



Updated August 25, 2023

## U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine

The United States has been a leading provider of security assistance to Ukraine, particularly since Russia launched its renewed and expanded invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. From 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, through August 22, 2023, the United States has committed more than \$46 billion in security assistance “to help Ukraine preserve its territorial integrity, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO,” according to the State Department. Of this amount, the Biden Administration has committed more than \$43 billion in security assistance since February 2022.

FY2022 and FY2023 security assistance packages are mostly being funded via \$48.7 billion in supplemental appropriations. This amount includes \$25.93 billion to replenish Department of Defense (DOD) equipment stocks sent to Ukraine via presidential drawdown authority; \$18 billion for DOD’s Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI; P.L. 114-92, §1250); and \$4.73 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF; 22 U.S.C. §2763) for Ukraine and “countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine.”

On August 10, 2023, the Administration submitted to Congress a request for nearly \$24 billion in FY2024 supplemental funding for Ukraine and other international needs. The request includes \$10.5 billion in security assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war, including \$4.5 billion to replenish DOD stocks, \$5 billion for USAI, and \$1 billion in FMF.

Supplemental appropriations also include funds for U.S. European Command operations and related support for the U.S. military. See CRS Insight IN12107, *Department of Defense Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: A Summary*.

### Overview of Programs Since 2014

The United States has used security assistance programs and authorities to help build the defensive capacity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) through train, equip, and advise efforts across multiple spending accounts.

Especially since 2021, the United States has been providing defense items to Ukraine via Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), by which the President can authorize the immediate transfer of articles and services from U.S. stocks, up to a funding cap established in law, in response to an “unforeseen emergency” (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(1)). Since August 2021, the Biden Administration has authorized 44 drawdowns initially valued at nearly \$24 billion (the PDA packages underwent a revaluation, which restored \$6.2 billion that the State Department said may be used to fulfill future PDA packages) (Table 1).

USAI and FMF procurement packages have included training, equipment, and advisory efforts to enhance Ukraine’s defensive capabilities (see Table 2).

Ukraine also has received assistance pursuant to DOD’s security cooperation authorities, notably Building Partner Capacity (10 U.S.C. §333) and Defense Institution Building

(10 U.S.C. §332), as well as International Military Education and Training, which has provided professional military education at U.S. defense institutions for Ukrainian military officers. Other State Department- and DOD-funded security assistance has supported conventional weapons destruction, border security, law enforcement training, and counter-weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

**Table 1. Presidential Drawdowns for Ukraine, FY2021-FY2023** (in millions of dollars)

| FY   | Auth.         | PDA #      | Value   |                 |
|------|---------------|------------|---------|-----------------|
| 2021 | Aug.          | 1          | 60.0    |                 |
|      | Dec.          | 2          | 200.0   |                 |
|      | Feb.          | 3          | 350.0   |                 |
|      | Mar.          | 4, 5       | 1,000.0 |                 |
|      | Apr.          | 6, 7, 8    | 1,700.0 |                 |
|      | May           | 9, 10      | 250.0   |                 |
|      | June          | 11, 12, 13 | 1,500.0 |                 |
|      | July          | 14, 15, 16 | 625.0   |                 |
|      | Aug.          | 17, 18, 19 | 2,325.0 |                 |
| 2022 | Sept.         | 20, 21     | 1,275.0 |                 |
|      | Oct.          | 22, 23, 24 | 1,625.0 |                 |
|      | Nov.          | 25, 26     | 800.0   |                 |
|      | Dec.          | 27, 28     | 1,275.0 |                 |
|      | Jan.          | 29, 30     | 5,350.0 |                 |
|      | Feb.          | 31, 32     | 875.0   |                 |
|      | Mar.          | 33, 34     | 750.0   |                 |
|      | Apr.          | 35, 36     | 825.0   |                 |
|      | May           | 37, 38, 39 | 975.0   |                 |
|      | June          | 40, 41     | 825.0   |                 |
|      | July          | 42, 43     | 1,200.0 |                 |
|      | Aug.          | 44         | 200.0   |                 |
|      | <b>Total:</b> |            |         | <b>23,985.0</b> |

**Sources:** Department of State and Department of Defense press releases through August 18, 2023.

Through the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine, established in 2015, the U.S. Army and National Guard, together with military trainers from U.S. allies, provided training, mentoring, and doctrinal assistance to the UAF before the war. This training mission was suspended at the outset of Russia’s invasion. Subsequently, DOD and U.S. allies resumed training Ukrainian personnel, outside Ukraine, both to operate weapon systems and at the collective unit level. Separately, U.S. Special Operations Forces have trained and advised Ukrainian special forces.

### Provision of Defense Equipment

After Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, the Obama Administration provided Ukraine nonlethal security assistance. In 2017, the Trump Administration announced U.S. readiness to provide lethal weapons to Ukraine.

