Updated August 3, 2023
Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Issues for Congress
Overview
Figure 1. Key African Countries with Wagner Activity
The Wagner Group, a nominally private military company
(PMC) that the U.S. government has referred to as a “proxy
military force of the Kremlin,” provides security services in
several African countries. Wagner affiliates are also
involved in mining and commerce, and in propaganda and
influence operations. Wagner’s activities in Africa appear
to support a broader effort by Moscow to challenge
Western influence at relatively low cost. Politically
connected Russian elites may also seek personal profits. In
addition to leveraging Moscow’s Cold War-era ties,
Wagner has exploited the vulnerabilities and ambitions of
particular African leaders. It also has leveraged (and sought

to stoke) local grievances and resentment of Western
Source: Public statements by U.S. officials in 2022.
influence, particularly that of former colonial power France.
U.S. officials have asserted in statements and testimony that
U.S. officials have accused Wagner of “predatory” behavior
Wagner abuses and economic exploitation undermine
in Africa and of trading security services for access to
stability in Africa. Wagner personnel have been implicated
natural resources. In early 2023, the Biden Administration
in atrocities against civilians in CAR, Mali, and Sudan.
designated Wagner a Transnational Criminal Organization
Firms tied to Wagner have reportedly exploited gold mines
(TCO), citing, in part, abuses in Africa. U.S. officials have
in these countries, along with diamonds and timber in CAR.
accused Wagner of using gold from Africa to finance
Several African leaders, including the President of Ghana,
operations in Ukraine, and of seeking to move weapons via
have voiced concern about Wagner’s regional activities.
Mali for use in Ukraine. See also: CRS In Focus IF12344,
Russia’s Wagner Private Military Company (PMC).
At the same time, some leaders in Africa appear to view
Wagner as furnishing valuable assistance that other partners
Wagner’s future in Africa is uncertain in the wake of its
are unwilling or unable to provide. In CAR and Mali,
June 2023 mutiny in Russia. Given Wagner’s existing
Wagner’s logistics support appears to have enabled national
connections and footprint, and a lack of ready alternatives,
militaries to expand operations against insurgents—albeit
Moscow likely finds it difficult to fully divest or replace
accompanied by significant abuses. Some leaders appear to
Wagner in the region. Russian officials have asserted that
share with Wagner a preferred scorched-earth approach to
support to Wagner’s African partners will continue, but
counterinsurgency. Leaders chafing at arms embargoes (as
who will control these activities and financial flows is
in CAR) or human rights criticism (as in Mali) may view
unclear. For his part, Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin
Wagner—and Russia more generally—as a counterweight
has vowed to continue operations in Africa. In light of
to Western donor influence. Wagner’s partnership with the
Wagner’s role in Russia’s regional strategy, the evolving
Malian junta against French postcolonial influence may
situation is of interest to U.S. policymakers.
also appeal to other leaders or contenders. The group’s
activities appear to vary based on local context.
Key Areas of Activity
Wagner is primarily active in the Central African Republic
CAR. The Wagner Group reportedly entered CAR after
(CAR), Libya, Mali, and Sudan, per U.S. officials. Wagner
Russia obtained an exemption to the U.N. arms embargo in
has also engaged in outreach to Burkina Faso, and has
2017 to provide weapons to CAR’s military, and offered to
reportedly sought to destabilize the government of Chad.
train local soldiers in their use. Wagner’s numbers swelled
Prigozhin cheered the military seizure of power in Niger in
as high as 2,000 as the group came to play a key role in
July 2023 via social media, and floated Wagner’s services.
military operations against rebel groups. Wagner personnel
Wagner previously deployed to Mozambique in 2019 to aid
provide personal protection to President Faustin-Archange
counter-insurgency operations but withdrew after taking
Touadera and serve as his advisors. Wagner has also
heavy casualties. Some reports suggest that Wagner may be
reportedly worked with some rebel factions. Wagner
active in other African countries in less visible ways.
affiliates are allegedly active in private security, mining,
and other commercial sectors. Several hundred Wagner
The countries where Wagner openly operates share some
personnel left CAR shortly after the June 2023 mutiny,
attributes, notably insurgencies and fraught relations with
which CAR officials characterized as a rotation rather than
traditional donors. Mali and Sudan are under military rule,
a drawdown. More Wagner personnel appeared to arrive
while CAR and Mali are former French colonies that once
ahead of a controversial constitutional referendum in July.
hosted French military operations. Burkina Faso and Chad,
fit both latter categories, as may Niger. In Libya, Wagner is
Libya. Wagner personnel reportedly began providing
aiding an armed group that has sought state power.
support in 2018 to Libyan National Army (LNA) leader
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Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Issues for Congress
Khalifa Haftar, a rival to Libya’s internationally-recognized
authorization measures. Congress may consider whether
government in Tripoli. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
existing reporting requirements enable sufficient review of
described Wagner forces as integral to the LNA’s failed
Wagner’s Africa activities and U.S. responses, or whether
2019-2020 campaign to seize Tripoli and asserted that
new, amended, or consolidated requirements are warranted.
Wagner personnel “almost certainly” downed an unarmed
U.S. drone “using a sophisticated Russian air defense
Sanctions Impact and Effectiveness. Congress may assess
system” in November 2019. According to AFRICOM,
