Updated June 9, 2023
Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation
Overview
According to Saudi officials, the kingdom intends to
The 118th Congress may engage the Biden Administration
develop the capacity to produce nuclear fuel using domestic
with regard to U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia’s National
resources. In 2019, Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abd al
Project for Atomic Energy and the potential for future U.S.-
Aziz bin Salman Al Saud said, “even if we scale up [nuclear
Saudi nuclear energy cooperation. In May 2022, Saudi
power] ... we want to go to the full cycle, to producing the
Arabia invited technical bids related to the planned
uranium, enriching the uranium.” The minister further stated
construction of two nuclear reactors, and, in January 2023, a
in January 2023 that Saudi Arabia intends to use its
Saudi minister restated the kingdom’s intention to use its
substantial domestic uranium resources for producing LEU.
domestic uranium resources for producing low-enriched
Saudi Arabia is a state party to the nuclear Nonproliferation
uranium (LEU) as nuclear fuel.
Treaty (NPT), which requires the government to accept
Congress and successive Administrations have sought the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on
kingdom’s commitment to forgo the most proliferation-
any nuclear facilities. IAEA safeguards present a significant
sensitive nuclear facilities—those for enriching uranium or
hurdle to the development of nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia
reprocessing spent nuclear fuel to obtain plutonium—and
has not concluded an additional protocol to its IAEA
Saudi Arabia’s acceptance of enhanced international
comprehensive safeguards agreement. Such a protocol
safeguards on its nuclear program. Previous Administrations would increase the IAEA’s ability to investigate undeclared
linked prospects for a U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation
nuclear facilities and activities by increasing the IAEA’s
agreement to these conditions, and Congress has limited the
authority to inspect certain nuclear-related facilities and
use of certain funds to support possible U.S. nuclear exports
demand information. Other international mechanisms are
to Saudi Arabia unless the kingdom makes such
designed to restrict the spread of sensitive nuclear
commitments. Depending on its nature and extent, possible
technology, including enrichment technology.
future U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation may require
In 2020, Saudi authorities denied press reports citing
Department of Energy (DOE) authorizations and/or
unnamed Western officials claiming that Saudi Arabia, with
congressional approval of U.S.-Saudi agreements.
China’s help, built a facility for milling uranium oxide ore.
Saudi Nuclear Plans and Policy
Saudi Arabia’s IAEA safeguards agreement requires the
government to declare such a facility to the agency. Other
In July 2017, Saudi Arabia approved a National Project for
press reports discussed another possible undeclared site.
Atomic Energy, including plans to build large and small
nuclear reactors for electricity production and water
Saudi state policy maintains that the kingdom’s nuclear
desalination. The project is part of a broader Saudi
energy pursuits are limited to peaceful purposes, but
government effort to diversify the kingdom’s economy and
senior officials, including Crown Prince Mohammed bin
expand the use of non-fossil fuel-based energy. Saudi
Salman bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud, also have stated that if
Arabia holds 16% of the world’s proven reserves of crude
Iran were to pursue or obtain a nuclear weapon, the
oil, has the world’s fourth-largest reserves of natural gas,
kingdom will follow suit.
and consumes the second most energy in the Middle East.
Oil and natural gas generate roughly 39% and 60% of the
kingdom’s electricity, respectively.
Threats to the security of critical Saudi infrastructure may
raise concerns about the security of Saudi nuclear facilities.
Saudi authorities have worked to develop required legal and
The U.S. government notes security threats in Saudi Arabia
regulatory frameworks with the support of the IAEA.
from terrorist groups and hostile regional actors, including
Agency officials completed a nuclear infrastructure review
missile and rocket attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure and
in Saudi Arabia in 2018 and issued a final report in January
government facilities that U.S. officials attribute to Iran or
2019. The kingdom established a Nuclear and Radiological
Iran-backed groups. Ongoing U.S.-Saudi security
Regulatory Commission in March 2018, and, in March
cooperation seeks to mitigate these threats and others.
2022, created the Saudi Nuclear Energy Holding Company
(SNEHC) to develop and operate planned nuclear facilities.
U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation
In 2017, the Saudi government solicited marketing
In 2008, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a
information from potential international partner companies
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) stating bilateral
for reactor construction, but did not meet its original
intent to cooperate on nuclear activities in the fields of
timeline for initiating a formal bidding process. In May
medicine, industry, and electricity production. The
2022, Saudi officials invited technical bids from companies
nonbinding MOU stated Saudi Arabia’s intent “to rely on
in Russia, China, and South Korea related to the planned
existing international markets for nuclear fuel services as an
construction of two 1.4 giga-watt electric (GWe) reactors at
alternative to the pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing.”
Khor Duweihin, a coastal area between the kingdom’s
borders with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation
The Obama and Trump Administrations engaged the
licensing authority. Foreign entities’ nuclear exports to
kingdom on the prospects for reaching a bilateral civil
Saudi Arabia containing U.S.-origin technology might
nuclear energy agreement, including through formal
require U.S. consent.
negotiations over the text of a proposed “123 agreement”
So-called “123 agreements,” must include the terms,
(see below) in 2012 and 2018. The Government
conditions, duration, nature, and scope of cooperation, as
Accountability Office (GAO) reported in 2020 that the
well as meet several nonproliferation criteria. The President
governments had “not made significant progress toward a
must make a written determination “that the performance of
nuclear cooperation agreement because of persistent
the proposed agreement will promote, and will not constitute
differences ... over nonproliferation conditions, including
an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.”
U.S. insistence that Saudi Arabia conclude an Additional
The AEA requires Congress to review a 123 agreement for
Protocol with the IAEA and that Saudi Arabia agree to
restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing.”
two time periods totaling 90 days of continuous session. If
The State
the President has not exempted the agreement from any
Department said in August 2020 that the United States
would “attach great importance” to continued Saudi
requirements of Section 123(a), it becomes effective at the
end of the second period, unless, during that time, Congress
compliance with the NPT and would seek an agreement
“with strong nonproliferation protections
adopts a joint resolution disapproving the agreement and the
that will enable
Saudi and U.S. nuclear industries to cooperate.”
resolution becomes law. Section 57(b)(2) of the AEA allows

for limited cooperation related to the “development or
National Nuclear Security Administration Administrator Jill
production of any special nuclear material outside of the
Hruby and Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm have
United States.” A 123 agreement is not necessary for such
talked to Saudi leaders about the government’s nuclear
cooperation, which mostly involves transfers of unclassified
program, Hruby told the Senate Armed Services Committee
nuclear technology and services pursuant to “Part 810
in April 2023, adding that the Administration is “asking the
authorizations” that are not subject to congressional review.
Saudis to be consistent with nonproliferation standards that
we have for every other country that we work with.”
Section 123 agreements do not require recipient

governments to forgo enrichment or reprocessing. Still,
In June 2023, the Saudi Foreign Minister said the kingdom
some 123 agreements contain provisions designed to
would “very much prefer to be able to have the U.S. as one
discourage enrichment and reprocessing programs in the
of the bidders” for its program, noting “there are others that
Middle East. The 2009 U.S.-UAE 123 agreement provides
are bidding, and obviously we would like to build our
the United States the right to terminate nuclear cooperation
program with the best technology in the world, and that will
with that country if the UAE “possesses sensitive nuclear
require a certain agreement to be in place.” With regard to
facilities within its territory or otherwise engages in
bilateral discussions, he said, “We have differences of
activities within its territory relating to enrichment of
opinion, so we’re working on finding a mechanism for us to uranium or reprocessing of nuclear fuel.” An Agreed Minute
be able to work together on civilian nuclear technology. But to that agreement states that its terms “shall be no less
we intend to move forward on that program.”
favorable in scope and effect than those which may be
accorded” to other countries in the Middle East. The minute
From 2017 to 2019, DOE granted seven “Part 810”
also explains that, if the U.S. government concludes a more-
authorizations (per 10 C.F.R. 810) for U.S. companies to
favorable 123 agreement with another regional government,
engage in civil nuclear discussions, including marketing,
the United States will, at the UAE’s request, consult with the
with Saudi Arabia in response to the kingdom’s 2017
government “regarding the possibility of amending” the 123
request for marketing information. In 2022, U.S. and Saudi
agreement with equally favorable terms.
officials signed an MOU on the exchange of technical
information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters.
Congress and U.S. Policy
Since FY2020, Congress annually has prohibited the use of
Both highly enriched uranium and plutonium can be
appropriated funds for Export-Import Bank support for
used as fuel in some types of nuclear reactors but also
nuclear exports to Saudi Arabia until the kingdom has a 123
are used as fissile material in nuclear weapons.
agreement “in effect”; “has committed to renounce uranium
Consequently, ostensibly peaceful enrichment and
enrichment and reprocessing on its territory under that
reprocessing facilities frequently generate concern that
agreement”; and has “signed and implemented” an
a government’s facilities may aid nuclear weapons
Additional Protocol with the IAEA [most recently for
programs. Conversely, a nuclear program without such
FY2023 in Section 7041(i), Division K, P.L. 117-328].
facilities generally poses little proliferation risk, but
may pose security and/or environmental risks.
Since 2018, some Members have introduced bills that would
have required a congressional joint resolution of approval
U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Requirements
before a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia could take effect.
In 2020, the House Permanent Select Committee on
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
Intelligence reported a bill with a provision that would have
(AEA, 22 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), requires nuclear cooperation
required the intelligence community to report to Congress
agreements for significant nuclear cooperation with foreign
on Saudi nuclear activities.
governments. Such cooperation includes the transfer of
certain U.S.-origin nuclear material subject to licensing for
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
commercial, medical, and industrial purposes; the export of
Affairs
reactors and critical reactor components; and other
Paul K. Kerr, Specialist in Nonproliferation
commodities under Nuclear Regulatory Commission export
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation

IF10799


Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10799 · VERSION 19 · UPDATED

---