Updated August 8, 2023
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions
For over 17 years, the United States has imposed sanctions
Traffickers pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
in response to activities of the Venezuelan government and
Designation Act (P.L. 106-120, Title VIII; 21 U.S.C. 1901
Venezuelan individuals. The earliest sanctions imposed
et seq.). Designated individuals include current and former
related to Venezuela’s lack of cooperation on antidrug and
Venezuelan officials.
counterterrorism efforts. The Obama Administration
imposed targeted sanctions against individuals for human
Targeted Sanctions Related to Antidemocratic
rights abuses, corruption, and antidemocratic actions. The
Actions, Human Rights Violations, and Corruption
Trump Administration expanded economic sanctions in
In response to increasing repression in Venezuela, Congress
response to the increasing authoritarianism of President
enacted the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil
Nicolás Maduro (in power since 2013) and in an effort to
Society Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-278; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
back the interim government led by Juan Guaidó (2019-
Among its provisions, the law required the President to
2022). Despite sanctions, Maduro consolidated power and
impose sanctions against those whom the President
the Unity Platform of opposition parties dissolved the
identified as responsible for significant acts of violence,
interim government led by Guaidó in late 2022.
serious human rights abuses, or antidemocratic actions.
Congress extended this act through 2023 in P.L. 116-94.
While the Biden Administration has maintained sanctions
on the Maduro government and its enablers, in November
In March 2015, President Obama issued E.O. 13692 to
2022, the Treasury Department issued a license to allow
implement P.L. 113-278, and Treasury issued regulations in
U.S. oil company Chevron to resume some operations in
July 2015 (31 C.F.R. Part 591). The E.O. targets (for asset
Venezuela after Maduro returned to negotiations with the
blocking and visa restrictions) those involved in actions or
opposition. The United States, Canada, the United
policies undermining democratic processes or institutions;
Kingdom, and the European Union (EU) have tried to
serious human rights abuses; prohibiting, limiting, or
leverage sanctions relief to incentivize Maduro to negotiate
penalizing freedom of expression or peaceful assembly; and
a path toward free and fair elections in 2024. With
public corruption. It includes any person who is a current or
negotiations stalled again, and leading opposition
former leader of any entity engaged in any of those
candidates barred from competing in 2024, some experts
activities, as well as current or former government officials.
are calling for fewer licenses and possibly more sanctions.
As of August 7, 2023, Treasury had imposed SDN
Terrorism-Related Sanctions
sanctions on more than 110 Venezuelans and at least eight
Since 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual
entities pursuant to E.O. 13692. The targeted individuals
determination that Venezuela is not “cooperating fully with
include President Maduro; his wife, and son; Vice President
United States anti-terrorism efforts” pursuant to Section
Delcy Rodríguez; Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino
40A of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2781). The
Lopez; supreme court judges; and several governors. In
most recent determination was made in May 2023. As a
May 2019, Treasury lifted sanctions on the former head of
result, the United States has prohibited all U.S. commercial
Venezuela’s intelligence service, General Manuel
arms sales and retransfers to Venezuela since 2006. In
Cristopher Figuera, who broke ranks with Maduro. In June
2008, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, Treasury
2022, Treasury lifted sanctions on Carlos Malpica Flores, a
designated two individuals and two travel agencies in
nephew of Cilia Flores, possibly to encourage Maduro to
Venezuela as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs)
resume negotiations with the opposition.
subject to asset blocking sanctions for financially
supporting Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist
Additional Financial Sanctions
Organization.
President Trump imposed additional financial sanctions on
Venezuela because of the government’s human rights
Drug Trafficking-Related Sanctions
abuses and antidemocratic actions. In August 2017, he
Since 2005, pursuant to procedures in the Foreign Relations
issued E.O. 13808, which prohibited access to U.S.
Authorization Act, FY2003 (P.L. 107-228, §706; 22 U.S.C.
financial markets by the Venezuelan government, including
2291j), the President has made an annual determination that
state energy company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.
Venezuela has failed demonstrably to adhere to its
(PdVSA), with certain exceptions to minimize the impact
obligations under international narcotics agreements.
on the Venezuelan people and U.S. interests. In March
President Biden made the determination for FY2023 in
2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13827 to prohibit
September 2022 but waived foreign aid restrictions.
transactions involving the Venezuelan government’s
issuance of digital currency, coin, or token. In May 2018,
Treasury has imposed sanctions on at least 22 individuals
President Trump issued E.O. 13835, which prohibited
with connections to Venezuela and 27 companies by
transactions related to purchasing Venezuelan debt and any
designating them as Specially Designated Narcotics
debt owed to Venezuela pledged as collateral. A July 2023
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions
Foreign Policy article asserts that these sanctions prompted
In January 2023, the Treasury Department gave Trinidad
many Western holders of the $60 billion in debt the Maduro
and Tobago a two-year license to engage with PdVSA on
government defaulted on in 2017 to sell bonds to buyers
developing an offshore natural gas field. The Maduro
from non-market-based economies. Those new creditors
government has opposed the license’s terms, which permit
could shape Venezuela’s economic future.
