April 26, 2023
Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Issues for Congress
Overview
Figure 1. Key African Countries with Wagner Activity
The Wagner Group, nominally a private military company
(PMC) with ties to the Russian state, has expanded its
presence in Africa over the past six years. Wagner provides
security services in several African countries, and affiliates
are reportedly involved in mining and commercial
activities. Wagner has been implicated in human rights
abuses in Africa, including killings and torture. In January,
the United States designated Wagner as a Transnational
Criminal Organization (TCO), citing, in part, its activities
in Africa. See also: CRS In Focus IF12344, Russia’s
Wagner Private Military Company (PMC).
The Wagner Group’s role in Africa appears to support a
Source: Public statements by U.S. officials, 2022.
broader effort by Moscow to challenge and disrupt Western
influence at relatively low cost. Politically connected
U.S. officials have asserted in statements and testimony that
Russian elites may also benefit from Wagner’s economic
the Wagner Group’s abuses and economic exploitation
activities. In addition to leveraging Moscow’s Cold War-era
undermine stability in countries where it operates.
ties, Wagner has exploited the vulnerabilities and ambitions
Wagner’s difficulties in Mozambique may also have hurt its
of particular African leaders. It also has leveraged (and
reputation. Several African leaders, including the presidents
sought to stoke) local grievances and resentment of Western
of Ghana and Niger, have publicly expressed concern about
countries, particularly former colonial power France.
Wagner’s activities in neighboring countries.
U.S. officials have criticized the Wagner Group’s
At the same time, some leaders may view the Wagner
“predatory” activities in Africa, asserting that they are
Group as furnishing valuable assistance that other partners
destabilizing, exploitative, and an extension of Russian
are unwilling or unable to provide. Wagner’s support to the
official policy. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
fragile government of CAR helped defend the capital
Victoria Nuland testified to Congress in January 2023 that
against rebel assault in early 2021; in both CAR and Mali,
Wagner’s access to gold mines in Mali and the Central
Wagner’s logistical support appears to have enabled
African Republic (CAR) “directly funds” operations in
national militaries to expand operations against
Ukraine.
insurgents—albeit accompanied by significant abuses.
Leaders chafing at arms embargoes (as in CAR) or human
Key Areas of Activity
rights criticism (as in Mali) may view the Wagner Group as
U.S. State Department and Defense Department officials
a counter-balance to Western donor influence. Some leaders
have stated that Wagner is active in CAR, Libya, Mali, and
appear to perceive Wagner as sharing a preferred scorched-
Sudan. Wagner also has engaged in outreach to Burkina
earth approach to counterinsurgency. Wagner’s partnership
Faso, and reportedly has sought to destabilize pro-Western
with the Malian junta against French postcolonial influence
leaders in countries such as Chad. In 2019, Wagner
may also appeal to other leaders or contenders.
personnel deployed to Mozambique to aid
counterinsurgency operations against a local Islamic State
CAR. The Wagner Group reportedly first entered CAR
affiliate, but withdrew after heavy casualties. Some reports
after Russia obtained an exemption to the U.N. arms
suggest Wagner may be active in other African countries in
embargo in 2017 to provide weapons to CAR’s military.
less visible ways. Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin
Russia then sent “instructors” (including Wagner personnel)
reportedly oversees a wider network of entities involved in
to train local soldiers. Press and think-tank reports estimate
disinformation and electoral processes in Africa.
that 1,000 to 2,000 Wagner personnel operate in CAR,
where they have played a prominent role in military
The countries where Wagner openly operates share some
operations against rebel groups since 2021. Wagner
attributes, notably domestic insurgencies and fraught
personnel also provide personal protection to President
relations with traditional donors. Mali and Sudan are under
Faustin-Archange Touadera and serve as his advisors.
military rule, as are Burkina Faso and Chad. CAR and Mali
Wagner affiliates are reportedly active in private security,
are former French colonies, as are Chad and Burkina Faso.
mining, and other commercial sectors.
Malian and Burkinabè officials have cited frustrations over
France’s counterterrorism operations, and diplomatic
Mali. Mali’s military junta reportedly contracted the
tensions led French troops to exit both countries in 2022-
Wagner Group in late 2021 to support combat operations
2023. In CAR, France ended a military stabilization mission
against Islamist insurgents. This followed an increase in
prior to Wagner’s entry. In Libya, Wagner is aiding an
official Russian arms sales to Mali. About 1,000-1,500
armed group that has sought state power.
Wagner personnel may operate in Mali, per press reports.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Issues for Congress
Malian officials deny that Wagner is present, asserting that
Potential Issues for Congress
its personnel are official Russian advisors. AFRICOM
Congressional Oversight. Congress has enacted legislation
stated in 2022 that Bamako had agreed to pay Wagner $10
requiring the executive branch to report on Russian PMC
million per month. Wagner’s entry aggravated a diplomatic
activities and influence worldwide (see, e.g., §1243 of P.L.
crisis with France, culminating in France’s military
117-263). Congress may consider whether these and other
withdrawal after a decade of U.S.-backed counterterrorism
reporting requirements enable sufficient review of
operations. Since Wagner’s arrival, Bamako has
Wagner’s Africa activities and U.S. responses, or whether
increasingly restricted the U.N. peacekeeping mission in
new or amended requirements are warranted.
