Updated May 19, 2023
Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation
Overview
According to Saudi officials, the kingdom intends to
The 118th Congress may engage the Biden Administration
develop the capacity to produce nuclear fuel using domestic
with regard to U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia’s National
resources. In 2019, Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abd al
Project for Atomic Energy and the potential for future U.S.-
Aziz bin Salman Al Saud said, “even if we scale up [nuclear
Saudi nuclear energy cooperation. In May 2022, Saudi
power] ... we want to go to the full cycle, to producing the
Arabia invited technical bids related to the planned
uranium, enriching the uranium.” The minister further stated
construction of two nuclear reactors, and, in January 2023, a
in January 2023 that Saudi Arabia intends to use its
Saudi minister restated the kingdom’s intention to use its
substantial domestic uranium resources for producing LEU.
domestic uranium resources for producing low-enriched
Saudi Arabia is a state party to the nuclear Nonproliferation
uranium (LEU) as nuclear fuel.
Treaty (NPT), which requires the government to accept
Congress and successive Administrations have sought the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on
kingdom’s commitment to forgo the most proliferation-
any nuclear facilities. IAEA safeguards present a significant
sensitive nuclear facilities—those for enriching uranium or
hurdle to the development of nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia
reprocessing spent nuclear fuel to obtain plutonium—and
has not concluded an additional protocol to its IAEA
Saudi Arabia’s acceptance of enhanced international
comprehensive safeguards agreement. Such a protocol
safeguards on its nuclear program. Previous Administrations would increase the IAEA’s ability to investigate undeclared
linked prospects for a U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation
nuclear facilities and activities by increasing the IAEA’s
agreement to these conditions, and Congress has limited the
authority to inspect certain nuclear-related facilities and
use of certain funds to support possible U.S. nuclear exports
demand information. Other international mechanisms are
to Saudi Arabia unless the kingdom makes such
designed to restrict the spread of sensitive nuclear
commitments. Depending on its nature and extent, possible
technology, including enrichment technology.
future U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation may require
In 2020, Saudi authorities denied press reports citing
Department of Energy (DOE) authorizations and/or
unnamed Western officials claiming that Saudi Arabia, with
congressional approval of U.S.-Saudi agreements.
China’s help, built a facility for milling uranium oxide ore.
Saudi Nuclear Plans and Policy
Saudi Arabia’s IAEA safeguards agreement requires the
government to declare such a facility to the agency. Other
In July 2017, Saudi Arabia approved a National Project for
press reports discussed another possible undeclared site.
Atomic Energy, including plans to build large and small
nuclear reactors for electricity production and water
Saudi state policy maintains that the kingdom’s nuclear
desalination. The project is part of a broader Saudi
energy pursuits are limited to peaceful purposes, but
government effort to diversify the kingdom’s economy and
senior officials, including Crown Prince Mohammed bin
expand the use of non-fossil fuel-based energy. Saudi
Salman bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud, also have stated that if
Arabia holds 16% of the world’s proven reserves of crude
Iran were to pursue or obtain a nuclear weapon, the
oil, has the world’s fourth-largest reserves of natural gas,
kingdom will follow suit.
and consumes the second most energy in the Middle East.
Oil and natural gas generate roughly 39% and 60% of the
kingdom’s electricity, respectively.
Threats to the security of critical Saudi infrastructure may
raise concerns about the security of Saudi nuclear facilities.
Saudi authorities have worked to develop required legal and
The U.S. government notes security threats in Saudi Arabia
regulatory frameworks with the support of the IAEA.
from terrorist groups and hostile regional actors, including
Agency officials completed a nuclear infrastructure review
missile and rocket attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure and
in Saudi Arabia in 2018 and issued a final report in January
government facilities that U.S. officials attribute to Iran or
2019. The kingdom established a Nuclear and Radiological
Iran-backed groups. Ongoing U.S.-Saudi security
Regulatory Commission in March 2018, and, in March
cooperation seeks to mitigate these threats and others.
2022, created the Saudi Nuclear Energy Holding Company
(SNEHC) to develop and operate planned nuclear facilities.
U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation
In 2017, the Saudi government solicited marketing
In 2008, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a
information from potential international partner companies
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) stating bilateral
for reactor construction, but did not meet its original
intent to cooperate on nuclear activities in the fields of
timeline for initiating a formal bidding process. In May
medicine, industry, and electricity production. The
2022, Saudi officials invited technical bids from companies
nonbinding MOU stated Saudi Arabia’s intent “to rely on
in Russia, China, and South Korea related to the planned
existing international markets for nuclear fuel services as an
construction of two 1.4 giga-watt electric (GWe) reactors at
alternative to the pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing.”
Khor Duweihin, a coastal area between the kingdom’s
borders with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
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Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation
The Obama and Trump Administrations engaged the
So-called “123 agreements,” must include the terms,
kingdom on the prospects for reaching a bilateral civil
conditions, duration, nature, and scope of cooperation, as
nuclear energy agreement, including through formal
well as meet several nonproliferation criteria. The President
