Updated February 1, 2023
Chinese Nuclear and Missile Proliferation
The U.S. government has continued to express concerns
facilities and 1997 changes to Chinese nuclear export
about China’s record concerning the proliferation of
policy, as well as other Chinese nonproliferation efforts.
nuclear- and missile-related technologies to other countries,
with more recent focus on the threat of Chinese acquisition
The United States has extensive nuclear cooperation with
of U.S.-origin nuclear technology. (See CRS In Focus
China, which is governed by a civil nuclear cooperation
IF11050, New U.S. Policy Regarding Nuclear Exports to
agreement, renewed in 2015. (See CRS Report RL33192,
China, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.) Official
U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.)
U.S. government reports indicate that the Chinese
government has apparently ended its direct involvement in
The above-described changes in Chinese behavior took
the transfer of nuclear- and missile-related items, but
place after the two governments concluded their first
Chinese-based companies and individuals continue to
nuclear cooperation agreement in 1985. Laws subsequently
export goods relevant to those items, particularly to Iran
adopted by Congress required, as a condition for U.S.
and North Korea. U.S. officials have also raised concerns
implementation of the agreement, the President to submit to
about entities operating in China that provide other forms of
Congress certain nonproliferation-related certifications, as
support for proliferation-sensitive activities, such as illicit
well as a report about Beijing’s “nonproliferation policies
finance and money laundering.
and practices.” President William Clinton stated in a
January 1998 letter to Congress that China had “made
Background
substantial strides in joining the international
China did not oppose new states’ acquisition of nuclear
nonproliferation regime, and in putting in place a
weapons during the 1960s and 1970s, the Department of
comprehensive system of nuclear-related, nationwide
State wrote in a declassified January 1998 report to
export controls,” since concluding the 1985 agreement.
Congress. According to a 1983 National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE), China had exported “nuclear materials
Beijing acceded in 1992 to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
since 1981” that were not subject to International Atomic
Treaty (NPT) as a nuclear-weapon state (NWS) and has
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Beijing did so “mainly
voluntary IAEA safeguards on its civil reactors. The treaty
to earn hard currency,” the estimate assesses, explaining
defines NWS as those that exploded a nuclear weapon or
that the
other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967:
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
Chinese became aware in 1979 that they had
States. All other NPT states-parties are nonnuclear-weapon
insufficient resources for their initially grandiose
states. According to the treaty, a NWS is not to transfer
modernization program and that they needed to
nuclear weapons to “any recipient whatsoever” or to “in
generate more revenue through expanded foreign
any way … assist, encourage, or induce any” nonnuclear-
trade. Accordingly, the State Council directed its
weapon state “to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
subordinate ministries in late 1979 to begin selling
weapons.”
surpluses.
China is also a participant in the Nuclear Suppliers Group
Consequently, according to the NIE, Beijing ended its
(NSG)—a multilateral control regime for nuclear-related
“abstention from commercial trade in conventional arms
exports. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
and nuclear materials.” During the 1980s and 1990s, China
performs an analogous function for missiles and related
transferred nuclear and missile technology to other
items. China is not an MTCR partner but has agreed to
countries’ weapons programs. China provided assistance to
adhere to the regime’s export guidelines.
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and engaged in
nuclear cooperation with Iran. Beijing exported missiles to
The Chinese government continues to express support for
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. (For more information,
the international arms control and nonproliferation regime.
see CRS Report RL33192, U.S.-China Nuclear
According to a July 2019 Chinese government publication
Cooperation Agreement, by Mark Holt, Mary Beth D.
titled China’s National Defense in the New Era, “China
Nikitin, and Paul K. Kerr.)
actively participates in international arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation” and “objects to arms
According to U.S. government reports and official
race and strives to protect global strategic balance and
statements, China significantly curtailed its nuclear- and
stability.” Similarly, Fu Cong, Director General of the
missile-related transfers during the 1990s; Beijing also
Department of Arms Control of China’s Ministry of
committed to improving its export controls. For example,
Foreign Affairs, stated during the December 9-10, 2020,
the 1998 State Department report cited above noted China’s
16th Asian Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation that
1996 pledge to refrain from assisting unsafeguarded nuclear
“China is ready to enhance non-proliferation policy
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Chinese Nuclear and Missile Proliferation
exchanges and cooperation with all countries, including the
