

# FY2024 NDAA: Summary of Funding Authorizations

July 31, 2023

Of the **\$910.8 billion** requested in the FY2024 President’s budget for activities within the **national defense** budget function, **\$874.2 billion** fell within the scope of the proposed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (NDAA; H.R. 2670; S. 2226). While the NDAA generally does not provide funding (i.e., *budget authority*), historically the legislation has served as an indicator of congressional intent on funding for such activities. The House- and Senate-passed versions of the bill would authorize at least the level of funding the President requested for such activities in FY2024 (beginning October 1, 2023), consistent with the defense discretionary spending cap in the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 (FRA; P.L. 118-5). See **Table 1**.

## *House-passed NDAA (H.R. 2670)*

H.R. 2670 would authorize **\$874.2 billion**—the level of funding the President’s budget requested for activities within the scope of the legislation, according to the accompanying committee report (H.Rept. 118-125). The bill would authorize slightly more funding than requested for the U.S. Department of Defense, or DOD (+0.04%). In terms of major DOD appropriation titles, the legislation would authorize more funding than requested for military construction and family housing (+4.8%); procurement (+0.3%); and research, development, test, and evaluation (+0.2%); and less funding than requested for the Defense Health Program and other activities (-0.3%); operation and maintenance (-0.3%); and military personnel (-0.1%). The legislation would authorize less funding than requested for atomic energy defense programs (-1.2%), including defense environmental cleanup activities. The legislation would authorize more funding than requested for certain other defense-related activities (15.9%), including a program to provide DOD access to **commercial tanker vessels**. Including amounts for certain programs not in the jurisdiction of House Armed Services Committee (HASC) or requiring additional authorization, the defense discretionary budget authority implication of H.R. 2670 is **\$886.3 billion**—approximately the level of the defense discretionary spending cap for FY2024 in P.L. 118-5 (**137 Stat. 12**). The cap does not apply to specially designated funding, such as emergency funding.

Statements made during debate of H.R. 2670 in HASC illustrate a range of perspectives on the overall level of funding authorizations in the bill. Representative Rob Wittman, Chair of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, **said** he supported the effort by Representative Mike Rogers, Chair of the

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HASC, to align funding authorized by the legislation to the spending cap in the debt-limit deal negotiated in part by Representative Kevin McCarthy, Speaker of the House. Wittman said, “The overall debt agreement enacted earlier this year, and the associated appropriations allocations, are the right medicine to our rampant government spending. So, as I begin our debate today, I support Chairman Rogers’ defense top line proposal, and Speaker McCarthy’s defense approach, to make sure that we rapidly access every programmatic efficiency available.” Representative Ro Khanna, who opposed reporting the legislation to the House, [said](#), “I voted against the NDAA because it puts the Pentagon spending on track to a trillion dollar defense budget ... While we should invest in defense technologies of the future, we must focus on investing in the health of our people, in the education of our people, in the industries of the future as we compete with China, and mitigating the climate crisis, which is our greatest national security threat.”

### ***Senate-passed NDAA (S. 2226)***

S. 2226 would authorize **\$876.8 billion**—approximately the level the President’s budget requested for activities within the scope of the legislation, after adjusting for a difference in the requested amount for the Air Force, Operation and Maintenance account, according to the accompanying committee report (S.Rept. 118-58). The legislation would authorize slightly more funding than requested for the DOD (+0.02%). In terms of major DOD appropriation titles, the legislation would authorize more funding than requested for procurement (+1.1%) and research, development, test, and evaluation (+0.8%); the requested level of funding for the Defense Health Program and other activities, and military construction and family housing; and less funding than requested for military personnel (-0.9%), and operation and maintenance (-0.4%). In addition, the legislation would authorize less funding than requested for atomic energy defense programs (-0.5%), including for the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund. S.Rept. 118-58 states, “The committee recommends an overall discretionary authorization of \$886.3 billion in fiscal year 2024”—the level of the defense discretionary spending cap for FY2024 in P.L. 118-5.

