Updated August 29, 2023
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Political and Economic Developments
Cuban Prisoners Defenders (CPD) reported that there were
Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a
1,047 political prisoners at the end of June 2023 (up from
government that has sharply restricted freedoms of
152 on July 1, 2021), of which 806 were imprisoned and
expression, association, assembly, and other basic human
considered prisoners of conscience by CPD, 212 were
rights since the early years of the 1959 Cuban revolution.
under some form of conditional release, and 29 were
imprisoned for other politically motivated acts.
Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro as president in
2018 and as head of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) at
Increased Cooperation with China and Russia
its eighth party congress in April 2021. Cuba’s National
In the aftermath of Venezuela’s economic crisis, Cuba has
Assembly elected Díaz-Canel to a second (final) five-year
increased its commercial and military ties to China and
presidential term in April 2023. The departure of Castro and
other older leaders from the PCC’s Politburo reflects the
Russia. In June 2023, in response to press reports regarding
Cuba-China security cooperation, the Biden Administration
generational change in Cuban leadership that began several
asserted that China had upgraded its intelligence collection
years ago. While in power (2006-2018), Raúl Castro (who
facilities in Cuba in 2019. Cuba also has strengthened its
succeeded his brother, longtime leader Fidel Castro) relaxed
diplomatic and commercial ties to Russia and has resisted
restrictions on private economic activities, but his
international efforts to condemn Russia’s invasion of
government’s slow, gradualist approach did not produce
Ukraine. Among other reported agreements, Russia has
major improvements. Cuba adopted a new constitution in
pledged to deliver 32,000 barrels of oil and oil products per
2019 that introduced some reforms but maintained the
state’s dominance over the economy and the PCC’s
day to Cuba and Cuba has offered to provide 30-year land
concessions to Russian firms in Cuba.
predominant political role.
U.S. Policy
Socioeconomic Conditions
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
The Cuban economy was hard-hit by the economic
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
shutdown associated with the Coronavirus Disease 2019
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
(COVID-19) pandemic and has yet to fully recover. Cuba
isolating the Cuban government. The Obama
reports the economy contracted by 10.9% in 2020 and grew
Administration initiated a policy shift away from sanctions
by 1.3% and 2% in 2021 and 2022, respectively. The Cuban
and toward engagement and the normalization of relations.
government forecasts growth of 3% in 2023. However,
Changes included the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a
according to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Cuba’s
state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015); the
economic output will not return to its pre-pandemic level
restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015); and eased
until 2024. Recovery has been slowed by fuel oil shortages
restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
due to reduced imports from Venezuela, a slower-than-
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
expected return of hard currency-wielding foreign tourists,
(2015-2016). In contrast, the Trump Administration
continuing distortions and inefficiencies in the centrally
introduced new sanctions in 2017, including restrictions on
planned economy, and the effects of U.S. sanctions.
transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban
Cuba unified its dual currency system in 2021; the long-
military. By 2019, the Trump Administration had largely
debated reform contributed to high inflation (with estimates
abandoned engagement and significantly increased
ranging between 150% and 500% in 2021). The EIU
sanctions, particularly on travel and remittances.
estimates that inflation averaged 76% in 2022 and forecasts
In its initial months, the Biden Administration announced it
an average rate of 62% in 2023.
was conducting a review of policy toward Cuba, with
Increased Repression
human rights a core pillar, and would review policy
decisions made by the prior Administration. In the
Beginning in November 2020, the government cracked
aftermath of the Cuban government’s harsh response to the
down on the San Isidro Movement (MSI), a civil society
July 11, 2021 protests, the Biden Administration criticized
group opposed to restrictions on artistic expression. On July
Cuba’s repression and imposed targeted sanctions on those
11, 2021, anti-government demonstrations broke out in
involved, including financial sanctions on three Cuban
Havana and throughout the country, with thousands of
security entities and eight officials, and visa restrictions
Cubans protesting economic conditions (food and medicine
against 50 individuals involved in repressing protesters.
shortages, blackouts) and long-standing concerns about the
lack of political freedoms. The government responded with
In May 2022, the Administration announced several policy
harsh measures, including widespread detentions of
changes aimed at increasing support for the Cuban people.
protesters, civil society activists, and bystanders. Hundreds
It increased immigrant visa processing at the U.S. Embassy
of the July 2021 protestors have been tried and convicted,
in Havana and said it would reinstate the Cuban Family
including more than 30 minors. The human rights group
Reunification Parole (CFRP) program. It eased travel
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
restrictions by reauthorizing scheduled and charter flights to
Terrorism Designations. Since May 2020, pursuant to the
cities beyond Havana and reinstating group people-to-
Arms Export Control Act, the Secretary of State has
people travel. It eased restrictions on sending cash
included Cuba on an annual list of countries certified as not
remittances by eliminating the dollar and frequency limits
