack of congressional involvement in the agreement and
regional leaders. Japanese officials frequently visit the
Japan’s designation as an FTA partner. IRA provisions
region and the government has launched several initiatives
were motivated in part by U.S. policymakers’ concerns over
that emphasize capacity-building in the security sphere.
U.S. dependence on China for EV batteries and other key
Japan’s approach generally complements U.S. policy
EV components such as processed critical minerals.
toward Southeast Asian countries, with both the United
States and Japan pursuing strong relations with Vietnam
In 2022, Japan joined 13 other countries as an inaugural
and the Philippines in particular. Japan also has developed
negotiating partner in the U.S.-led IPEF initiative, an
stronger relations with countries like Cambodia and Burma
economic arrangement that covers selected trade issues,
than does the United States, which has imposed sanctions
such as digital trade, trade facilitation, labor, and the
and restrictions on interactions with their authoritarian
environment, but not tariff liberalization or other market
regimes. During the Biden and Trump Administrations, the
access provisions. IPEF also addresses issues not typically
United States and Japan have launched initiatives to
covered in FTAs, like supply chain resiliency. In May 2023,
cooperate on infrastructure projects, including many
IPEF partners announced the “substantial conclusion” of a
involving significant public-private partnerships, in
supply chain agreement and released the text in September.
Southeast Asia.
IPEF appears to be the Biden Administration’s response to
concerns that the United States lacked a robust trade agenda
Kishida’s government responded to Russia’s invasion of
in the region following U.S. withdrawal from the proposed
Ukraine forcefully, viewing Russia’s aggression as a threat
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017. Some Members of
to the international rules-based order, and drew potential
Congress and partners like Japan have called for the United
parallels with PRC claims over Taiwan. Japan has adopted
States to consider joining the 11-nation Comprehensive and
most of the sanctions and other penalties against Russia
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
employed by the United States and Europe, and provided
(CPTPP), which Japan helped form after U.S. withdrawal.
humanitarian and material support for Ukraine despite
The Administration is pursuing other bilateral economic
Russia’s threats to curtail energy supplies.
engagement with Japan, including a Task Force on the
Promotion of Human Rights and International Labor
Economic and Trade Issues
Standards in Supply Chains established in early 2023.
The United States and Japan are the world’s largest and
third-largest economies. In 2022, Japan was the fifth-largest
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Coordinator, Specialist in Asian
U.S. trading partner for exports ($120 billion) and imports
Affairs
($188 billion). The United States and Japan do not have a
Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
comprehensive bilateral free trade agreement (FTA). In
Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, Specialist in International
2019, the U.S. and Japan signed two limited trade deals,
Trade and Finance
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

U.S.-Japan Relations

IF10199
Kyla H. Kitamura, Analyst in International Trade and
Finance


Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10199 · VERSION 33 · UPDATED

---