Updated April 14, 2023
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs
Overview
Nuclear Material Production
North Korea continues to advance its nuclear weapons and
North Korea reportedly continues to produce fissile
missile programs despite UN Security Council sanctions
material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for
and high-level diplomatic efforts. Recent ballistic missile
weapons. North Korea restarted its plutonium production
tests and military parades suggest that North Korea is
facilities after it withdrew from a nuclear agreement in
continuing to build a nuclear warfighting capability
2009, and is operating centrifuge uranium enrichment
designed to evade regional ballistic missile defenses. Such
plants at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and possibly at
an approach likely reinforces a deterrence and coercive
Kangson. In March 2023, the IAEA reported construction
diplomacy strategy—lending more credibility as it
and operations at the Yongbyon uranium centrifuge
demonstrates capability—but it also raises questions about
enrichment plant, Radiochemical Laboratory plant and
crisis stability and escalation control.
Experimental Light Water 5MW(e) Reactor. Spent fuel
from that reactor is reprocessed at the Radiochemical
U.S. policy as well as U.N. resolutions call on North Korea
Laboratory to extract plutonium for weapons. In September
to abandon its nuclear weapons and missile programs. Kim
Jong Un has repeatedly rejected “denuclearization” talks.
2022, the IAEA reported ongoing uranium mining, milling,
and concentration activities at Pyongsan. Fissile material
According to the U.S. intelligence community’s 2023
production in large part determines the number and type of
annual threat assessment (ATA), North Korean leader Kim
nuclear warheads a country is able to build.
Jong-un views nuclear weapons and intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as “the ultimate guarantor of his
Nuclear Warheads
autocratic rule and has no intention of abandoning those
Outside experts estimate that North Korea has produced
programs, believing that over time he will gain international
acceptance as a nuclear power.”
enough fissile material for between 20 to 60 warheads. A

