Updated February 2, 2023
China Primer: U.S.-China Relations
U.S.-China Competition
period, China’s top diplomats met occasionally with U.S.
Congress has intensified its legislative and oversight
counterparts outside China, senior U.S. officials who
activity related to the People’s Republic of China (PRC or
traveled to China were subject to onerous COVID-19
China) in response to growing concerns about PRC actions
protocols, and U.S. diplomats in China faced severe
and intentions. Upon his election as House Speaker in the
limitations on their activities. Xi himself did not travel
118th Congress, Kevin McCarthy identified the ruling
abroad for 32 months. The November 2022 Biden-Xi
Communist Party of China (CPC) as one of two U.S. “long-
meeting, held on the sidelines of a gathering of the G-20
term challenges” for the House to address, the other being
nations in Bali, Indonesia, was the two leaders’ first in-
the national debt. On January 10, 2023, the House voted to
person meeting of the Biden Administration. Secretary of
establish a Select Committee on the Strategic Competition
State Antony J. Blinken is scheduled to make his first visit
between the United States and the Chinese Communist
to China in his current position on February 5-6.
Party “to investigate and submit policy recommendations
on the status of the Chinese Communist Party’s economic,
In 2021, the State Department and the PRC’s Ministry of
technological, and security progress and its competition
Foreign Affairs established joint working groups to address
with the United States” (H.Res. 11).
a limited set of issues. The groups, which continue to meet,
have made modest progress on such issues as visas for
The Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Administration presents the United
journalists, the cases of American citizens subject to
States as engaged in geopolitical competition with China
arbitrary PRC exit bans, and diplomatic reciprocity.
over the shape of the future global order, part of a broader
Following then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to
contest between democracies and autocracies. The
Taiwan in August 2022, the PRC government formally
Administration’s October 2022 National Security Strategy
suspended cooperation with the United States in several
outlines a three-part strategy for “out-competing” China:
areas, including transnational crime and counternarcotics;
first, to invest in competitiveness, innovation, resilience,
suspended climate-change talks; and cancelled meetings of
and democracy at home; second, to align U.S. efforts with
several military-to-military dialogues. Climate-change talks
those of allies and partners; and third, to “compete
have since resumed.
responsibly with the PRC to defend our interests and build
our vision for the future.” The document states that the
In December 2022, the State Department launched a new
Administration also seeks to “engage constructively with
Office of China Coordination, known as “China House.” In
the PRC wherever we can.” Following a November 2022
a statement, the department said the office would draw on
meeting with China’s top leader, CPC General Secretary Xi
regional and functional expertise from across the
Jinping, Biden noted, “We’re going to compete vigorously.
department to meet “the most complex and consequential
But I’m not looking for conflict.”
geopolitical challenge we face.” The Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) launched a dedicated China Mission Center
Top PRC officials have decried the U.S. government’s
in 2021. CIA Director William J. Burns said at the time that
identification of China as the leading U.S. competitor and
it would allow CIA to strengthen its work on “the most
dismissed the Administration’s assertion of a struggle
important geopolitical threat we face in the 21st century.”
between democratic governance and authoritarianism as a
“false narrative.” They have also condemned congressional
Select Issues in U.S.-China Relations
actions, including China-related provisions of the James M.
Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
Taiwan
Fiscal Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263). A PRC readout of the
Since then-Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the PRC has
Biden-Xi meeting paraphrased Xi as saying the two
stepped up military activity around the island. The White
countries need to “explore the right way to get along with
House says Biden raised the PRC’s “coercive and
each other” and seek “peaceful coexistence.”
increasingly aggressive actions toward Taiwan” in his
meeting with Xi. In a post-meeting press conference, Biden
Mechanics of the Relationship
said he made clear that differences between Beijing and
Under the Biden Administration, in-person interactions
Taipei should be “peacefully resolved.” He also stated that
between U.S. and PRC officials at all levels have been
he did not see “any imminent attempt on the part of China
limited. That situation is related in large part—though not
to invade Taiwan.” The PRC claims sovereignty over self-
exclusively—to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
ruled Taiwan and has long vowed to unify with it, by force
pandemic. The PRC government kept China’s borders
if necessary. Since 1979, the United States has maintained
largely closed for nearly three years in an ultimately failed
official relations with the PRC and unofficial relations with
effort to enforce a “zero-COVID” approach to the pandemic
Taiwan. To deter the PRC from use of force or coercion
in China; borders reopened on January 8, 2023. During this
against Taiwan, the 117th Congress passed the Taiwan
https://crsreports.congress.gov
China Primer: U.S.-China Relations
Enhanced Resilience Act (Title LV, Subtitle A of P.L. 117-
China is a large market for U.S. firms but poses significant
263). See CRS In Focus IF10275, Taiwan: Political and
trade barriers, unfair practices, and a lack of reciprocity in
Security Issues, and CRS In Focus IF11719, China Primer:
key areas for these firms. Many Members of Congress have
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
expressed concern about China’s state-driven economic,
trade, investment, and technology practices and the
Human Rights
challenges they pose to U.S. economic and technology
The Biden Administration and many Members have
leadership. China continues to require the transfer of some
criticized PRC authorities’ treatment of ethnic and religious
critical U.S. capabilities to China as a condition for some
minorities in the western PRC regions of Xinjiang and
U.S. firms to operate in strategic areas in the country. Some
Tibet, with the State Department assessing PRC actions in
Members have also expressed concern that China’s
Xinjiang to constitute genocide and crimes against
practices distort markets and undermine fair competition as
humanity. In the PRC’s Hong Kong Special Administrative
PRC firms expand globally in areas that China restricts
Region, Secretary Blinken has accused the CPC of having
foreign firms from accessing domestically. China’s system
“imposed harsh anti-democratic measures under the guise
blurs state and corporate interests, enabling its government
of national security.” In the 117th Congress, enacted
to deploy trade tools (e.g., in such areas as antidumping,
legislation seeking to support human rights in China
antitrust, standards, and procurement), economic coercion,
included the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (P.L.