During debate of the bill in a closed session, SASC voted 12-13 opposing [an amendment](#) to “raise the topline for implementation of the National Defense Strategy and for other purposes.” Senator Roger Wicker, Ranking Member of SASC, reportedly filed the motion to increase funding authorized in the legislation by \$25 billion. On July 19, in [remarks](#) on the Senate floor, Senator Wicker said, “Ideally, we would have an annual 3% to 5% boost to our topline above inflation.” [Section 1004](#) of the legislation included a Sense of the Senate provision on the need for emergency supplemental funding in FY2024. The section states, in part, “there are growing national security concerns that require additional funds beyond the revised security spending limit, to include continued support to the Ukrainian armed forces, additional munitions production, additional large surface combatants, shipbuilding industrial base modernization investments, submarine industrial base and supply chain management, additional production of wheeled and tracked combat vehicles, and emergent capabilities and exercises in the United States Indo-Pacific Command.” Senator Elizabeth Warren, who opposed reporting the legislation to the Senate, [previously described](#) the FY2024 DOD budget request as “massive” and expressed concern that the department’s [unfunded priorities lists](#) “distort our budget process.”

In Statements of Administration Policy on H.R. 2670 and S. 2223, the White House pledged to work with Congress to set “appropriate and responsible levels of defense and non-defense spending to support the security of the Nation consistent with the Fiscal Responsibility Act.”

**Table 1** shows funding authorized in the FY2024 NDAA for DOD-military activities (including by major appropriation title), atomic energy defense programs, and certain defense-related activities.

**Table 1. Summary of Funding Authorizations in FY2024 NDAA**

(in billions of dollars of discretionary budget authority)

Title	President's budget request <sup>a</sup>	House-passed NDAA (H.R. 2670)	Senate-passed NDAA (S. 2226)	Enacted NDAA	% Change (authorized- request)
Procurement	\$167.99	\$168.57	\$169.84		
Research and Development	\$144.98	\$145.21	\$146.14		
Operation and Maintenance	\$290.07	\$289.17	\$291.75 <sup>b</sup>		
Military Personnel	\$178.87	\$178.63	\$177.33		
Defense Health Program and Other DOD	\$42.60	\$42.46	\$42.60		
Military Construction and Family Housing	\$16.67	\$17.47	\$16.67		
<b>Subtotal, Department of Defense-Military (051)</b>	<b>\$841.19</b>	<b>\$841.51</b>	<b>\$844.34</b>		
<b>Atomic Energy Defense Programs (053)</b>	<b>\$32.65</b>	<b>\$32.26</b>	<b>\$32.47</b>		
<b>Defense-Related Activities (054)</b>	<b>\$0.38</b>	<b>\$0.44</b>	<b>\$0.00<sup>c</sup></b>		
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$874.21</b>	<b>\$874.21</b>	<b>\$876.81</b>		

**Source:** H.Rept. 118-125 accompanying H.R. 2670, pp. 421-426; and S.Rept. 118-58 accompanying S. 2226, pp. 400-403.**Note:** Totals may not sum due to rounding. Dollars rounded to nearest hundredth. The “Authorized” and “% Change” columns are blank because the FY2024 NDAA has not been enacted.

- a. Amounts in this column reflect those in H.Rept. 118-125.
- b. S.Rept. 118-58 included a higher requested amount for Air Force, Operation and Maintenance funding than H.Rept. 118-125 (\$65.72 billion vs \$62.75 billion).
- c. The SASC typically does not authorize appropriations for the Department of Transportation Maritime Administration Maritime Security Program and Tanker Security Program; however, the final version of the NDAA typically does.

**Table 2** shows the difference between requested and authorized funding in the NDAA over the past decade.

**Table 2. Requested and Authorized Funding in the National Defense Authorization Act, FY2014-FY2023**

(in billions of dollars of discretionary budget authority)

Fiscal Year	Public Law (P.L.)	President's Budget Request	Authorized	% Change (Authorized- Request)
2014	P.L. 113-66	\$625.15	\$625.14	0.0%
2015	P.L. 113-291	\$577.15	\$577.15	0.0%
2016	P.L. 114-92	\$604.21	\$599.21	-0.8%
2017	P.L. 114-328	\$607.98	\$611.17	0.5%
2018	P.L. 115-91	\$665.72	\$692.10	4.0%
2019	P.L. 115-232	\$708.11	\$708.10	0.0%

2020	P.L. 116-92	\$741.93	\$729.93	-1.6%
2021	P.L. 116-283	\$731.61	\$731.61	0.0%
2022	P.L. 117-81	\$743.09	\$768.21	3.4%
2023	P.L. 117-263	\$802.36	\$847.32	5.6%

**Source:** CRS analysis of funding tables in conference reports or explanatory statements accompanying National Defense Authorization Acts. Links to sources are embedded in figures.

**Note:** Dollars rounded to nearest hundredth; percentages rounded to nearest tenth. The "% Change" column is the percentage change between authorized and requested amounts.

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