INSIGHTi

Post-Title 42: U.S. Foreign Policy Initiatives to
Manage Regional Migration
Updated May 15, 2023
U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions of foreign nationals crossing into the United States illegally between
ports of entry have surged, reaching a record 2.2 million in FY2022, with the majority of migrants
originating from Latin America and the Caribbean. The motivation to migrate among Latin American and
Caribbean residents increased during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, which
delayed migrants’ travel plans, exacerbated preexisting socioeconomic challenges, and contributed to
increased social unrest and repression in some countries.
On May 11, 2023, the federal COVID-19 public health emergency declaration expired. The Biden
Administration therefore ended Title 42, a public health measure invoked in March 2020 by the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention that had enabled U.S. authorities to restrict entry into the United
States of foreign nationals lacking “proper travel documents.” The Biden Administration announced
foreign policy initiatives aimed at managing regional migration amid a potential post-Title 42 migration
surge. Congress is considering legislation and appropriations that could affect those policies, as well as
overseeing existing foreign policy efforts to manage regional migration.
U.S. Foreign Policy Efforts to Manage Regional Migration
The Biden Administration initially focused on addressing migration from Central America, a region that
had emerged as a top source of U.S.-bound migrants over the prior decade. In July 2021, pursuant to the
United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (P.L. 116-260, Division FF, Subtitle F) and
Executive Order 14010, the Administration released a new U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes
of Migration in Central America that seeks to address underlying socioeconomic, governance, and
security challenges in the subregion. The Administration also developed a Collaborative Migration
Management Strategy intended to build a regional framework for safe, orderly, and humane migration in
North and Central America to help relieve migration pressures at the U.S. border.
The Administration subsequently broadened its engagement on migration issues beyond Central America
to other countries in the Western Hemisphere, citing the diversification of migrant flows. Secretary of
State Antony Blinken met with his counterparts in the region for a series of Migration Ministerial
meetings, leading to the negotiation of the Los Angeles Declaration for Migration and Protection, signed
by the United States and 20 other Western Hemisphere countries on the sidelines of the June 2022
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Summit of the Americas. The declaration recognizes migration management as a shared responsibility and
seeks to bolster regional efforts to improve border controls, create legal migration and protection
pathways, support migrants and host communities, and coordinate responses to mass migration
movements.
U.S. efforts to implement the Los Angeles Declaration and otherwise address regional migration include
the following measures.
Foreign Assistance
The Biden Administration has used foreign assistance to advance its migration management strategies in
the region. In FY2022, the Administration allocated at least $704.9 million to support the implementation
of the root causes strategy in Central America. It also allocated $295.6 million in humanitarian assistance
to respond to the needs of vulnerable populations in Central America and Mexico and $656.3 million in
humanitarian assistance to countries throughout the hemisphere hosting more than 6.1 million Venezuelan
migrants and refugees. FY2023 allocations are not yet available. For FY2024, the Administration has
requested at least $945.8 million to continue implementation of the root causes strategy in Central
America and more than $50.0 million for a new Americas Partnership Opportunity Fund “to address
migration management challenges faced by high and upper-middle income countries.”
Anti-smuggling and Messaging Campaigns
The Biden Administration also has worked with regional partners to combat migrant smuggling. In June
2021, for example, the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security established Joint Task Force Alpha
to enhance enforcement efforts against human smuggling groups in Mexico and northern Central
America. By February 2023, those efforts had led to the arrest of 7,800 human smugglers. Such activities
build on existing cooperation mechanisms, such as transnational criminal investigative units that
investigate and prosecute smugglers and human traffickers and an International Biometric Information-
Sharing Program to help partner governments detect and detain potential terrorists and other criminals
before they reach the United States.
In April 2023, Colombia, Panama, and the United States launched a 60-day coordinated enforcement
campaign to deter the illicit movement of people through the Darién Gap region of Panama. The United
Nations predicts 400,000 migrants will cross the Darién in 2023, most relying on smugglers. The United
States also announced a public messaging campaign through local paid media to counter the false
narratives smugglers use to lure migrants into undertaking costly, dangerous journeys.
Legal Pathways, Stiffer Penalties
The Biden Administration has expanded legal pathways for migrants to enter the United States while
increasing penalties for those who enter the country illegally. With support from various U.N. agencies,
the Administration announced the establishment of Regional Processing Centers in Colombia and
Guatemala where migrants can apply for legal migration pathways to the United States, Spain, or Canada.
Most migrants apprehended at the border are likely to be ineligible for asylum, deported to Mexico under
Title 8 expedited removal procedures, and banned from reentry for at least five years.
Considerations for Congress
As Congress debates legislative and oversight responses to post-Title 42 migration, foreign policy
considerations may include the following:

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• U.S. Relations in the Region. U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are
diverse and include trade, security, and democracy issues. How might the United States
balance migration management with other U.S. interests?
• Foreign Assistance. To what extent should migration trends be a factor as Congress
appropriates funding for, and evaluates the effectiveness of, foreign assistance activities?
What, if any, safeguards are in place to ensure migration management assistance does not
contribute to human rights abuses?
• Migration Agreements. On May 11, 2023, the House passed H.R. 2, which, among other
measures, would direct the Administration to seek to reestablish migration agreements
similar to the Migration Protection Protocols with Mexico and Asylum Cooperation
Agreements with Central American countries concluded during the Trump
Administration. How might such agreements affect humanitarian conditions and
migration trends? How might the United States help countries meet their existing
commitments under the regional humanitarian protection framework?

Author Information

Clare Ribando Seelke
Ramon Miro
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Analyst in Latin American Affairs


Peter J. Meyer

Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs




Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
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