August 9, 2023
The Intelligence Community’s Foreign Malign Influence Center
(FMIC)
Foreign Malign Influence
Prior to the establishment of FMIC, an ODNI Election
Congress defines foreign malign influence in 50 U.S.C.
Threats Executive managed the intelligence community’s
§3059(f)(2) as a “hostile effort undertaken by, at the
election-related foreign intelligence collection. Legislation
direction of, or on behalf of, or with the substantial support
to establish the center stated that the intelligence
of” specifically Russia, Iran, North Korea, China, or “any
community needed to be invested in
other foreign country that the Director of the center
determines appropriate,” to influence U.S. public opinion or
institutionalizing ongoing, robust, independent, and
“political, military, economic, or other policies or
vigorous analysis of data related to foreign threat
activities” of federal, state, or local governments. This
networks … [to] help counter ongoing information
includes efforts by such foreign governments to influence
warfare operations against the United States, its
“any election within the United States.”
allies, and its partners. (H.Rept. 116-333, emphasis
FMIC Background
added)
Congress established the Foreign Malign Influence Center

(FMIC) under Section 5322 of the Damon Paul Nelson and
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for
Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC)
Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (P.L. 116-92, codified as
• Congress establishes FMIC, Dec. 20, 2019, as an ODNI
50 U.S.C. §3059), amending the National Security Act of
mission center
1947 (P.L. 80-253).
• DNI activates FMIC, Sept. 23, 2022
General concern over the potential for foreign interference
• FMIC’s mission is to provide indications and warning and
in U.S. elections has grown with the recognition that
strategic assessments of the threat of malign influence
foreign malign actors are able to employ sophisticated tools
campaigns by Russia, Iran, and North Korea, China, etc.
such as artificial intelligence (AI) to conduct disinformation
• Reports to Congress annually
campaigns. Congress created the center for policymakers to
• Is to sunset Dec. 31, 2028, at discretion of the DNI
better understand and respond to such threats.
• After FMIC termination, intelligence community would
retain responsibility for assessing and providing warning of
FMIC is one of five mission centers within the Office of the
the threat of foreign efforts to interfere with U.S.
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The other centers
elections.
include the National Counterintelligence Center (NCTC),
the National Counterintelligence and Security Center

