Legal Sidebari

Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools: the Supreme
Court Considers a Futility Exception to IDEA
Administrative Exhaustion
January 26, 2023
This term, the Supreme Court considers the interplay between the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA) and other federal laws protecting students with disabilities, particularly the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). The Court heard argument in Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools on January 18,
2023. In Perez, a deaf student seeks money damages under the ADA for his school district’s alleged
failure to provide him with any interpreting services for most of his schooling. The questions before the
Court are, first, whether the IDEA requires children with disabilities and their parents to complete state-
level administrative proceedings before filing related ADA claims in court, even when further
administrative proceedings are “futile”—that is, when they cannot provide the child with any further
relief. Second, the case raises the question of whether plaintiffs seeking only money damages under the
ADA must pursue the IDEA administrative process at all, when money damages can never be awarded in
IDEA proceedings.
The IDEA provides that children with disabilities retain the rights and remedies available under other
federal disability laws, including the ADA. A ruling against the student in Perez would raise the
possibility that in some circumstances, students with disabilities may face a trade-off between receiving
immediate services under the IDEA and retaining their ability to pursue remedies under other laws. A
ruling against the school, on the other hand, could incentivize some students and parents to privilege
damages over educational services when looking to remedy disability discrimination. This case may also
have implications for other statutory schemes requiring claimants to work through administrative
processes before heading to court. This Sidebar reviews the statutory and legal background of the case,
the implications of the issues before the Court, and some potential considerations for Congress.
Statutory Framework—the IDEA, the ADA, and Section 504
A number of federal laws protect the rights of public school students with disabilities and allow students
to receive needed services. Under the IDEA, Congress has authorized grants to state and local education
agencies to provide children with disabilities “a free appropriate public education” (FAPE). Public
schools must also comply with Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
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(Section 504), which prohibit state and local governments and recipients of federal funds, respectively,
from discriminating against people with disabilities. Students alleging disability discrimination against
their schools often seek to bring claims under the ADA and/or Section 504 in addition to, or in lieu of, the
IDEA. (Students may also seek to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if they think schools violated their
constitutional rights, such as when teachers physically abuse disabled students.)
While related, the IDEA, ADA, and Section 504 focus on different wrongs. As the Supreme Court
explains,
The [IDEA’s] goal is to provide each child with meaningful access to education by offering
individualized instruction and related services appropriate to her “unique needs.” ... By contrast,
Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ... aim to root out disability-based
discrimination, enabling each covered person (sometimes by means of reasonable accommodations)
to participate equally to all others in public facilities and federally funded programs.... In short, the
IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational services, while Title II and § 504 promise
nondiscriminatory access to public institutions.
These laws also provide for different redress. When a parent or student brings a successful IDEA claim, a
court may order a school to provide services to remedy the past denial of a FAPE and ensure the student
receives a FAPE going forward. Parents may also receive reimbursement for educational expenditures
that the state should have paid. Importantly, courts may not award compensatory damages under the
IDEA, including damages for emotional distress, medical bills, or lost income.
Some, but not all, ADA and Section 504 remedies are similar. Under the ADA and Section 504, courts
may order schools to take action to remedy disability discrimination. A court could order services, which
may be (but are not necessarily) similar or identical to the services a student can receive under the IDEA.
However, courts may also be able to award ADA and Section 504 plaintiffs damages, such as
compensation for lost income or medical bills or other financial harms, that are categorically unavailable
under the IDEA. (An exception is damages for emotional distress: the Supreme Court recently held that
plaintiffs may not receive compensatory damages for emotional distress under Section 504, and lower
courts increasingly hold that emotional distress damages are also unavailable under Title II of the ADA.)
Students and parents therefore may have reason to bring ADA and Section 504 claims in addition to IDEA
claims.
The procedures for making claims under the IDEA also diverge from those under Section 504 and the
ADA. Under the IDEA, parents and schools must follow a detailed complaint resolution process when
they cannot reach agreement on a child’s services. That process expressly encourages the informal
resolution of complaints through settlement. If the parties cannot settle, they proceed to an administrative
due process hearing. Only after parents and students have fully completed—or, in legal terms,
“exhausted”—the state-level administrative process can they bring an IDEA suit in court. Notably, if the
family rejects an offer of settlement from the school and then fails to obtain a better outcome later, they
cannot recover attorneys’ fees and costs, relief that is otherwise available for successful claimants. This
provision, among others, encourages parents and students to settle their claims.
In contrast to the IDEA, neither the ADA nor Section 504 (nor § 1983) require administrative exhaustion;
claimants can proceed straight to court. Concerned, in part, that plaintiffs would skip the IDEA
administrative process by pleading only Section 504 or § 1983 claims (the ADA did not yet exist), in
1984, the Supreme Court decided that children with disabilities could challenge their educational services
exclusively through the IDEA. Congress then abrogated that holding, amending the IDEA to expressly
provide that the IDEA does not “restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under ...
other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities,” including the ADA and Section 504.
However, Congress determined that plaintiffs with non-IDEA claims “seeking relief that is also available
under” the IDEA must exhaust IDEA administrative procedures “to the same extent as would be required
had the action been brought under” the IDEA.

