Updated June 5, 2023
Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook
Since Russia launched its renewed invasion of Ukraine in
The UAF faces two major hurdles to training and deploying
February 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have
new personnel. First, at the time of the invasion, Ukraine
successfully defended against and pushed back Russian
did not have a fully developed professional
forces in many regions, despite several apparent
noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps, which it previously
disadvantages. The UAF has demonstrated flexibility over
had been seeking to develop along NATO standards. The
the course of the conflict to date, as well as an ability to
UAF continued to face issues with retention, professional
integrate Western security assistance and training in its
development, and funding. As described above, a high
military campaigns. The UAF continues to face obstacles
proportion of trained veterans, many with combat
sustaining momentum against Russian forces, however.
experience, mitigated to some degree the need for an
Ukraine’s resistance has come with losses in personnel and
established NCO corps to train and command new recruits.
equipment, and sustainment will be an ongoing
Losses among those veterans have increased the importance
consideration.
of developing a professional NCO corps and affected unit-
level capability.
Since early 2022, the Biden Administration and Congress
have firmly supported Ukraine’s defense of its territorial
Second, the UAF’s need for immediate reinforcements
integrity against Russia’s invasion. The UAF’s evolving
creates pressure to deploy troops with only basic training.
condition may be of interest to Congress as Members
To sustain combat operations in the current conflict,
continue to weigh options and conduct oversight over
however, the UAF continues to balance the time to train
policies to support Ukraine’s defense against Russian
personnel on conducting complex operations and operating
aggression.
advanced weaponry with ensuring sufficient personnel are
deployed at the front line.
Personnel
Some observers note that the UAF’s impressive overall
Equipment
performance to date has been in part due to high levels of
To date, the UAF has sustained significant equipment
recruitment and motivation. High losses, however, pose a
losses. Some UAF units appear to be operating without
continued challenge to the UAF’s ability to maintain
mechanized or motorized vehicle support, likely due to
effective, sustained operations.
losses and limited replacements. Despite losses, Western
security assistance and UAF resilience in repairing and
After Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the UAF
maintaining equipment has been crucial to UAF successes.
gained important combat experience fighting Russian-led
forces in Ukraine’s eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk
Ukrainian officials have emphasized a need for long-range
(known as the Donbas). This led to a large proportion of
rocket and artillery systems to counter Russia’s quantitative
trained and experienced veterans among Ukraine’s
and qualitative advantages in long-range fire. At the start of
population. These veterans and other volunteers (including
the war, Ukraine still relied on Soviet and Russian 122mm
foreign recruits) were quickly mobilized into Ukraine’s new
and 152mm caliber rocket and artillery systems, and
volunteer Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) and Reserve
ammunition and replacement parts have become scarce.
without the need for lengthy training. The high ratio of
Western provision of artillery, rocket artillery, and
trained and experienced recruits meant they were able to
ammunition has been crucial in sustaining UAF operations.
operate artillery, tank, and support systems that traditionally
require more time to master. These units have been crucial
The UAF’s access to materials, components, and
in supporting regular UAF units and enabling them to
ammunition to operate and repair Soviet- and Russian-era
spearhead operations and counteroffensives.
equipment has been a source of concern. Although some
Central and Eastern European defense industries are
Since the beginning of the 2022 war, the UAF reportedly
compatible with Soviet and early Russian equipment, these
has suffered high levels of casualties, lowering force
sources are insufficient to meet Ukraine’s needs.
quality. Losses are likely higher among regular UAF and
Additionally, Russian forces have targeted Ukraine’s
Special Forces units, leading to a greater reliance on TDF
domestic defense industry, affecting its ability to produce
and Reserve units. Many of these TDF and Reserve units
and maintain equipment (including ammunition and
also have sustained heavy casualties, further increasing the
complex weapon systems).
ratio of mobilized personnel to regenerate forces. Unlike in
the initial period of the war, when most recruits were
Ukraine’s air force and air defenses thus far have proven
veterans, at present most new recruits have little military
effective in limiting Russian air superiority. Russia retains
experience and, as a result, take longer to train.
air superiority in certain regions, however, and continues to
target Ukrainian air defenses.
