INSIGHTi

Venezuela: Issues for the 118th Congress
February 17, 2023
U.S. policy toward Venezuela may be shifting amid growing recognition that an array of sanctions and
international support for an interim government since 2019 have failed to dislodge authoritarian President
Nicolás Maduro. Within Venezuela, the Unity Platform of opposition parties has adjusted its strategy,
deciding to compete in presidential elections due in 2024, dissolve the interim government led by Juan
Guaidó, and negotiate with the Maduro government. Meanwhile, some foreign governments have moved
to normalize relations with the Maduro government. The Biden Administration has engaged in talks with
Maduro and has offered sanctions relief if negotiations produce “meaningful progress” for the Venezuelan
people and democracy in the country. Congress may consider legislation and oversight steps to shape U.S.
policy responses to developments in Venezuela.
The Venezuelan Opposition’s Strategy
Former President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) and Maduro have fomented divisions within the Venezuelan
opposition; Maduro has used state institutions to quash dissent. The opposition has boycotted most
elections since 2015. In 2019, it united behind Guaidó’s efforts to combine domestic protests and
international pressure to convince Maduro to step down. Although Guaidó gained international
recognition (and control of some Venezuelan assets abroad), Maduro has remained in control, buoyed by
support from international allies (Russia, China, and Iran), corrupt security forces, and illicit revenue.
By 2021, the opposition had begun exploring a new approach—competing in elections even under
imperfect circumstances—to overcome the stalemate. They welcomed the reconstituted National
Electoral Council, announced in May 2021, which has opposition representation. They engaged in
Norway-mediated talks with Maduro representatives in August-September 2021 that sought to address
humanitarian issues. Although Maduro suspended those talks in October 2021, the negotiations laid the
foundation for a November 2022 humanitarian accord to use Venezuelan assets frozen abroad to create a
U.N.-administered humanitarian fund. Some in the opposition welcomed the presence of European Union
(EU) electoral observers during November 2021 legislative and municipal elections in which the
opposition won a gubernatorial victory in Chávez’s home state of Barinas. Pro-election observers urge
Maduro to adopt EU recommendations on how to level the playing field for future elections; skeptics
doubt his government will allow any meaningful reforms.
Opposition parties scheduled a primary election for October 2023 to select a unified presidential
candidate for 2024. They continue to face many obstacles in a country ranked “not free” by Freedom
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House and in which the government has disqualified several opposition figures from competing in
elections and restricted freedom of speech and assembly.
U.S. Policy Changes
The U.S. government ceased recognizing Maduro as Venezuela’s legitimate president in January 2019,
following his reelection in a 2018 vote that was widely deemed fraudulent. Since then, it has sought to
compel Maduro to leave office through diplomatic, economic, and legal pressure, including sanctions on
Venezuela’s state oil company (PdVSA) and the Maduro government.
While maintaining most sanctions on the Maduro government, the Biden Administration has placed
increased emphasis on supporting negotiations. U.S. officials met with Maduro twice in 2022 and
negotiated an October 2022 prisoner swap. Since November 2022, the Treasury Department has issued
licenses to allow certain companies to conduct business with PdVSA as incentives for Maduro to resume
negotiations. The United States also has coordinated with the EU, Canada, and the United Kingdom to
offer Maduro further sanctions relief if negotiations make progress toward the restoration of democracy.
Neighboring countries (Colombia, Brazil, and Peru) also support a negotiated solution and have restored
relations with the Maduro government.
The Administration has accepted the 2015 National Assembly decision to dissolve Guaidó’s interim
government but has continued to recognize the assembly as “the last remaining democratic institution in
Venezuela.” The decision to not recognize an interim government has raised concerns about the future of
CITGO (U.S.-based refining company owned by PdVSA) and other Venezuelan assets frozen abroad,
which creditors are seeking to seize for debt repayment.
Issues for Congress
According to the VERDAD Act (P.L. 116-94, Division J), U.S. policy supports “diplomatic engagement
in order to advance a negotiated and peaceful solution” to the crisis in Venezuela. Some Members have
backed Administration efforts to engage the Maduro government and facilitate negotiations; others
oppose U.S. talks with Maduro and offers of sanctions relief. The 118th Congress could consider using
various policy tools to shape the U.S. approach toward Venezuela.
Targeted Sanctions. The VERDAD Act authorizes targeted sanctions for corruption, human rights
abuses, and antidemocratic actions in Venezuela through 2023. Congress may seek to extend those
sanctions or modify them, for example, by expanding the types of behavior subject to targeted sanctions
or removing sanctions on those who facilitate democratic elections.
Sectoral Sanctions. Whereas some in Congress support continued pressure on the Maduro government,
others argue that broad sanctions have not achieved their stated goals and have hurt the Venezuelan
people. A 2021 Government Accountability Office report found that U.S. sanctions exacerbated
Venezuela’s economic decline and hindered humanitarian aid delivery. Congress has various legislative
options to shape sanctions policy, including repealing sanctions authorities, codifying existing executive
orders, and setting the terms under which the Administration could lift sanctions.
Democracy Assistance. Over the past five years, the United States has provided democracy and human
rights assistance to support Venezuelan civil society and, until its recent dissolution, the interim
government. Congress may monitor democracy and human rights conditions in Venezuela and decisions
regarding frozen Venezuelan assets previously under the Guaidó government’s control. Congress also
might seek to modify the amount and type of assistance appropriated for Venezuela ($50.0 million in
FY2023) and to examine how future assistance will be coordinated with the Venezuelan opposition,
particularly if the Unity Platform seeks election-related assistance.

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Migration. Congress could conduct oversight on the regional migration challenges caused by
Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis and a new October 2022 U.S. immigration policy that created a parole
program for Venezuelan migrants while also authorizing the expulsion of irregular Venezuelan migrants
into Mexico. Congress also could consider measures to address challenges in Latin American and
Caribbean countries where some 6 million Venezuelans have migrated since 2014.


Author Information

Clare Ribando Seelke

Specialist in Latin American Affairs




Disclaimer
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