uses and maintains a network of financial
incoming U.S. administration.”
representatives, primarily in China, who operate as
agents for North Korean financial institutions …
Current Proliferation Concerns
these representatives orchestrate schemes, set up
As noted, official U.S. government reports indicate that the
front or shell companies, and manage surreptitious
Chinese government has apparently ceased direct
bank accounts to move and disguise illicit funds,
involvement in nuclear-related proliferation and transfers of
evade sanctions, and finance the proliferation of
complete missile systems. However, Chinese entities have
North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missile
continued to engage in proliferation, and the U.S.
programs.
government has repeatedly expressed concerns with regard
to weaknesses in China’s export control system. According
Then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alex Wong
to a 2019 Department of State report regarding states’
asserted during a November 2020 speech that “China hosts
compliance with nonproliferation and arms control
no less than two dozen North Korean WMD and ballistic
agreements, “Chinese entities” continued in 2018 “to
missile procurement representatives and bank
supply MTCR-controlled items to missile programs of
representatives.” China has flouted UN Security Council
proliferation concern, including those in Iran, North Korea,
resolutions’ requirements to expel such representatives,
Syria, and Pakistan.” The United States also “raised a
Wong claimed, adding that the United States has “provided
number of [other] cases with China concerning” Chinese
China with ample actionable information on the ongoing
entities’ missile technology transfers to “programs of
UN-prohibited activities occurring within its borders,” but
concern” in those same countries, according to the report,
Beijing “has chosen not to act.”
which added that, despite U.S. requests for Beijing to
“investigate and put a stop to such activities, most of these
Media outlets have reported that China is assisting in the
cases remain unresolved.” The 2021 version of the report
construction of facilities in Saudi Arabia for possible
states only that “Chinese entities continued to supply
uranium production. When asked about the topic during a
MTCR-controlled goods to missile programs of
September 2020 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
proliferation concern in 2020.” Editions of the report
hearing, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
published in 2016, 2017, 2018, 2020, and 2022 contain
David Hale declined to provide any information, citing
similar language.
classification concerns.
The United States has continued to sanction Chinese
China’s construction of civil nuclear reactors in Pakistan
entities for proliferation. For example, on October 3, 2022,
has been another source of congressional concern; the
the U.S. government imposed sanctions on a Chinese
United States has argued that the projects violate Beijing’s
company and a Chinese individual for transferring
NSG commitments. China has constructed four power
controlled weapons technology to Iran, North Korea, and/or
reactors in Pakistan and is constructing two additional such
Syria. On January 21, 2021, the State Department
reactors. Pakistan has IAEA safeguards agreements in force
announced that it was imposing sanctions on three Chinese
for all of these reactors. However, the NSG guidelines
entities for unspecified “missile technology proliferation
prohibit such projects in states, such as Pakistan, which lack
activities.”
IAEA safeguards on all of the country’s nuclear facilities.
Islamabad’s nuclear weapons facilities are not safeguarded.
Regarding government involvement in these sorts of
transfers, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Vann
The United States argues that only the first two reactor
Van Diepen told Politico in 2017 that, even if the transfers
projects are consistent with China’s NSG commitments;
are not directly state-sponsored, “China hasn’t devoted the
Beijing and Islamabad concluded contracts for these
priority, effort, or resources to thwart” such activity, adding
reactors before China joined the NSG in 2004. At that time,
that “when that continues to be the case over 20 years, even
other NSG members agreed to “grandfather” only ongoing
when they have been criticized, over time it becomes a
Chinese reactor projects in Pakistan, then-Assistant
choice, and you have to wonder what’s going on.”
Secretary of State Thomas Countryman said during a May
2015 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. (For
U.S. officials have described other concerns with regard to
more information, see CRS Report RL34248, Pakistan’s
Chinese proliferation behavior, such as money laundering,
Nuclear Weapons, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D.
the provision of illicit financial services, and illegitimate
Nikitin.)
procurement by entities operating within China. According
to a 2018 Department of the Treasury report, “Chinese
Paul K. Kerr, Specialist in Nonproliferation
entities and individuals” have engaged in proliferation
financing activities “for the benefit of” Iranian and North
IF11737
Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. A
2017 Department of the Treasury report similarly assesses
that North Korea


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Chinese Nuclear and Missile Proliferation


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11737 · VERSION 7 · UPDATED

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