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Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook
Role of U.S. and Western Security
flexibility, motivation, and capability. The UAF appears
Assistance
committed to capitalizing on reduced Russian military
Since the start of Russia’s 2022 war, the United States has
capability and demonstrating to foreign audiences its ability
provided Ukraine more than $37.6 billion in security
to retake territory.
assistance. The United States and European allies and
partners also continue to contribute training, logistics, and
The UAF command structure appears to be more
intelligence. Observers note the difference and effort to
centralized than it was earlier in the war. While the UAF
train personnel on operating weapons systems compared to
seeks to adopt NATO-style principles of command, it still
training on maintenance and sustainment, which is crucial
exhibits traits of Soviet-style command, particularly among
to operating systems over the long-term. Western officials
mobilized officers educated according to Soviet doctrine.
continue to consider concerns over escalation, stockpiles
Nevertheless, the UAF has demonstrated flexibility and a
and defense industrial production capacity, and available
willingness to adjust operations due to changing
funding to procure and sustain security assistance.
circumstances, particularly at the unit and junior levels.
Training
Russia’s armed forces retain some advantages in equipment
Prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion, the United States and other
(specifically artillery and long-range fire), air support, and
allies contributed training and advice to the UAF. Current
electronic warfare. Ukrainian officials state that its most
training efforts focus on employing and operating Western
urgent needs include, in addition to air defense, armored
security assistance, on basic infantry skills and unit-level
mobility (armored and infantry fighting vehicles), artillery
development, and, increasingly, combined arms operations.
(such as M777), long-range fires, and ammunition. In
particular, armored mobility is required to upgrade and
The UAF still faces pressure to deploy troops into the field
equip new and existing units.
with minimum training to replace losses, but it has
increased efforts to prioritize advanced training to support
Additionally, the UAF still relies on a core of professional
long-term development and the creation of new units
units to conduct combined arms operations and spearhead
capable of combined arms operations. Training will likely
operations, supported by TDF and Reserve units.
grow in importance as the UAF seeks to replace its losses
Recruitment and motivation remain high, but losses,
with mobilized personnel.
exhaustion, and the need to rotate units likely will remain
an ongoing challenge.
Equipment
In the initial phase of the war, U.S. and European provision
As mentioned, training new recruits to replace and expand
of anti-tank and short-range man-portable air defense
these professional units could prove decisive in the future.
(MANPAD) systems were crucial in deflecting Russia’s
The UAF has established new units with Western
invasion. As the war has evolved, Western security
equipment, and re-formed existing units in preparation for a
assistance has adjusted to the conditions and needs of the
summer offensive. It is unclear how these forces will
UAF. Assistance has provided the UAF with capabilities to
operate and if they have enough support or combat enablers
not only defend but also push back Russian forces.
to breach and exploit Russian defensive lines. Beyond this
summer, the UAF’s ability to regenerate forces and
Due to the almost total exhaustion of ammunition for
maintain force quality likely will be critical to its success.
Soviet- and early Russian-era artillery, the UAF is
increasingly dependent on Western artillery. Ukrainian
These developments may factor into congressional
officials continue to call for advanced systems such as tanks
decisionmaking on future options regarding whether and
(including Leopard, Challenger, and Abrams), Western
how to support Ukraine’s defense. Some observers believe
fighters, and long-range missiles. Air defense systems
UAF capabilities will continue to increase with continued
remains a top priority for Ukraine security assistance, at
U.S. and Western security assistance, especially in key
both the strategic and tactical level, including mobile air
areas, such as air defenses and artillery. UAF training to
defense systems to protect units as they advance and
operate and maintain these systems likely will determine
support offensive operations.
the extent of improvement in UAF capabilities.
At the unit level, the UAF has identified protected mobility
Ukrainian officials also note the importance of continued
(e.g., armored vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles) and unit-
ammunition supplies, especially as the UAF depends
level fire support (e.g., mortars) among its needs in order to
increasingly on Western artillery. In addition, the UAF has
exploit advances, protect withdrawal, and support
identified needs in logistics (including training and
operations. Individual supplies such as body armor, medical
updating processes), breaching equipment (such as mine
equipment, and secure communications also are requested.
clearing and bridging capabilities), medical evacuation and
care, intelligence, and secure communications to deal with
Current Military Performance and
Russian electronic warfare capabilities.
Outlook
More than 15 months into the war, the UAF appears to have
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European
blunted Russian forces, including via offensives into
Affairs
Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Kherson regions, and is preparing to
regain offensive momentum this summer. The UAF
IF12150
continues to demonstrate high levels of operational
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Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12150 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED