Updated August 15, 2023
Crisis in Mali
Once seen as a regional democratic leader, Mali has
Figure 1. Mali at a Glance
become an epicenter of conflict and instability over the past
decade. Insurgent groups affiliated with Al Qaeda and the
Islamic State operate widely and have spread across Mali’s
borders. Other armed groups, ethnic militias, and criminal
bands are also active, some with apparent state backing. A
military junta seized power in 2020 and ousted civilian
transition leaders the following year—heralding a wave of
coups in the region.
The junta has overseen major shifts in Mali’s foreign
relations and security partnerships, embracing Russia and
rejecting former colonial power France along with U.N.
peacekeepers. In 2021, the junta contracted with Russia’s
Wagner Group, a nominally private military company
(PMC), to assist counterinsurgency operations. In 2022,
amid a diplomatic rift with Bamako, France withdrew over
2,000 troops from Mali, ending a decadelong U.S.-
supported counterterrorism operation. In June 2023,
Bamako called for the withdrawal of the U.N. peacekeeping
operation in Mali, MINUSMA. Malian officials had

previously placed growing restrictions on MINUSMA,
Source: CRS graphic. Data from CIA World Factbook, IMF, UNAIDS.
hindering its ability to fulfill its mandate. In early 2023,
Mali expelled the top U.N. human rights official. Wagner’s
Background. Mali has been in crisis since 2012, when a
entry and MINUSMA’s pending exit have strained an
northern separatist rebellion led by members of the minority
already fragile 2015 peace deal between the government
ethnic Tuareg community paved the way for a military coup
and northern separatist rebels; clashes between the military
and an Islamist insurgent advance. Rebels—bolstered by
and signatory groups erupted in the north in August 2023.
arms from Libya and fighters with ties to Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)—declared an independent state
Colonel Assimi Goïta, a member of Mali’s special forces, is
of “Azawad” in the north. By mid-2012, AQIM and two
serving as Mali’s “Transition President,” and populist
allied groups had outmaneuvered the separatists to assert
politician Choguel Maïga as the junta-appointed prime
control over much of the north.
minister. Military officers hold key cabinet posts and lead
the interim legislature. Under pressure from the Economic
At the transitional government’s request, France deployed
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which
its military in early 2013 to counter an Islamist insurgent
imposed broad economic sanctions for six months in 2022,
advance and ousted insurgent leaders from major towns in
the junta agreed to hold elections in February 2024 in which
the north. A U.N. peacekeeping operation, MINUSMA, was
current leaders would not be candidates. Whether Mali will
established in mid-2013 to help stabilize the country,
adhere to these commitments is uncertain, however. A new
absorbing a nascent African-led intervention force. Veteran
constitution adopted by referendum in June 2023
politician Ibrahim Boubacar Kéïta was elected president, at
concentrates power in the presidency and could pave the
which point donors, including the United States, normalized
way for Goïta to run for president.
relations with Bamako. French forces transitioned into
Operation Barkhane, a regional counterterrorism mission
Although the junta has struggled to improve security and
that received U.S. military logistical support, in 2014.
address economic hardships, it has arguably drawn popular
support from its face-off with France, the U.N., separatist
Under international pressure to reach a peace deal in the
groups, and other West African leaders. Rights groups
north, the government signed an accord in 2015 with two
accuse the junta and its supporters of intimidating and
armed coalitions: one led by ex-separatists, and the other by
repressing critics; the government has also banned or
pro-unity groups with ties to Bamako. Mediated by Algeria
suspended several French and local media outlets. Bamako
with international backing, the accord aimed to address
has sought to drive a wedge within ECOWAS, rejecting
Tuareg political grievances, reestablish state authority in the
regional sanctions on neighboring Niger in response to a
north, demobilize rebel fighters, promote northern
military seizure of power there in July 2023, and pledging
economic development, and isolate designated terrorist
to defend Niger’s junta against a threatened regional
groups, which were not party to the talks. Implementation
military intervention. In 2022, Mali withdrew from the G5
lagged, however, and signatory groups maintained parallel
Sahel, a donor-backed grouping that had sought to
governance structures. Meanwhile, armed groups multiplied
coordinate military operations.
and Islamist insurgencies expanded into central Mali.
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Crisis in Mali
President Kéïta was reelected in 2018, but opposition
Economic and Humanitarian Conditions
mounted over corruption, allegedly fraudulent legislative
Landlocked and arid with high population growth, Mali is
elections, insecurity, and economic hardships. Large street
among the world’s poorest and least developed countries.
protests erupted against Kéïta’s administration in mid-2020.
Gold and cotton exports are the backbone of the formal
State security forces cracked down on protesters, and
economy; the vast majority of Malians are engaged in
ECOWAS mediators failed to achieve a road-map out of
farming, livestock, and fishing. Conflicts have internally
the impasse. The 2020 coup d’état followed.
displaced over 400,000 Malians and shuttered some 1,500
Islamist Insurgencies
schools; nearly 9 million Malians (over 40%) are reportedly
in need of humanitarian assistance in 2023. Several parts of
The most potent insurgent force in Mali appears to be the