(NCSC), the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity
FMIC Functions
Center (NCBC), and the Cyber Threats Intelligence
Integration Center (CTIIC). The purpose of the ODNI
In statute, the center’s functions are to (1) “serve as the
mission centers is to integrate and coordinate the foreign
primary organization in the United States Government for
intelligence collection and analysis related to a subject area
analyzing and integrating all intelligence … pertaining to
requiring special emphasis, such as counterterrorism,
foreign malign influence;” and (2) provide Members of
biosecurity, or—for the FMIC—efforts by foreign malign
Congress and policymakers in the federal government
“comprehensive assessments, and indicati
actors to subvert the U.S. democratic process.
ons and warnings,
of foreign malign influence.” To carry out these functions,
FMIC’s establishment follows the intelligence community’s
the center is to be properly staffed with analysts from across
collective assessment that
the intelligence community with access to all the
intelligence necessary to provide comprehensive
assessments and warnings of the threat of foreign malign
Russian efforts to influence the 2016 U.S.
influence campaigns.
presidential election represent the most recent
expression of Moscow’s longstanding desire to
FMIC Organization
undermine the U.S.-led liberal democratic order,
The Director of the center, who is appointed by the Director
but these [2016] activities demonstrated a
of National Intelligence (DNI), is dual-hatted as the
significant escalation in directness, level of activity,
Election Threats Executive. This individual is responsible
and scope of effort … Russia’s goals were to
for the overall effort to coordinate foreign intelligence
undermine public faith in the U.S. democratic
collection and analysis on malign efforts to influence U.S.
process. (ICA-2017-01D, 6 January 2017, p. ii).
elections. The center itself is organized into three units: (1)
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The Intelligence Community’s Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC)
Mission Management, (2) Analytic Integration, and (3)
both the capacity and intent for other elements to assume
Partner Engagement.
the functions of the center. This notification would need to
include a timeline of the actions necessary for an orderly
Mission Management
transition.
The Mission Management unit is responsible for managing
intelligence collection requirements on foreign malign
Issues Facing Congress
influence, and integrating what is collected “across
In its oversight responsibility, Congress may consider
intelligence functions, disciplines, and activities to achieve
FMIC’s effectiveness, funding, and management of the
unity of effort and effect.” (ICD 900, 6 May 2013) The
intelligence community’s collection and analysis of foreign
center fuses intelligence from multiple sources as the basis
malign influence campaigns. Some questions that may be
for making threat assessments. The primary intelligence
considered include:
community elements that collect on foreign malign
influence include the National Security Agency (NSA), the
• To what degree, if any, has the center improved the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of
capacity of the intelligence community to manage
Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Homeland
collection, analysis and reporting related to the threat of
Security (DHS). The Mission Management group also
foreign malign influence campaigns?
works closely with the National Intelligence Management
Council (NIM-C), the ODNI entity responsible for advising
• Absent the center, what is the current capacity of the
the DNI on regional and functional issues of importance to
intelligence community to synthesize and report on
U.S. national security.
foreign malign influence campaigns?
Analytic Integration
• Does the center have adequate resources to carry out its
FMIC does not collect raw foreign intelligence, but is
functions in the event that advances in cyber technology,
staffed with analysts from across the intelligence
such as AI, contribute to an expanded threat of foreign
community, including the Departments of State, Homeland
malign influence campaigns?
Security, and the FBI, who analyze the foreign intelligence
other intelligence agencies collect. The center uses this
• How closely have the intelligence community and the
intelligence to produce Indications & Warning (I&W)
center adhered to statutory protections of the civil
reports and assessments for policymakers and Congress.
liberties of U.S. persons while carrying out their
mandate to collect and report on foreign malign
Partner Engagement
influence campaigns?
Outside of the intelligence community, FMIC works with
other domestic partners. These include, among others: (1)
Relevant Statutes
the FBI Foreign Influence Task Force (FBI FITF), the lead
federal organization responsible for investigating foreign
Title 50 U.S. Code §3059
influence operations; (2) the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the lead agency for
coordinating efforts to defend U.S. critical infrastructure—
CRS Products
including federal elections infrastructure—from malign
CRS In Focus IF12061, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience:
foreign actors in cyberspace; and (3) the U.S. Election
Countering Russian and Other Nation-State Cyber Threats, by Brian
Assistance Commission (EAC). The center also is able to
E. Humphreys
work with international partners on matters of mutual
CRS In Focus IF11445, The Election Infrastructure Subsector:
interest related to foreign malign influence campaigns.
Development and Challenges, by Brian E. Humphreys and Karen L.
Annual Report
Shanton
Each year the FMIC Director is required to submit a report
to the congressional intelligence and foreign affairs/foreign
Other Resources
relations committees (50 U.S.C. 5039 (d)). This report must
IC Assessment, Foreign Threats to the 2020 U.S. Federal Elections,
summarize significant foreign malign influence events and
ICA 2020-00078D, 10 March 2021.
provide recommendations to improve FMIC performance.
IC Assessment, Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent
The report should also include any recommendations for
U.S. Elections, ICA-2017-01D, 6 January 2017.
navigating the challenges of the intelligence community’s
IC Directive 900, Integrated Mission Management, 6 May 2013.
collecting and reporting on foreign efforts to interfere in
U.S. elections and the need to protect the privacy and civil
IC Directive 107, Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency, February
liberties of Americans who could be the targets of such
28, 2018.
campaigns.

Sunset Provision
The DNI has the authority under (50 U.S.C. 5039 (e)) to
Michael E. DeVine, Analyst in Intelligence and National
terminate the center on December 31, 2028, upon notifying
Security
the congressional intelligence committees and the
committees on appropriations subcommittees on defense in
IF12470
the House and Senate that the intelligence community has
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The Intelligence Community’s Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC)


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12470 · VERSION 1 · NEW

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