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In a 2017 case, the Supreme Court held that ADA and Section 504 plaintiffs “sought relief that is also
available under” the IDEA, and therefore had to administratively exhaust their claims, when the
“gravamen” of their suit was the denial of a FAPE, regardless of whether the plaintiffs brought claims
under the IDEA. The Court expressly declined to consider whether plaintiffs who sought only damages,
which are not available under the IDEA and cannot be awarded in IDEA administrative hearings, would
have to exhaust claims related to the denial of a FAPE.
That question, in addition to the question of whether there is a general futility exception to IDEA
exhaustion, arises in Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools. In short, Perez asks whether Section 504 and ADA
plaintiffs should have to take the time and expense to go through state administrative proceedings
established under the IDEA when those proceedings either cannot give them what they want—damages—
or cannot give them any useful relief at all.
Case Background and the Sixth Circuit’s Decision
In Perez, the plaintiff, who is deaf, alleges that his school district violated his rights under the ADA by
failing to provide him with a qualified sign language interpreter for 12 years. He claims that as a result of
this failure, and the fact that the school allegedly misled the family about the services it was providing
him and his academic progress, he did not receive a FAPE and could not graduate from high school.
The family sought relief under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA. As is common in IDEA
administrative proceedings, the IDEA hearing officer dismissed the ADA and Section 504 claims for lack
of jurisdiction. The parties then settled the IDEA claim for all of the relief requested, including
compensatory educational services at the district’s expense and attorneys’ fees. The hearing officer
therefore dismissed the IDEA claim. The family then brought suit in federal court under the ADA seeking
compensatory damages.
The Sixth Circuit dismissed his suit. The circuit court held that, because the gravamen of the complaint
was the denial of a FAPE, the family needed to “first complete the IDEA’s full administrative process”
before suing for damages under the ADA. Because the plaintiff settled the IDEA claim, he did not allow a
hearing officer to pass on the claim and develop an administrative record, and therefore, the circuit court
held, he did not fully exhaust his administrative remedies.
The circuit court rejected the family’s argument that the IDEA does not require exhaustion when
attempting to complete the administrative process would be futile. In his case, the plaintiff argued that he
could have gained nothing from proceeding to a hearing: the hearing officer could not have awarded
damages or ruled on the IDEA claim once the parties settled. Had the plaintiff rejected the settlement, he
might have received a less favorable outcome at the hearing and lost his attorneys’ fees, in addition to
potentially losing access to services. Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit held that there are no exceptions to
the IDEA’s exhaustion provision when a student complains about the denial of a FAPE, meaning that
students must go through the entire process, even if it is useless to them, before they can go to court with
claims under Section 504 or the ADA.
The circuit court relied on a 2016 decision from the Supreme Court, Ross v. Blake. In that case, the
Supreme Court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) exhaustion provision is not subject
to judge-made exceptions, explaining that “mandatory exhaustion statutes like the PLRA establish
mandatory exhaustion regimes, foreclosing judicial discretion.” The Sixth Circuit understood the IDEA to
enact this kind of mandatory exhaustion regime. The circuit court also disagreed that exhaustion was
futile, when the process could have allowed the hearing officer to make an administrative record that
would have assisted judicial review.
The Sixth Circuit opinion drew a dissent. The dissent agreed that a plaintiff cannot skip administrative
exhaustion simply by seeking money damages for the failure to provide a FAPE, so long as a hearing

