August 24, 2023
Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues
U.S. policy toward Taiwan has long prioritized the
vulnerable to external disruption. Civil defense
maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
preparedness is insufficient, according to some observers,
To dissuade the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from
and Taiwan’s military struggles to recruit, retain, and train
using force to try to gain control of self-governing Taiwan
personnel. At a societal level, it is not clear what costs—in
(which officially calls itself the Republic of China), the
terms of economic security, well-being, safety and security,
United States has supported Taiwan’s military deterrence
and lives—Taiwan’s people would be willing or able to
efforts and sought to strengthen Taiwan’s own capability to
bear in the face of possible PRC armed aggression.
deter PRC military aggression in the region. One challenge
for the United States has been how to deepen military ties
In 2023, U.S. officials have said on several occasions that a
with Taiwan without triggering the conflict that U.S. policy
PRC invasion of Taiwan is “neither imminent nor
seeks to prevent. See CRS In Focus IF10275, Taiwan:
inevitable.” In February 2023, U.S. Central Intelligence
Political and Security Issues, for background on Taiwan’s
Agency Director William J. Burns said that PRC leader Xi
political status, the unofficial relationship between Taiwan
Jinping has instructed the PLA “to be ready to conduct a
and the United States, and the PRC’s claim to sovereignty
successful invasion [of Taiwan]. Now that does not mean
over Taiwan.
that he’s decided to conduct an invasion in 2027 or any
other year. But it’s a reminder of the seriousness of his
Taiwan’s Security Situation
focus and his ambition.” Previously, U.S. officials had
publicly cited specific years in the mid-2020s as possible
Advantages
target dates for a PLA attack on Taiwan, sparking alarm
Taiwan has a technologically advanced military that is
and reinvigorating debates among experts and policymakers
tasked with deterring—and if necessary, defeating—PRC
about how to allocate limited time and resources to shore up
military aggression against the archipelago. Taiwan enjoys
Taiwan’s resilience to PRC military aggression.
some military advantages, including geography and
climate: the Taiwan Strait is 70 nautical miles (nm) wide at
PRC Gray Zone Pressure Against Taiwan
its narrowest point, and 220 nm wide at its widest; extreme
Below the threshold of an all-out attack, the PLA currently
weather conditions make the Strait perilous to navigate at
is engaging in persistent, low-level, non-combat operations
certain times of the year. Moreover, Taiwan’s mountainous
that analysts say are eroding Taiwan’s military advantages
terrain and densely populated coastal areas are largely
and readiness. Such “gray zone” actions include:
unsuitable for amphibious landing and invasion operations.
Taiwan’s defense budget is expanding nominally and as a
• large and increasingly complex military exercises;
share of gross domestic product; Taiwan’s 2023 defense
• near-daily PLA air operations in the vicinity of Taiwan,
budget of around U.S. $24.6 billion represents nearly a 10%
including frequent sorties across the so-called “median
increase from 2022. Taiwan’s defense relationship with the
line,” an informal boundary bisecting the Taiwan Strait
United States (detailed below) confers a range of political
that PLA aircraft rarely crossed prior to 2022;
and military advantages as well.
• routine PLA naval patrols on the Taiwan side of the
Challenges
median line, some as close as 24 nm from Taiwan’s main
Taiwan faces an increasingly asymmetric power balance
island; and
across the Strait. The Communist Party of China’s military,
•
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has undergone a
unmanned combat aerial vehicle flights near and
encircling Taiwan, and reported flights of unmanned
decades-long modernization program focused primarily on
aerial vehicles in the airspace of Kinmen, an outlying
developing the capabilities needed to prevail in a conflict
island of Taiwan located next to the PRC coast.
over Taiwan. Some observers assess that the PLA now is
able, or will soon be able, to execute a range of military
The PRC government often ramps up these gray zone
campaigns against Taiwan. The PLA trains for operations
activities following high-profile engagements between
such as missile strikes, seizures of Taiwan’s small outlying
senior policymakers of the United States (including
islands, blockades, and—the riskiest and most challenging
Members of Congress) and Taiwan. PRC leaders claim that
campaign for the PLA—an amphibious landing and
these engagements are evidence that Washington uses
invasion of Taiwan’s main island.
Taiwan as a “pawn” to undermine and contain China, and
often respond with large-scale military exercises simulating
Taiwan also faces defense challenges at home. Civil-
operations against Taiwan as “a serious warning against
military relations are strained for historical, political, and
Taiwan separatist forces colluding with external forces.”
bureaucratic reasons. The archipelago’s energy, food,
water, internet, and other critical infrastructure systems are
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Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues
The normalization of PLA operations ever closer to
disagree, however, on how to implement such a strategy.
Taiwan’s main island in peacetime could undermine
The U.S. government encourages Taiwan to pursue what it
Taipei’s ability to perceive whether the PLA is using
calls an “asymmetric” strategy, that aims to make Taiwan
“routine” operations or exercises to obscure preparations
prohibitively costly and destructive for the PRC to annex.
for an attack. If the PLA were to use such operations as
This approach envisions Taiwan slowing and crippling an
cover for an imminent attack, it could significantly shorten
amphibious invasion through a combination of anti-ship
the time Taiwan would have to respond.
missiles, naval mines, and similarly small, distributable,
and relatively inexpensive weapons systems. Some in
PRC gray zone activities provide the PLA with training and
Taiwan argue that this approach leaves Taiwan vulnerable
intelligence gathering opportunities. They also strain
Taiwan’s armed forces, which face growing operational and
to current and potential future gray zone coercion short of
an invasion. Uncertainty as to whether, how, and for how
maintenance costs associated with responding to frequent
long Washington might aid Taiwan in the event of an attack
PLA activities. Some assess that Beijing also seeks to use
informs these debates.
coercive but nonviolent operations to sow doubt and fear in
Taiwan’s elites and population about Taiwan’s military
Arms Transfers
capabilities and create political pressure for Taipei to
For decades, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been the most
acquiesce to Beijing’s insistence on cross-Strait unification.
visible U.S. contribution to Taiwan’s defense capabilities.
U.S. Support for Taiwan’s Defense, and
In fiscal years 2020-2022 combined, Taiwan was the largest
Congress’s Role
purchaser of U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) globally; it
was the fourth-largest purchaser of total FMS from
The United States has maintained unofficial defense ties
FY1950-FY2022. The scale of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan
with Taiwan since 1980, when it terminated a decades-old
notwithstanding, many observers argue that Taiwan’s
U.S.-Taiwan mutual defense treaty. The United States
military is insufficiently equipped to defeat a possible PRC
agreed to withdraw all U.S. military personnel from the
armed attack. Further, as the war in Ukraine has illuminated
island the year before, following the establishment of U.S.-
vulnerabilities in U.S. and partner defense industrial
PRC diplomatic relations in January 1979. This unofficial
processes, observers have raised concerns about
but robust defense relationship—which encompasses arms
impediments to the timely delivery of U.S. defense items to
transfers, training, information-sharing, and routine bilateral
Taiwan. To address this, the TERA:
defense dialogues and planning—substantially contributed
to Taiwan’s ability to deter PRC military aggression in the
• Authorizes (for the first time) Foreign Military
decades since. Congress aimed to enhance U.S.-Taiwan
Financing (FMF) assistance for U.S. arms sales to
defense ties in 2022 when it passed the Taiwan Enhanced
Taiwan: up to $2 billion a year in direct loans and loan
Resilience Act (TERA; Title LV, Subtitle A of the James
guarantees and up to $2 billion a year in grant assistance
M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] for
through FY2027. The Consolidated Appropriations Act,
Fiscal Year 2023, P.L. 117-263, see below).
2023 (P.L. 117-328) did not appropriate funds for grant
assistance. It made up to $2 billion available for FMF
U.S. Strategy and Policy
loans to Taiwan in FY2023, but Taiwan indicated it
The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C.
does not plan to use the loan assistance.
§3301 et seq.) provides the legal basis for U.S. support for
•
Taiwan’s defense. The TRA states that it is U.S. policy to
Amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
“make available to Taiwan such defense articles and
§2318(a)(3)) to make Presidential Drawdown
Authority available to Taiwan, allowing the drawdown
defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to
from Department of Defense stocks of up to $1 billion
enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability” and “to maintain the capacity of the United
per fiscal year in defense articles, services, and
education and training for Taiwan. In July 2023, the
States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion
Biden Administration notified Congress of its intent to
that would jeopardize the security, or the social or
economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”
exercise this authority to transfer $345 million worth of