**Table 2. Selected U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, FY2016-FY2023**

(selected account allocations, in millions of dollars)

|   | FY16  | FY17  | FY18  | FY19  | FY20  | FY21  | FY22                 | FY23                                       |
|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|----------------------|--|
| Foreign Military Financing (FMF)              | 85.0  | 99.0  | 95.0  | 115.0 | 115.0 | 115.0 | 1,317.6 <sup>a</sup> | —  |
| Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) | 226.5 | 148.6 | 195.5 | 214.8 | 256.7 | 275.7 | 6,300.0 (obl.)       | 11,700.0 (obl.)<br>out of 12,300.0 (appr.) |

**Sources:** State Department congressional budget justifications, Department of Defense budget requests, P.L. 117-103, P.L. 117-128, P.L. 117-180, P.L. 117-328. Table data valid through August 18, 2023.

a. FMF assistance from FY2022 Ukraine supplemental appropriations also has been provided to other European allies and partners.

According to DOD, USAI packages prior to FY2022 provided sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, counter-artillery radars, Mark VI patrol boats, electronic warfare detection and secure communications, satellite imagery and analysis capability, counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS), air surveillance systems, night vision devices, and equipment to support military medical treatment and combat evacuation procedures.

Since 2018, Ukraine also has used FMF, as well as some of its national funds, to procure U.S. defense equipment, including Javelin anti-armor missiles and Mark VI patrol boats purchased through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. In addition, Ukraine has purchased firearms; ammunition; ordnance; and other equipment directly from U.S. suppliers via Direct Commercial Sales.

Since 2022, the United States has provided more advanced defense equipment to Ukraine, as well as greater amounts of previously provided equipment. According to DOD, U.S. security assistance committed to Ukraine as of August 14, 2023, has included the following:

- 38 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and ammunition;
- 12 National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS); 1 Patriot air defense battery; and other air defense systems;
- 31 Abrams tanks, 45 T-72B tanks and 186 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles;
- 300 M113 and 189 Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers;
- 2,000+ Stinger anti-aircraft systems;
- 10,000+ Javelin anti-armor systems and 80,000+ other anti-armor systems;
- Phoenix Ghost Tactical, Switchblade Tactical, and other UAS;
- 198 155 mm and 72 105 mm Howitzers and artillery;
- 182 mortar systems;
- Remote Anti-Armor Mine (RAAM) Systems;
- 7,000+ Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles, high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMs), and laser-guided rocket systems;
- 35,000+ grenade launchers and small arms;
- communications, radar, and intelligence equipment; and
- training, maintenance, and sustainment.

In addition, the Administration has approved or preliminarily approved third-party transfers of U.S.-origin defense articles and equipment, including F-16 aircraft, from several NATO and EU members to Ukraine. NATO and EU members and other allies state they have committed at least \$30 billion in security assistance to Ukraine.

## Recent Legislation

Prior to and immediately following Russia's renewed invasion of Ukraine, Congress authorized or proposed

increased funding levels for existing security assistance authorities. Congress increased the PDA funding cap (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(1)) from \$100 million up to \$11 billion for FY2022 via P.L. 117-128 and up to \$14.5 billion for FY2023 via P.L. 117-328. The Administration's FY2024 supplemental request proposes a cap of \$1.1 billion.

P.L. 117-328 continues provisions from P.L. 117-128 that require the Secretaries of State and Defense to report on measures taken to account for the end-use of U.S. weapons transferred to Ukraine. The act also continues a requirement for monthly descriptions of U.S. security assistance provided to Ukraine since February 24, 2022, including a comprehensive list of provided defense articles and services, as well as associated authorities and funding.

In addition, P.L. 117-328 appropriated \$6 million for the DOD Inspector General to carry out reviews of DOD activities to execute funds in the bill. The Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-118) provides means to bypass bureaucratic barriers for leasing or lending U.S. defense articles to Ukraine.

## Discussion on Future Assistance

U.S. policy increasingly has recognized the UAF's ability to employ and operate advanced weaponry, including systems capable of supporting Ukraine's counter-offensive operations. Much of U.S. assistance has been focused on providing capabilities that Ukraine's domestic defense industry cannot produce, as well as those that can be immediately deployed on the battlefield to increase the UAF's resilience and ability to sustain offensive combat operations. In addition to advanced rocket and missile systems, these include protected mobility assets (such as armored vehicles), artillery and ammunition, communication, and intelligence support.

Ukrainian officials have sought to acquire other advanced systems, including more Western battle tanks, fighter aircraft, long-range missiles, and additional air defense capabilities. Increasingly, the provision of security assistance to Ukraine also is focused on improving the UAF's medium- to long-term capabilities, including transitioning towards more NATO-standard weaponry and improving the UAF's ability to service and repair defense equipment provided.

Debate continues about the prospects for Ukraine's counter-offensive, potential for escalation, and the ability of the U.S. defense industrial base to supply growing demands. The Biden Administration reportedly has received Ukrainian assurances that the UAF will not use U.S.-provided long-range weapons to attack Russian territory.

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