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officer can provide some other relief. However, the dissent referred to the Supreme Court’s 1988 opinion
in Honig v. Doe, in which the Court stated that the IDEA did not require exhaustion when exhaustion was
futile—a statement that the Sixth Circuit majority characterized as dictum that could not be reconciled
with Ross. Because the hearing officer could not provide Perez with anything more than what he had
obtained via settlement, the dissent agreed with the argument that exhaustion was futile and would have
allowed the ADA damages claim to proceed.
Supreme Court Arguments and Potential Impact
The question of whether students have to go through a “futile” administrative
process
The first question under consideration by the Supreme Court is whether and when futility excuses the
IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. The answer implicates students’ access to the full panoply of remedies
under federal disability rights laws. In addition to potentially requiring families to spend time and
resources on administrative proceedings that cannot help them, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that its
interpretation of the IDEA requires a trade-off: a family that settles can receive immediate IDEA services
but loses the right to pursue damages under the ADA or Section 504. A family that rejects a settlement can
seek damages but may find at the end of the administrative process that they receive fewer IDEA services
than the settlement offered, and at greater delay. If they get less than what they could have settled for, they
will also lose attorneys’ fees. The plaintiff and his amici argue that the Sixth Circuit’s holding is in
tension with the IDEA’s encouragement of settlement and the prompt provision of services to children
with disabilities, as well as its express statement that students retain their rights under other federal
disability rights laws. The Solicitor General agrees: “It is not plausible that ... Congress ... required
parents to forgo favorable IDEA settlements and attorneys fees, delay educational relief, and pursue
pointless administrative proceedings in order to bring the ADA claims that [the IDEA] was specifically
designed to preserve.” The amici assert that the vast majority of IDEA cases resolve before a due process
hearing, suggesting that the Sixth Circuit’s approach may have a broad impact.
Arguing in support of the Sixth Circuit’s decision, the school district particularly emphasizes the primacy
of the IDEA in ensuring that students with disabilities receive appropriate educational services and
contends that channeling all FAPE-related complaints through the full administrative process ensures the
fulfillment of the IDEA’s goals. The school district also contends that requiring claimants to exhaust
allows hearing officers to develop a valuable administrative record for judicial appeals. The school district
focuses on the value of letting education professionals, not courts, try to resolve IDEA issues.
Courts have recognized exceptions beyond futility to IDEA exhaustion, such as when plaintiffs challenge
certain general policies or systemic practices rather than their individual educational services, or when
going through the administrative process would cause irreparable harm. A decision recognizing judge-
made exceptions to the exhaustion requirement could, depending on one’s perspective, weaken the
IDEA’s administrative procedures or continue to allow flexibility in cases where the administrative
process is not the best forum for resolving claims.
The Supreme Court may also give useful guidance on interpreting other statutory administrative
exhaustion provisions. Such requirements—and judicially recognized futility exceptions—are widespread
in federal law. Ross contemplated that “an exhaustion provision with a different text and history from [the
PLRA] might be best read to give judges the leeway to create exceptions or to itself incorporate standard
administrative-law exceptions.” Perez offers the Court an opportunity to further clarify what expressions
of legislative intent in the text and history of an exhaustion provision allow for judge-made exceptions.

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The question of whether students requesting only damages have to go through the
administrative process
Regarding the first question before the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit dissent observed that the circuit
court’s holding created a split with 11 other circuits, each of which has held that plaintiffs need not pursue
futile IDEA administrative processes. There is no circuit split on the second question before the Court:
whether plaintiffs must exhaust claims based on the denial of a FAPE when they seek a remedy—
damages—that is not available under the IDEA. Every court to consider the issue has held that they must.
As one circuit court reasoned, although “there is a textualist case that a claim does not ‘seek relief that is
also available’ under the IDEA if the plaintiff cannot seek the same remedy under the IDEA,” most courts
interpret the statute to mean that a claimant must exhaust when the IDEA could provide some remedy for
her claim, not just the remedy she prefers. This reading, that circuit court held, is “necessary to enforce
the statutory scheme,” to allow “educational professionals” to address claims in the first instance and
prevent plaintiffs from circumventing exhaustion by “tacking on a request for money damages.” The
school district and its amici, too, argue that the plaintiff’s proposed rule would undermine collaboration
between schools and parents and incentivize parents to pursue money damages at the expense of
educational services.
Alongside his amici, Perez and the Solicitor General reject the premise that parents will dodge the
administrative process, as doing so would forfeit educational services to which their children may be
entitled. Requiring those who seek only money damages to pursue administrative hearings that cannot
help them, Perez and his amici argue, wastes time and resources.
Considerations for Congress
The matters at stake in Perez are purely statutory. Congress has a history of legislating in this area in
response to the Supreme Court. Congress may opt to clarify its intent regarding when students with ADA,
Section 504, or other claims must exhaust the IDEA’s administrative process. Futility is not the only
judge-made exhaustion exception, and Congress may consider whether it wants to expressly write such
exceptions into the IDEA or other statutory exhaustion schemes. In doing so, Congress could allow
claimants to take advantage of an exception to exhaustion in certain circumstances, but not others; it need
not adopt the same approach to all claims.

Author Information

Abigail A. Graber

Legislative Attorney




Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.

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