negotiations over the text of a proposed “123 agreement”
must make a written determination “that the performance of
(see below) in 2012 and 2018. The Government
the proposed agreement will promote, and will not constitute
Accountability Office (GAO) reported in 2020 that the
an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.”
governments had “not made significant progress toward a
The AEA requires Congress to review a 123 agreement for
nuclear cooperation agreement because of persistent
two time periods totaling 90 days of continuous session. If
differences ... over nonproliferation conditions, including
the President has not exempted the agreement from any
U.S. insistence that Saudi Arabia conclude an Additional
requirements of Section 123(a), it becomes effective at the
Protocol with the IAEA and that Saudi Arabia agree to
end of the second period, unless, during that time, Congress
restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing.” The State
adopts a joint resolution disapproving the agreement and the
Department said in August 2020 that the United States
resolution becomes law. Section 57(b)(2) of the AEA allows
would “attach great importance” to continued Saudi
for limited cooperation related to the “development or
compliance with the NPT and would seek an agreement
production of any special nuclear material outside of the
“with strong nonproliferation protections that will enable
United States.” A 123 agreement is not necessary for such
Saudi and U.S. nuclear industries to cooperate.”
cooperation, which mostly involves transfers of unclassified
nuclear technology and services pursuant to “Part 810
According to a February 2023 State Department email, the
authorizations.”
Biden Administration is “not in a position to characterize the
Such authorizations are not subject to
status or substance” of
congressional review.
such bilateral discussions, and
“remains committed” to the long-standing U.S. objective “to Section 123 agreements do not require recipient
limit the spread of uranium enrichment and spent fuel
governments to forgo enrichment or reprocessing. Still,
reprocessing technologies.” National Nuclear Security
some 123 agreements contain provisions designed to
Administration Administrator Jill Hruby and Secretary of
discourage enrichment and reprocessing programs in the
Energy Jennifer Granholm have met with Saudi leaders
Middle East. The 2009 U.S.-UAE 123 agreement provides
about the government’s nuclear program, Hruby told the
the United States the right to terminate nuclear cooperation
Senate Armed Services Committee on April 26, adding that
with that country if the UAE “possesses sensitive nuclear
Saudi Arabia has not agreed to adopt “nonproliferation
facilities within its territory or otherwise engages in
standards that we have for every other country that we work
activities within its territory relating to enrichment of
with.”
uranium or reprocessing of nuclear fuel.” An Agreed Minute
to that agreement states that its terms “shall be no less
From 2017 to 2019, DOE granted seven “Part 810”
favorable in scope and effect than those which may be
authorizations (per 10 C.F.R. 810) for U.S. companies to
accorded” to other countries in the Middle East. The minute
engage in civil nuclear discussions, including marketing,
with Saudi Arabia in response to the kingdom’s 2017
also explains that, if the U.S. government concludes a more-
favorable 123 agreement with another regional government,
request for marketing information. In 2022, U.S. and Saudi
the United States will, at the UAE’s request, consult with the
officials signed an MOU on the exchange of technical
government “regarding the possibility of amending” the 123
information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters.
agreement with equally favorable terms.
Both highly enriched uranium and plutonium can be
Congress and U.S. Policy
used as fuel in some types of nuclear reactors but also
Since FY2020, Congress annually has prohibited the use of
are used as fissile material in nuclear weapons.
appropriated funds for Export-Import Bank support for
Consequently, ostensibly peaceful enrichment and
nuclear exports to Saudi Arabia until the kingdom has a 123
reprocessing facilities frequently generate concern that
agreement “in effect”; “has committed to renounce uranium
a government’s facilities may aid nuclear weapons
enrichment and reprocessing on its territory under that
programs. Conversely, a nuclear program without such
agreement”; and has “signed and implemented” an
facilities generally poses little proliferation risk, but
Additional Protocol with the IAEA [most recently for
may pose security and/or environmental risks.
FY2023 in Section 7041(i), Division K, P.L. 117-328].
U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Requirements
In the 117th Congress, Members introduced bills that would
have prohibited certain U.S. defense sales to Saudi Arabia if
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
the kingdom knowingly imports enrichment or reprocessing
(AEA, 22 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), requires nuclear cooperation
technologies in the absence of certain nonproliferation
agreements for significant nuclear cooperation with foreign
commitments. Since 2018, some Members have introduced
governments. Such cooperation includes the transfer of
bills that would have required a congressional joint
certain U.S.-origin nuclear material subject to licensing for
resolution of approval before a 123 agreement with Saudi
commercial, medical, and industrial purposes; the export of
Arabia could take effect. In 2020, the House Permanent
reactors and critical reactor components; and other
Select Committee on Intelligence reported a bill with a
commodities under Nuclear Regulatory Commission export
provision that would have required the intelligence
licensing authority. Foreign entities’ nuclear exports to
community to report to Congress on Saudi nuclear activities.
Saudi Arabia containing U.S.-origin technology might
require U.S. consent.
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
Affairs
Paul K. Kerr, Specialist in Nonproliferation
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Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation

IF10799


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10799 · VERSION 17 · UPDATED

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