Updated April 24, 2023
U.S.-North Korea Relations
North Korea’s advances in nuclear weapons and missile
Amid signs that basic human needs inside North Korea are
capabilities since 2016 under its leader Kim Jong-un have
not being met, some Members of Congress have proposed
catapulted Pyongyang from a threat to U.S. interests in East
offering food and medical aid packages to Pyongyang
Asia to a potential direct threat to the U.S. homeland. U.S.
and/or easing the licensing processes for those delivering
policy on North Korea (officially known as the Democratic
humanitarian aid.
People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) has focused
primarily on the DPRK’s nuclear weapon and missile
programs. Other U.S. concerns include illicit DPRK
activities, including cyber-crime, weapons trade (including
arms deals with Russia), systemic human rights abuses, and
the potential resumption of small-scale conventional attacks
against U.S. ally South Korea (officially known as the
Republic of Korea, or ROK).
Since U.S.-DPRK negotiations on the latter’s nuclear
weapons program broke down in 2019, North Korea largely
has ignored attempts by the United States and ROK to
resume dialogue. In 2022, Kim declared North Korea will

Sources: CRS. Boundaries, U.S. Department of State.
never denuclearize. North Korea also has continued to test
missiles of various ranges and capabilities, including more
U.S. and ROK Approaches to the DPRK
than 80 ballistic missiles since the start of 2022, in violation
The Biden Administration says it is pursuing a “calibrated,
of U.N. Security Council (UNSC) requirements. The tests
practical approach” that “is open to and will explore
appear to have advanced the reliability and precision of the
diplomacy with North Korea” to eventually achieve “the
DPRK’s missile forces, and improved North Korea’s ability
complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” If
to defeat regional missile defense systems. In 2022, North
negotiations resume, the Administration appears to envision
Korea tested intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) for
offering some sanctions relief in exchange for steps toward
the first time since 2017. In 2023, it continued to test
denuclearization. This approach appears to align with that
ICBMs, including a solid-fuel ICBM test on April 13. Since
of South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, who assumed
early 2022, many observers have seen evidence that North
office in May 2022 and has hardened Seoul’s stance toward
Korea is preparing to conduct its seventh nuclear weapons
the DPRK. Since Yoon’s inauguration, Washington and
test, which would be its first since 2017. North Korea has
Seoul have shifted the alliance’s emphasis from diplomacy
undertaken its missile tests despite hardships resulting from
to deterrence, in part by expanding the size and scope of
the near-total closure of its borders for over two years after
bilateral military exercises. They have offered Pyongyang
the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.
unconditional humanitarian assistance, and Yoon has
pledged to provide large-scale economic assistance if North
As the DPRK demonstrates greater military capability,
Korea “embarks on a genuine and substantive process for
some Members of Congress have pushed the Biden
denuclearization.” Pyongyang has rejected these offers. The
Administration to offer greater incentives for North Korea
Biden Administration has responded to the DPRK’s missile
to return to negotiations. Others have sought to require the
tests by introducing new unilateral sanctions designations,
Administration to tighten pressure by enacting additional
dispatching U.S. military assets to Northeast Asia, and
sanctions legislation. The FY2023 National Defense
reinvigorating U.S.-South Korea-Japan security
Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 117-263) requires the
cooperation. U.S. officials say they have communicated to
President to develop a strategy to combat the DPRK’s
North Korea their willingness to meet without
“repressive information environment” and authorizes $10
preconditions, and that “the ball is in [Pyongyang’s] court.”
million annually for five years to increase U.S.-government
sponsored broadcasting and information dissemination into
U.S. and International Sanctions
North Korea. Some Members support reauthorizing the
North Korea is the target of scores of U.S. and UNSC
North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, which seeks to
sanctions. Collectively, UNSC sanctions prohibit North
elevate U.S. policy on the DPRK’s human rights record.
Korea from exporting over 80% of the items it once could
Authorities in the 2004 act expired at the end of FY2022. In
sell abroad. Important North Korean imports, such as oil,
early 2023, the Biden Administration appointed a special
are capped. Additionally, in 2016, 2017, and 2019 Congress
envoy for North Korean human rights, subject to Senate
passed, and Presidents Obama and Trump signed,
confirmation. The position has been vacant since 2017.
legislation expanding U.S. sanctions (P.L. 114-122, P.L.
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U.S.-North Korea Relations
115-44, and P.L. 116-92). Both Administrations issued
and U.S. assets. U.S. officials also have voiced concerns
executive orders and designations to authorize and apply
about Pyongyang’s improving cyber capabilities, which the
sanctions against North Korean entities and secondary