and espionage to advantage its firms and advance China’s
117-78), which restricts Xinjiang-related imports. See CRS
industrial and other policies. Experts see the PRC state’s
In Focus IF12265, China Primer: Human Rights.
expanding role in commercial activity—including an
intensification of industrial policies and enactment of
Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids
national economic security policies since 2020—as
China ceased to be the primary source of illicit fentanyl
increasing the business and broader economic risks of U.S.
entering the United States after the PRC imposed class-
commercial ties with China.
wide controls over all fentanyl-related substances in 2019.
Some Members have shown interest in addressing risks
In the context of the U.S. opioid epidemic, the U.S.
government’s
related to China’s digital platforms (e.g., TikTok) operating
focus is now on addressing flows of
in the United States and in exerting greater oversight over
uncontrolled PRC-produced precursor chemicals used to
executive branch decisions on export control licensing and
make fentanyl in third countries, primarily Mexico, and
foreign investment reviews. Congress has sought to
stemming illicit fentanyl-related financial flows linked to
promote U.S. industry in strategic (e.g., semiconductor) and
the PRC. The FENTANYL Results Act (Title LV, Subtitle
emerging (e.g., electric vehicle) technologies and
C of P.L. 117-263) provides assistance to build the capacity
considered new guardrails on U.S. commercial and research
of foreign law enforcement agencies with respect to
ties with China, including outbound investment. Recently
synthetic drugs, but bars such assistance to the PRC or any
enacted legislation intended to address these issues includes
of its law enforcement agencies. See CRS In Focus
the CHIPS Act of 2022 (Division A of P.L. 117-167), the
IF10890, China Primer: Illicit Fentanyl and China’s Role.
Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-169), and the
Relations with Russia and North Korea
Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business
Technology Transfer Extension Act of 2022 ( P.L. 117-
The United States has pressed China to help bring an end to
183). See CRS In Focus IF11284, U.S.-China Trade
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression in
Relations, and CRS In Focus IF10964, “Made in China
Ukraine. Xi has expressed China’s opposition to the
2025” Industrial Policies: Issues for Congress.
threatened or actual use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, but
has otherwise expressed solidarity with Putin. The FY2023
Cooperation and Assurances
NDAA requires a report on whether and how the PRC has
Areas the two governments have identified for cooperation
provided support to Russia with respect to the war in
include climate change, global macroeconomic stability,
Ukraine. The Biden Administration has also pressed China
global food security, and public health. Biden and Xi also
to do more to restrain North Korean leader Kim Jong-un,
appear to have used their November 2022 meeting to clarify
who in 2022 presided over an unprecedented number of
their intentions, with the goal of lessening the risk that
missile tests, including multiple intercontinental ballistic
miscalculations lead to conflict. According to the PRC
missile (ICBM) tests, in violation of U.N. resolutions. In
readout of the meeting, Xi told Biden that, “China does not
2022, the PRC joined Russia in vetoing a U.S.-led draft
seek to change the existing international order or interfere
U.N. resolution that would have tightened sanctions against
in the internal affairs of the United States, and has no
North Korea over its missile launches. See CRS In Focus
intention to challenge or displace the United States.” In a
IF12100, China-Russia Relations.
press conference after the meeting, in addition to stating
Trade, Investment, and Technology
that he does not seek conflict, Biden said he believes that
China was the United States’ fourth
there “need not be a new Cold War.” The PRC readout
-largest goods trading
paraphrased Biden as saying that the United States
partner in 2021 (with the European Union considered as
“respects China’s system, and does not seek to change it,”
one trading partner). Two-way foreign direct investment
“does not seek to revitalize alliances against China,” and
(FDI) flows have slowed since 2016, while investment and
“does not support Taiwan independence.” The less-detailed
commercial ties not included in FDI data—technology
White House readout of the meeting did not mention those
licensing, research, venture capital, and financial
reported statements.
investments—have expanded.
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov
China Primer: U.S.-China Relations
IF10119
Karen M. Sutter, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10119 · VERSION 57 · UPDATED