the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions, the resources devoted to
Wagner’s presence totaled about
enforcing them, and the impact of sanctions (if any) on
2,000 as of 2020, but
regional perceptions of the Wagner Group and Russia—
declined in 2022 as some personnel left for Ukraine.
including as Wagner’s relationship with Russia’s
Mali. Mali’s military junta reportedly contracted with
government and defense sector evolves. Congress may
Wagner in 2021 to support operations against Islamist
examine the extent of U.S. sanctions coordination with
insurgents. This coincided with an increase in Russian arms
partners such as the European Union and United Kingdom,
sales to Mali. AFRICOM stated in 2022 that Bamako had
which have also issued Wagner-related sanctions in Africa.
agreed to pay Wagner $10 million per month. Press reports
Members may also weigh the potential implications of bills
indicate that 1,000-1,500 Wagner personnel were in Mali as
that would seek compel the executive branch to designate
of early 2023, although local officials have denied
Wagner’s presence
the Wagner Group a Foreign Terrorist Organization (S.
. In 2022, citing concerns about Wagner
416/H.R. 506) for U.S. interests in Africa—including with
and other diplomatic tensions, France decided to withdraw
regard to countries, like Mali, that U.S. officials have
over 2,000 troops from Mali, ending a U.S.-backed
accused of paying Wagner.
counterterrorism mission. In June 2023, the junta called for
the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Mali (MINUSMA) to
Conditionality. Congress may consider whether to restrict
withdraw. These developments have strained Mali’s already
or condition U.S. aid, or support for multilateral lending, to
fragile peace process with northern separatist groups. U.S.
governments in Africa that pursue contracts or relationships
officials accused Wagner of engineering MINUSMA’s exit.
with Wagner. (U.S. aid to the governments of Mali, Sudan,
and Burkina Faso, among others, is already subject to
Sudan. Wagner-affiliated entities have reportedly been
certain legal restrictions due to military coups and other
active in Sudan since then-President Omar al Bashir struck
factors.) Such conditions may have unintended
a series of agreements with Russia in 2017. Prigozhin-
consequences, such as the possible loss of U.S. leverage or
linked firms have been involved in gold mining—in
collaboration with elements of Sudan’s security forces—
contacts with local partners, or perceptions that the United
States is depriving needy countries of support.
and in training and provision of security services. In 2022,
Wagner operatives were implicated in a scheme to smuggle
Alternatives to Wagner. News reports indicate that in a
gold from Sudan to Russia. In May 2023, after fighting
bid to decrease Wagner’s influence in CAR, U.S. officials
broke out between Sudan’s rival security forces, the U.S.
have offered President Touadéra alternative security
Treasury Department reported that Wagner had supplied
arrangements and other incentives, in coordination with
Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) with
European countries and Rwanda (which has troops in
surface-to-air missiles to fight the military. Russia’s foreign
CAR). U.S. officials have also reportedly weighed offering
ministry, meanwhile, has sought to maintain “friendly”
military aid to Burkina Faso to deter partnership with
relations with the country’s military government.
Wagner. Congress may consider whether to authorize, fund,
U.S. Sanctions
or condition the use of such tools, as well as the potential
for unintended consequences. For example, leaders might
When designating the Wagner Group as a TCO in January
seek to attract or leverage U.S. offers by signaling a
2023, the Treasury Department also designated Wagner
willingness to engage with Wagner, while policy risks may
under the U.S. sanctions program for CAR (Executive
arise from U.S. support to authoritarian or abusive regimes.
Order [EO] 13667). The Wagner Group and Prigozhin were
previously designated under other U.S. sanctions programs.
African Perceptions. Countering the Wagner Group and
Russian “malign influence” have emerged as U.S. priorities
Treasury has designated a number of other Wagner-linked
in Africa. Although the Biden Administration has asserted
individuals and entities under the CAR sanctions program.
that “the United States will not dictate Africa’s choices,”
In addition, citing ties with Wagner, Treasury has
some in Africa have chafed at perceived U.S. pressure,
designated individuals and entities active in CAR, Sudan,
amid enduring sensitivities over state sovereignty and the
and Mali under Russia-related and other non-Africa-
legacy of the Cold War. For example, Southern African
specific U.S. sanctions programs. Designees include three
leaders assailed the Countering Malign Russian Activities
top Malian defense officials and at least two firms based in
Globally Act (H.R. 9374), which passed the House in 2022.
the United Arab Emirates, among others. These actions
Framing U.S. diplomatic engagement in Africa with regard
freeze any assets under U.S. jurisdiction, block transactions
to Russia and Wagner is likely to remain challenging.
with U.S. persons, and impose visa and entry restrictions. In
late 2022, the State Department also named Wagner as an
Alexis Arieff, Coordinator, Specialist in African Affairs
Entity of Particular Concern under the International
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
Religious Freedom Act of 1998, citing actions in CAR.
Affairs
Potential Issues for Congress
Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs
Oversight. Congress has enacted legislative provisions
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European
requiring the executive branch to report on Russian PMC
Affairs
activities and influence worldwide, often via defense
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Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Issues for Congress

IF12389


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12389 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED

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