regime could use for retaliation, coercion, espionage, or
sanctions targeting those engaged in, financing, or
sabotage, in addition to the estimated hundreds of millions
otherwise facilitating trade with North Korea. More
of dollars it reportedly has stolen by way of cyber activities.
recently, the Biden Administration has designated for
sanctions those operating in illicit cyber activities, weapons
North Korea’s Human Rights Record
procurement, and fuel trade that violates U.S. and UNSC
Various reports portray extreme human rights abuses by the
restrictions.
North Korean government over many decades, including a
system of prison camps housing approximately 100,000
The U.N. has documented North Korea’s efforts to evade
political prisoners. In 2014, a U.N. Human Rights Council
sanctions, including ship-to-ship transfers of oil and coal in
commission concluded that North Korea had committed
the waters off China’s and Russia’s coasts. During 2022,
“crimes against humanity” and argued that the individuals
China and Russia blocked U.S.-led efforts at the UNSC to
responsible should face charges. The North Korea
adopt tighter restrictions on petroleum trade intended to
Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-
respond to DPRK’s missile tests. In contrast, from 2006 to
122) requires the President to certify human rights
2017, both countries supported the adoption of 10 sanctions
improvements in order to suspend or terminate most
resolutions at the UNSC following North Korean ICBM
sanctions.
and/or nuclear tests. China accounts for over 90% of North
Korea’s trade. Kim could have greater room for maneuver
The DPRK’s Internal Situation
if he perceives that Beijing and Moscow are becoming
Leader Kim succeeded his father in 2011. On assuming
more reliable partners, including due to China and Russia’s
power, Kim, believed to be in his late 30s, conducted
increased strategic competition with the United States and
several purges of high-level officials to solidify his status as
its allies. The State Department says Russia is buying North
paramount leader. For the first several years of his tenure,
Korean rockets and artillery shells for use in its war in
the DPRK economy appeared to expand, in part due to the
Ukraine.
government allowing previously prohibited markets and
granting enterprises somewhat greater autonomy. Since
Nuclear, Missile, and Cyber Capabilities
2016, when the UNSC began to impose sanctions targeting
North Korea has said its nuclear weapons are intended to
critical sectors, growth appears to have fallen, in part due to
deter an attack by the United States. Some analysts worry
the near-collapse of DPRK exports as trading partners
that the DPRK may become emboldened to launch attacks
implemented sanctions.
if it believes it has developed a sufficiently robust deterrent,
or to use nuclear blackmail to achieve other policy
Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the North
objectives. In its 2023 worldwide threat assessment, the
Korean government had largely closed the country’s
U.S. intelligence community said that Kim views nuclear
borders and imposed restrictions on economic activities.
weapons and ICBMs as “the ultimate guarantor of his
Between January 2020 and January 2022, North Korea’s
autocratic rule.” In 2022, North Korea adopted a new law
official trade, which already had been reduced to a trickle
that expands the conditions under which North Korea
due to sanctions, fell by nearly 90%. The difficulty of
would use nuclear weapons to include non-nuclear attacks
importing food and agricultural products during the border
and situations that threaten the regime’s survival.
shutdown, combined with poor weather, appears to have
exacerbated North Korea’s chronic food shortages. The
North Korea has tested six nuclear devices: in 2006, 2009,
U.N. estimates that over 10 million North Koreans, roughly
2013, twice in 2016, and in 2017. Since the Six-Party
40% of the population, are undernourished. There are few
nuclear talks (among China, Japan, North Korea, Russia,
outward signs, however, that economic difficulties are
South Korea, and the United States) broke down in 2009,
threatening the regime’s stability or compelling North
North Korea has restarted its nuclear facilities that produce
Korea to engage with the United States or South Korea. In
fissile material for nuclear weapons. The U.S. Defense
the first three months of 2023, trade with China increased to
Intelligence Agency reportedly has assessed that North
three-year highs, though overall trade remains below pre-
Korea has successfully developed a nuclear warhead that is
pandemic levels.
“miniaturized” or sufficiently small enough to be mounted
on long-range ballistic missiles.
Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs
North Korea’s resumption of ICBM tests appears to be an
Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation
effort to improve its ability to strike the United States.
Dianne E. Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy
Additionally, the DPRK’s multiple short- and medium-
Legislation
range ballistic missile tests appear aimed at advancing its
ability to thwart regional missile defenses and strike allies
IF10246


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U.S.-North Korea Relations


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10246 · VERSION 16 · UPDATED

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