defense items to Taiwan.
The TRA does not require the United States to defend
• Requires the executive branch to “fast-track” FMS to
Taiwan, but by stating that it is U.S. policy to maintain the
Taiwan by developing a list of “pre
capacity to do so, the TRA creates “strategic ambiguity”
-cleared” defense
items for the island and to “prioritize and expedite”
about U.S. actions in the event of a PRC attack on Taiwan.
FMS requests from Taiwan.
Some observers, including some Members of Congress,
have advocated changing U.S. policy by making a formal
The House- and Senate-passed bill for an FY2024 NDAA
commitment to defend Taiwan. Supporters of this proposed
(H.R. 2670) would include several provisions related to
shift to “strategic clarity” argue that such clarity is
Taiwan’s security. Among these are a report requirement on
necessary to deter an increasingly capable and assertive
the consequences of a war with China (§1355), a
PRC. Supporters of maintaining strategic ambiguity argue
requirement to pursue Taiwan’s eligibility for exemptions
that the longstanding policy continues to encourage
to certain export control licensing requirements (§6242),
restraint by both Beijing and Taipei while incentivizing
and a temporary authorization of procurement flexibilities
Taipei to invest more in its own defense.
to expedite munitions transfers to Taiwan (§1347).
Taiwan and U.S. officials agree that Taiwan’s strategy to
deter a PRC attack needs to account for China’s growing
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
military capabilities and use of coercion. They sometimes
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Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues

IF12481


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12481 · VERSION 1 · NEW

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