Venezuela to receive humanitarian aid but not cash.
Broader Sectoral Sanctions
In 2020 and in January 2021, Treasury sanctioned
On November 1, 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13850.
individuals, as well as oil and shipping companies, for
This E.O. set forth a framework to block the assets of, and
helping PdVSA violate sanctions. While the Biden
prohibit certain transactions with, any person determined by
Administration has not issued similar sanctions related to
the Secretary of the Treasury to operate in sectors of the
transactions with PdVSA, future Administrations could.
economy or to engage in corrupt transactions with the
Two major European oil and natural gas companies—ENI
Maduro government. Some 24 individuals have been
of Italy and Repsol of Spain—have been working in
sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 13850, including people and
Venezuela since the 1990s to produce natural gas. They
entities who siphoned hundreds of millions of dollars from
have sought a license similar to that granted to Chevron.
an emergency food aid system and those who have helped
Maduro and PdVSA evade oil sanctions.
Sanctions on the Maduro Government
In August 2019, President Trump issued E.O. 13884,
On January 28, 2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, Treasury
blocking the property and interests of the Maduro
designated PdVSA as operating in the oil sector of the
government in the United States and within the control of
Venezuelan economy and the Secretary of the Treasury
U.S. persons. The order prohibited U.S. persons from
determined the company was subject to U.S. sanctions. As a
engaging in transactions with the Maduro government
result, all property and interests in property of PdVSA
unless authorized by OFAC. E.O. 13884 also authorized
subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and U.S. persons
financial sanctions and visa restrictions on non-U.S.
(companies or individuals) generally are prohibited from
persons that assist the Maduro government, including
engaging in transactions with the company. Treasury also
foreign energy companies working with PdVSA. To allow
sanctioned Venezuela’s state-owned gold sector company,
assistance to the Venezuelan people, OFAC issued licenses
Minerven, for using illicit gold to support Maduro.
authorizing transactions involving the delivery of food,
agricultural commodities, and medicine; remittances;
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has
international organizations; and communications services.
issued general licenses to allow certain transactions and
activities related to PdVSA and its U.S. subsidiaries. OFAC
Policy Considerations
first authorized transactions with U.S.-based PdVSA
Congress has maintained bipartisan support for a negotiated
subsidiaries PDV Holding Inc. (PDVH) and CITGO
solution to the crisis in Venezuela that would pave the way
Holding Inc. through July 2019 and then through February
for free and fair elections. In December 2019, Congress
2021. OFAC authorized PDVH, CITGO, and other U.S.
enacted P.L. 116-94, which included provisions from the
companies to import petroleum from PdVSA through April
Venezuela Emergency Relief, Democracy Assistance, and
2019, but payments went to a blocked U.S. account. Since
Development (VERDAD) Act (S. 1025). The law extended
2019, OFAC has continuously renewed, most recently
targeted sanctions regarding corruption and undemocratic
through October 2023, a license blocking creditors from
actions through 2023. With those authorizations expiring in
seizing CITGO assets. In May 2023, OFAC issued a license
December, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
allowing creditors to negotiate with the 2015 National
Committee announced in August 2023 that he would
Assembly (since the interim government no longer exists).
introduce a VERDAD Expansion Act. The act would
authorize and/or codify various types of sanctions on the
OFAC initially authorized U.S. companies working in
Maduro regime and its allies if progress is not made in
Venezuela with PdVSA (including Chevron) to operate
negotiations within six months of the bill’s enactment.
through July 2019. An amended license allows only
transactions necessary for the “safety or the preservation of
Some in Congress support continued sanctions on the
assets” through November 19, 2023. A license permitting
Maduro government; others argue that broad sanctions have
certain exports of liquefied petroleum gas to Venezuela has
hurt the Venezuelan people. A February 2021 Government
been extended through July 2024.
Accountability Office report found that U.S. sanctions had
worsened Venezuela’s economic decline and hindered some
In May 2022, the Treasury Department allowed Chevron,
humanitarian aid delivery. Similarly, some in Congress
the last major U.S. oil company operating in Venezuela, to
have supported U.S. sanctions relief. Others have
discuss future operations with PdVSA. In November 2022,
introduced legislation that would prohibit U.S. imports of
Treasury issued a license allowing Chevron to resume
Venezuelan oil and could seek to codify and/or expand
production, import, and export of petroleum products at its
current executive orders. See CRS In Focus IF10230,
existing joint ventures in Venezuela. Petroleum production
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy; CRS In Focus
must be sold to Chevron, and the United States can be the
IF12448, Venezuela’s Natural Gas: Questions Endure.
only export destination. Chevron has recouped some of the
billions in debt PdVSA owes the company.
See also “Venezuela-Related Sanctions,” available at
https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-
information/venezuela-related-sanctions.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Affairs
IF10715
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10715 · VERSION 41 · UPDATED