Mali, impeding its ability to report on abuses. Wagner’s
Sanctions Impact and Effectiveness. Congress may seek
support to the military may also be fueling strains in a long-
to assess the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions related to
running peace process with northern separatist groups.
Wagner in Africa and resources devoted to enforcing them.
Libya. Wagner group personnel reportedly began providing
Congress may consider the impact of the January 2023
support in 2018 to Libyan National Army (LNA) leader
TCO designation on African governments’ perceptions of
Khalifa Haftar, a rival to Libya’s internationally-recognized
the Wagner Group and Russia. Congress may examine the
government in Tripoli. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
extent of U.S. sanctions coordination with partners such as
described Wagner forces as integral to the LNA’s failed
the European Union, which has made additional Wagner-
2019-2020 campaign to seize Tripoli and asserted that
related designations in Africa. Members may also weigh the
Wagner personnel “almost certainly” downed an unarmed
potential implications for U.S. relations in Africa of bills
U.S. drone “using a sophisticated Russian air defense
seeking to prompt the executive branch to designate the
system” in November 2019. According to AFRICOM,
Wagner Group a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
Wagner’s presence totaled about 2,000 as of 2020, but
Conditionality. Congress may consider whether to restrict
declined in 2022 as some personnel left for Ukraine.
or condition U.S. aid to governments in Africa that pursue
Sudan. Wagner-affiliated entities have reportedly been
contracts or relationships with Wagner. (Currently, U.S. aid
active in Sudan since then-president Omar al Bashir struck
to the governments of Mali, Sudan, and Burkina Faso is
a series of agreements with Russia in 2017. Prigozhin-
subject to some legal restrictions due to military coups and
linked firms have been involved in gold mining
other factors.) Legislative conditions on U.S. support for
concessions—in collaboration with elements of Sudan’s
multilateral lending are another potential tool. Either option
security forces—and in training and provision of security
may have unintended consequences, such as the possible
services. In 2022, Wagner operatives were implicated in a
loss of U.S. leverage or contacts with local partners.
scheme to smuggle gold from Sudan to Russia. In April
2023, after fighting broke out between Sudan’s rival
Alternatives to Wagner. News reports suggest that in a bid
to decrease Wagner’s influence in CAR, U.S. officials have
security forces, some press reports suggested that Wagner
offered President Touadéra alternative security
and Libya’s Haftar were supplying ammunition and
arrangements and other incentives, in coordination with
surface-to-air missiles to the paramilitary Rapid Support
European countries and Rwanda (which has troops in
Forces (RSF), which is fighting to take over the country
CAR). Congress may consider whether to authorize, fund,
from the Sudanese military. Russia’s foreign minister has
or condition the use of such tools. Congress may also
claimed Wagner is helping Sudan to fight terrorism.
consider the potential for unintended consequences. For
U.S. Sanctions
example, African leaders might seek to attract or leverage
In January 2023, the Treasury Department designated the
U.S. offers by signaling a willingness to engage with
Wagner Group as a TCO under Executive Order 13863,
Wagner, while policy risks may arise from U.S. support to
citing, in part, “serious criminal activity” (including human
authoritarian or abusive regimes.
rights abuses) in CAR and Mali. Treasury simultaneously
African Perceptions. Countering the Wagner Group and
designated Wagner under the sanctions program for CAR
Russian influence has emerged as a U.S. policy priority in
(Executive Order 13667). Treasury made several additional
Africa. At the same time, African leaders and publics have
Wagner-linked designations under the CAR program:
chafed at perceived U.S. pressure, amid enduring
Sewa Security Services in CAR;
sensitivities over state sovereignty and the legacy of the
the Officers Union for International Security (OUIS) in
Cold War. For example, some African leaders assailed the
CAR and the OUIS director, a Russian national;
Countering Malign Russian Activities Globally Act (H.R.
Kratol Aviation, based in the United Arab Emirates and
9374), which passed the House in 2022. In announcing its
active in CAR, Libya, and Mali; and
Africa strategy in 2022, the Biden Administration asserted
the former National Security Advisor in CAR, a Russian that, “the United States will not dictate Africa’s choices.”
national and “Wagner Group employee.”
Framing U.S. diplomatic engagement in Africa with regard
to Russia and Wagner is likely to remain challenging.
The Wagner Group was designated previously for other
U.S. sanctions. These actions freeze any Wagner Group
Alexis Arieff, Coordinator, Specialist in African Affairs
assets under U.S. jurisdiction, block transactions with U.S.
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
persons, and impose visa and entry restrictions. Treasury
Affairs
has also designated several entities active in CAR and
Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs
Sudan for links to Wagner and/or Prigozhin, under non-
Africa-specific sanctions programs.
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European
Affairs
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Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Issues for Congress
IF12389
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12389 · VERSION 1 · NEW