the country are at crisis-level food insecurity in 2023, with
Union for Supporting Islam and Muslims (aka JNIM), led
possible emergency-level (worse) projected for the
by Iyad Ag Ghaly, a Malian national and ethnic Tuareg.
northeastern Menaka region. Mali has one of the world’s
State Department public reports suggest that JNIM is the
highest rates of acute malnutrition; over 30% of children
second-largest Al Qaeda affiliate in Africa (after Somalia’s
under five years old exhibit stunted growth.
Al Shabaab), with some 1,000-2,000 fighters. JNIM is
primarily active in north/central Mali and northern Burkina
U.S. Policy and Aid
Faso, and appears to be expanding into southern Mali and
U.S. policymakers have sought to improve stability and
coastal West Africa. In Mali, the group has led attacks on
development, counter terrorism, and address humanitarian
French, U.N., regional, and local security forces, along with
needs in Mali, although the tools available for doing so
local officials, traditional leaders, and perceived civilian
have progressively diminished. Over the past decade, the
collaborators. JNIM has reportedly broadened its footprint
United States has supported multiple stabilization initiatives
by offering security and judicial services to local
(e.g., the G5 Sahel “joint force,” France’s Operation
communities that may view the state and rival armed
Barkhane, and MINUSMA), none of which are fully
groups as ineffective and/or abusive.
operational today. Legislative and policy restrictions have
constrained U.S. security and development cooperation
A separate AQIM offshoot has affiliated with the Islamic
with Mali and a growing number of neighboring states.
State (IS) and claimed the 2017 deadly ambush of U.S.
Successive Administrations have called for implementation
soldiers in neighboring Niger. This group rebranded in
of the 2015 peace accord, which may now be moribund.
2022 as IS-Sahel Province, an apparent elevation within the
U.S. officials have voiced concern that the junta’s
IS global network. IS-Sahel has repeatedly carried out large
civilian massacres as a tactic, in contrast to JNIM’s more
partnership with Wagner and MINUSMA’s withdrawal in
2023 will worsen security and humanitarian conditions.
targeted and governance-centric approach. IS-Sahel has
competed with JNIM for recruits, and the two have fought
Aid. The United States allocated $147 million in bilateral
each other in northeastern Mali, an IS-Sahel stronghold.
aid for Mali in FY2022 (latest public data)—focusing on
health, agriculture, education, and governance—along with
These insurgencies have proven resilient, withstanding
$90 million in emergency humanitarian assistance and $362
nearly a decade of French military strikes and multilateral
million for MINUSMA’s budget. The Administration has
stabilization efforts by exploiting local tensions and
proposed $142 million in bilateral aid for Mali in FY2024.
grievances. Abuses by state security forces and their militia
Certain aid to the government of Mali, including military
and PMC allies appear to have spurred insurgent
aid, has been subject to coup-related legal restrictions since
recruitment. Mali’s military leaders have expanded combat
2020 (see CRS In Focus IF11267, Coup-Related
operations against JNIM, bolstered by newly acquired
Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid Appropriations). Mali has
Russian aircraft and Wagner Group logistical support.
also been subject to security aid restrictions under the Child
While operations may clear JNIM from some areas, holding
Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (Title IV of P.L. 110-457).
and stabilizing them is likely more challenging. JNIM
Sanctions. In July 2023, the Biden Administration imposed
carried out a coordinated assault on the military base
financial and visa sanctions on Mali’s Minister of Defense
outside Bamako where President Goïta resides in July 2022,
and two top Malian Air Force officials under a Russia-
and the kidnapping of a German priest within Bamako city
related executive order, citing ties with the Wagner Group.
limits in November 2022. In April 2023, JNIM claimed an
This followed U.S. sanctions designations of two Russian
attack on a key Malian base in the central town of Sevaré.
nationals identified as key Wagner operatives in Mali. The
Wagner Group Role. Although Wagner’s future is
Administration also imposed visa restrictions on two mid-
uncertain following its June 2023 mutiny in Russia,
level Malian military commanders, citing their role in a
Moscow has asserted that Africa operations will continue.
civilian massacre in central Mali. In 2022, the
Some 1,000-1,600 Wagner personnel were reportedly in
Administration designated the son of deposed former
Mali as of mid-2023. Most are reportedly supporting
President Kéïta under the “Global Magnitski” sanctions
Malian military operations in central Mali. The head of U.S.
program, citing corruption. Separately, in line with U.N.
Africa Command (AFRICOM) stated in 2022 that Bamako
Security Council actions, the United States has designated
had agreed to pay Wagner $10 million per month. U.S.
five individuals linked to armed groups under a Mali-
officials have accused Wagner of using gold mined in Mali
specific sanctions program. Other Malian and Mali-based
(and elsewhere in Africa) to finance operations in Ukraine;
individuals and groups are under U.S. terrorism sanctions.
of seeking to move weapons via Mali for use in Ukraine;
and of helping to “engineer” MINUSMA’s exit
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
. Street
protests in Bamako have increasingly featured pro-Russia,
IF10116
anti-France, and anti-U.N. messages.
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Crisis in Mali


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10116 · VERSION 19 · UPDATED

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