cooperating fully with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. In early
for family remittances and reauthorizing donative
January 2021, pursuant to several laws, the Secretary of
remittances to Cuban nationals. In January 2023, the
State redesignated Cuba as a state sponsor of international
Department of Homeland Security launched a new
terrorism, citing its harboring of several U.S. fugitives and
humanitarian parole program allowing up to 30,000
members of Colombia’s National Liberation Army.
individuals per month from Cuba and other selected
countries combined to enter and remain in the United States
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel
for two years with work authorization, subject to
Between late 2016 and May 2018, 26 U.S. Embassy
sponsorship and vetting requirements. As of the end of June
Havana community members suffered a series of
2023, more than 35,000 Cubans had arrived in the United
unexplained injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive
States under the parole program.
issues. Since the initial Havana cases, a number of U.S.
government and military officials worldwide have reported
Irregular Migration
these symptoms. In December 2020, the National
Driven by Cuba’s difficult economic conditions and
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
political repression, irregular Cuban migration to the United
released a report concluding the most plausible mechanism
States has surged over the past two years. U.S. Customs and
for the source of the health symptoms was directed pulsed
Border Protection (CBP) reported over 224,000 border
radio frequency energy. A March 2023 report by the Office
enforcement encounters of Cuban migrants nationwide in
of the Director of National Intelligence assessed the
FY2022, a sixfold increase over FY2021, with the
possibility that a foreign adversary played a role in causing
overwhelming majority at the Southwest land border. For
the injuries as “very unlikely.”
the first ten months of FY2023, CBP reported 171,958
encounters of Cuban migrants. U.S. maritime interdiction of
118th Congress: Selected Actions on Cuba
Cubans also has increased, with the Coast Guard reporting
For FY2024, the Biden Administration requested $15
838 interdictions in FY2021; 6,182 in FY2022; and (as of
million for the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) and $20
August 5, 2023) 6,897 interdictions in FY2023. In
million for Cuba democracy programming. These amounts
November 2022, Cuba agreed to resume accepting
are similar to estimated FY2023 allocations of $13 million
previously suspended U.S. deportation flights of Cubans.
for OCB and $20 million for Cuba democracy
programming. The Department of State, Foreign
Bilateral Meetings
Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) Appropriations
During the Biden Administration, U.S. and Cuban officials
Act, 2024, reported in the House (H.R. 4665/H.Rept. 118-
have resumed previously suspended meetings on selected
146), would provide $35 million for OCB, an additional
issues of bilateral concern. Semiannual talks to review
$10 million related to Cuba broadcasting, and $30 million
implementation of bilateral migration accords resumed in
for Cuba democracy programming. The bill also would
April 2022. In January 2023, U.S. and Cuban officials met
require the Secretary of State to report on, and withhold
in Havana to discuss law enforcement and anti-terrorism
some assistance from, those countries and international
matters under the U.S.-Cuba Law Enforcement Dialogue. In
organizations that are paying the government of Cuba for
March 2023, the Coast Guard hosted a Cuban delegation at
“coerced and trafficked labor of Cuban medical
the Port of Wilmington, NC, as part of the U.S.
professionals.” The FY2024 SFOPS appropriations measure
International Port Security Program.
reported in the Senate (S. 2438/S.Rept. 118-71) would
recommend nearly $13 million for OCB but would not
Selected U.S. Sanctions
specify a funding level for Cuba democracy programs.
Transactions with the Cuban Military. In 2017, the State
Department published a list of entities controlled by the
The House- and Senate-passed versions of the National
Cuban military, intelligence, or security services with
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (H.R. 2670
which direct financial transactions would disproportionately
and S. 2226) would extend through FY2024 a prohibition
benefit those services or personnel at the expense of the
on the use of funds to close or relinquish control of the U.S.
Cuban people or private enterprise. This “Cuba restricted
Naval Station, Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The Senate-passed
list” includes 231 entities (ministries, hotels, businesses).
versions of both bills would further require the Secretary of
Defense to report on the presence and activities in Cuba of
Travel and Remittances. Since 2019, U.S. restrictions
the Russian and Chinese militaries, their potential impact
have prohibited travel by cruise ships and by private and
on U.S. national security, and U.S. policy response options.
corporate aircraft. Since 2020, most U.S. travelers have
been prohibited from staying at over 400 hotels and private
For further information on recent legislative initiatives on
residences identified as owned or controlled by the Cuban
Cuba, see CRS Report R47246, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the
government. A 2020 U.S. prohibition against processing
117th Congress. Also see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba:
remittances through “Cuba restricted list” entities resulted
U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances.
in Western Union suspending its money transfer services to
This In Focus updates an earlier version written by former
Cuba, until revised rules in 2022 authorized the company to
CRS Specialist Mark Sullivan.
issue transfers through local electronic payment processors.
Ramon Miro, Analyst in Latin American Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview

IF10045
Peter J. Meyer, Specialist in Latin American and Canadian
Affairs


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 102 · UPDATED

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