



Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. F-16 Sale

February 16, 2023

In January 2023, media sources—citing unnamed U.S. officials—[reported](#) that the Biden Administration has provided [informal notification](#) to Congress about possible F-16 sales for Turkey (Türkiye), a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Issues potentially factoring into congressional review of the sales include Turkey’s role regarding [the Russia-Ukraine war](#), [Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO membership applications](#), [regional rivalry with Greece](#), and [Turkish domestic matters](#).

The January informal notification is [reportedly](#) for 40 new F-16s of the advanced [Block 70/72 Viper configuration](#) and Block 70/72 upgrade packages for 79 existing fighters (see **Figure 1**), [along with](#) 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, at an estimated total value of \$20 billion. The transaction could [modernize](#) and extend the service life of much of [Turkey’s fleet](#) while Turkey tries to acquire or design a [more advanced fighter](#).

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Figure 1. F-16 Block 70/72 Viper Configuration


Source: Lockheed Martin

Some Members of Congress from both parties have [expressed reservations](#). Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) Chairman Bob Menendez [was quoted in January as saying](#), “Until [Turkish President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan ceases his threats [against neighboring NATO allies], improves his human rights record at home ... and begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not approve this sale.” Several other Senators, including [SFRC Ranking Member Jim Risch](#) and [the 29](#) who wrote a February letter to President Biden, have indicated they might only consider supporting the F-16 sale to Turkey if its parliament agrees to [Sweden and Finland joining NATO](#).

In general, the State Department [formally notifies](#) SFRC and the House Foreign Affairs Committee of a possible arms sale 20 to 40 days after an informal notification, giving the committees opportunity to raise concerns in a confidential process. If a [committee chair or ranking member](#) places a “hold” on the proposed transaction, formal notification usually does not proceed, though holds are not legally binding. Under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, [P.L. 90-629](#), 82 Stat. 1320), the Administration can proceed with a sale—if not [blocked by legislation](#)—[15 days](#) (for NATO allies like Turkey) after formal notification.

Congress and U.S.-Turkey Arms Transactions

Congressional legislation and oversight has helped shape U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation for decades. Congress placed an [arms embargo](#) on Turkey from 1975 to 1978, following the [1974 Cyprus conflict](#). Since then, Turkey has focused more on developing its defense industry (see [Figure 2](#)), and as part of that goal, one objective of Turkish arms purchases from the United States and other foreign suppliers has been to [acquire technology](#) for future indigenous defense production.

Figure 2. Arms Imports as a Share of Turkish Military Spending

Sources: Stratfor, based on information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Traders Database, with some text modifications by CRS.

Since Erdogan became president in 2014, a number of proposed U.S. arms transfers to Turkey either [have stalled](#) or [faced reported congressional holds](#). After Turkey acquired an [S-400 surface-to-air defense system from Russia](#), the Trump Administration removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program ([citing concerns](#) about possible Russian use of the S-400 to collect intelligence on F-35 stealth capabilities), and [imposed congressionally authorized sanctions](#) on Turkey. Section 1245 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, [P.L. 116-92](#)) prohibits funding the transfer of F-35s to Turkey unless Turkey no longer possesses the S-400.

Considerations for Congress

Several issues could have implications for congressional approaches to the possible sale, and vice versa. Shortly after [Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine](#), a State Department letter to some Members of Congress [reportedly said](#) that there were “compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability interests, as well as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are supported by appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.” While Turkey has acted [more independently](#) of the West under Erdogan, it has [NATO's second-largest military](#), [hosts](#) allied military assets and personnel, and partners in other ways with the [United States](#) and [NATO](#)—including using F-16s in [occasional policing missions](#).

U.S. officials have [voiced appreciation](#) for Turkish actions that appear [favorable to Ukraine](#). Turkey has denounced Russia's invasion, [closed the Bosphorus \(alt. Bosphorus\) and Dardanelles Straits](#) to belligerent warships, [helped broker](#) a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports, and supplied Ukraine with [military equipment](#).

However, Turkey also has [boosted](#) various forms of economic and energy cooperation with [Russia](#). During early 2023, U.S. officials [have warned](#) counterparts in [Turkey](#) (and some [non-NATO countries](#)) about possible penalties for businesses that continue trade potentially supplying Russia's defense industry.


Within a context of [strong congressional support](#) for [Swedish and Finnish NATO accession](#), some Members [argue](#) that Turkish delay on the issue threatens alliance unity. Turkish officials [appear dissatisfied](#) with steps Sweden has taken to date—per a June 2022 [trilateral memorandum](#)—against those that Turkey considers terrorists. Turkey's parliament [reportedly might agree](#) to Finland's accession as soon as March, but Finland [apparently would rather](#) join NATO together with Sweden, preferably before NATO's July summit.

[Turkey-Greece regional disputes](#) also are a factor for Congress. U.S. arms transfers could affect the [balance of power](#) between [Turkey](#) and [Greece](#). U.S.-Greece cooperation [has expanded](#), and reportedly the Administration informally notified Congress of a possible sale of up to [40 F-35s to Greece](#) at the same time as the Turkey/F-16 informal notification. Additionally, the [joint explanatory statement](#) accompanying the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) cautioned NATO allies against “unauthorized territorial overflights of another NATO ally's airspace.”

[Domestic developments in Turkey](#) are another consideration. Many U.S. lawmakers [have alleged](#) that “gross violation of human rights and democratic backsliding” have occurred under the rule of President Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP). Closely contested Turkish [presidential and parliamentary elections](#) could occur by June 2023 (see [Figure 3](#)), though they might be delayed due to effects of the [disastrous February 6 earthquakes](#) in southern Turkey. Observers speculate about the earthquakes' potential to [affect election outcomes](#) and [Turkey's struggling economy](#), and how [leadership changes](#) or [getting past the elections](#) might influence Turkish policies relevant to the F-16 issue.

[Congressional action](#) on a possible F-16 sale [could influence](#) whether Turkey continues to use major U.S. weapons platforms, and other aspects of [U.S.-Turkey political-military ties](#). Turkey is [reportedly exploring](#) Eurofighter Typhoons as a potential alternative to F-16s, but [it is unclear](#) if consortium partner Germany would approve such a sale. Moreover, Turkey's air force [could face difficulties](#) adjusting to a non-F-16 platform, thus potentially complicating alternatives.

Figure 3. Turkish Public Opinion Polls



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