2021 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report says
The Korea People’s Assembly adopted a new law in
that North Korea “retains a stockpile of nuclear weapons.”
September 2022 that reportedly expands the conditions
Another goal of a nuclear weapons program is to lower the
under which North Korea would use nuclear weapons to
size and weight of a nuclear warhead for deployment on
include possible first use in situations that threaten the
missiles. A July 2017 DIA assessment and some outside
regime’s survival.
observers asserted North Korea had achieved the level of
miniaturization required to fit a nuclear device on weapons
In response to these developments, the United States and
ranging from short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to
South Korea have conducted joint military drills and
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). Kim Jong-un in
revived the bilateral Extended Deterrence Strategy and
January 2021 said that the country was able to “miniaturize,
Consultation Group. The Biden Administration’s 2022
lighten and standardize nuclear weapons and to make them
Nuclear Posture Review said, “Any nuclear attack by North
tactical ones.” In his January 1, 2023 speech, Kim said the
Korea against the United States or its Allies and partners is
country would “exponentially expand” its nuclear arsenal
unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime.”
and “mass produce” tactical nuclear weapons.
Congress may choose to examine U.S. policy toward North
Korea.
Missile Testing
Nuclear Testing
North Korea conducted an unprecedented 63 ballistic
missile test launches in 2022 according to U.S. government
North Korea has tested a nuclear explosive device six times
officials. U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions
since 2006. Each test produced underground blasts
prohibit North Korea’s development of the means of
progressively higher in magnitude and estimated yield.
delivering conventional and nuclear payloads, in addition to
North Korea conducted its most recent test on September 3,
the nuclear weapons themselves. UNSC resolutions
2017. A North Korean press release stated it had tested a
specifically ban “all ballistic missile tests” by North Korea.
hydrogen bomb (or two-stage thermonuclear warhead) that
A ballistic missile is a projectile powered by a rocket
it was perfecting for delivery on an intercontinental ballistic
engine until it reaches the apogee of its trajectory, at which
missile.
point it falls back to earth using earth’s gravity. Ballistic
In April 2018, North Korea announced that it had achieved
missiles can deliver nuclear and large conventional
its goals, would no longer conduct nuclear tests, and would
payloads at high speed and over great distances. They are
close down its Punggye-ri nuclear test site. It dynamited the
categorized as short-range, medium-range, or long-range
entrances to two test tunnels in May 2018. International
(intercontinental) based on the distance from the launch site
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports say North Korea
to the target.
began restoring test tunnels in March 2022 and the test site
North Korea is developing delivery systems that possess
“remains prepared to support a nuclear test.”
certain critical features: mobility, reliability, potency,
precision, and survivability. Mobile weapons have
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North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs
increased survivability compared with fixed launch sites
assets on the peninsula. The KN-24 is a tactical system with
and static stockpiles. Reliability, potency, precision and in-
a mobile launcher, solid propellant, and relatively large
flight maneuverability work together to maximize the
payload. The KN-24 demonstrates the guidance system and
impact of North Korea’s limited quantity of weapons,
in-flight maneuverability to achieve precision strikes.
launchers, and warheads. A key element to North Korean
Outside experts assess that the North Koreans may
missile doctrine, therefore, is continued testing to develop,
ultimately intend the KN-24 to serve as a dual capable
ensure, and demonstrate these features.
system.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
The KN-25 blurs the line between rocket and missile;
North Korea improved its ability to strike the continental
however, it achieves the same effect as a traditional SRBM
United States with an ICBM through a series of tests, first
by delivering destructive effects on a precision target at
in 2017, then in 2022, and again in February 2023. The
significant range thanks to advanced avionics, inertial and
DPRK first successfully test-launched two liquid-
satellite guidance systems, and aerodynamic structures. The
propellant, road-mobile ICBMs in 2017: the Hwasong-14
KN-25 carries a conventional payload up to 380 km,
(U.S. designated KN-20) and Hwasong-15 (U.S. designated
allowing it to strike any target in South Korea. Tests in
KN-22). The Hwasong-15 was most recently flight tested
2019 and 2020 demonstrate that a crew can launch the four
on February 18 in what North Korea called a “sudden
rockets composing the KN-25 system at 20-second
launching drill.”
intervals. Since the KN-25 is a more economical system
than traditional SRBMs, the North Koreans may seek to fire
North Korea displayed a larger Hwasong-17 ICBM at an
large numbers of these rockets in salvos to overwhelm the
October 2020 military parade and began test launching it in
ability of an adversary’s missile defense systems to
2022. The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses it is
“probably designed to deliver multiple warheads.”
successfully engage all incoming projectiles. Salvo firing
Analysts
projectiles gives them the greatest likelihood of
point to the larger diameter and propulsion capability,
accomplishing their intended effect in the face of even the
potentially allowing it to carry multiple warheads.
most advanced missile defense systems.
In addition, in December 2022 North Korea static (or
The newest missiles—including the Hwasong-14,
ground) tested an ICBM solid-propellant rocket motor,
Hwasong-15, Hwasong-17, KN-15, KN-23, KN-24, and
potentially for a land-based or submarine-based ICBM. On
KN-25—demonstrate mobility, potency, precision, and
April 13, North Korea claimed it had tested a solid-fuel
have characteristics that make the missiles difficult to
ICBM, the Hwasong-18. Reliability of these systems
defeat in flight. These traits suggest that the North Korean
remains uncertain without further testing.
test program may be intended to increase the reliability,
Short- and Medium-Range Missiles
effectiveness, and survivability of their ballistic missile
North Korean SRBMs and medium-range ballistic missiles
force. The 2023 ATA says North Korea will continue
(MRBM), precision-guided multiple launch rocket systems
testing a variety of missiles, “to validate technical
(MLRS), and artillery pose the most acute near-term threats
objectives, reinforce deterrence, and normalize
to other nations. Advances in these systems demonstrate a
Pyongyang’s missile testing.”
shift toward solid propellants and satellite guidance
The recent advances in North Korea’s ballistic missile
systems; advances that could carry over to larger, more
testing program also appear to be directed at developing
potent systems like the Hwasong series ICBMs. These
capabilities to defeat or degrade the effectiveness of missile
developments provide the projectiles greater mobility and
defenses deployed in the region: Patriot, Aegis Ballistic
survivability prior to launch and greater precision on target.
Missile Defense (BMD), and Terminal High Altitude Area
In the MRBM category, the Pukguksong-2 (KN-15) poses
Defense (THAAD). In addition, North Korea’s progress
the greatest threat to North Korea’s regional adversaries and
with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM)
exhibits advanced technology. The KN-15 is a solid-
suggests an effort to counter land-based THAAD missile
propellant missile capable of striking mainland Japan and
defenses by launching attacks from positions at sea outside
carrying a nuclear or conventional payload—known as dual
the THAAD’s radar field of view, although local Aegis
capable. The North Koreans fire the missile from a tracked
BMD systems could likely still track these projectiles. The
vehicle, which gives the system mobility and makes
Pukgugsong-3 SLBM was successfully tested beginning in
prelaunch targeting of the system difficult.
late 2019. According to a 2021 DIA report, North Korea
has said this SLBM, to be launched from a ballistic missile
The KN-23 SRBM exemplified a notable advance to the
submarine, will be cold-launched, solid-fueled and “will
North Korean inventory. The May 2019 tests of two KN-23
carry a nuclear warhead.” North Korea has also unveiled
missiles revealed an atypical flight path. On terminal
longer-range SLBMs, the Pukguksong-4 and -5.
approach to its target, the KN-23 conducted a “pull-up”
maneuver, intended to complicate the ability of ground-
North Korean tests have demonstrated growing success and,
based interceptors to destroy the hostile missile in flight by
coupled with increased operational training exercises,
increasing its speed and angle of attack. The KN-23 can
suggest a pattern designed to strengthen the credibility of
strike any location on the Korean peninsula with either a
North Korea’s regional nuclear deterrent strategy.
conventional or nuclear payload and uses a solid-propellant.
Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation
North Korea has committed to expanding the performance
of its precision guided tactical weapons. The KN-24 and
IF10472
KN-25 pose significant threats to South Korea and U.S.


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North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10472 · VERSION 27 · UPDATED

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