Updated January 23, 2023
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs
Overview
Nuclear Material Production
North Korea continues to advance its nuclear weapons and
North Korea reportedly continues to produce fissile
missile programs despite UN Security Council sanctions
material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for
and high-level diplomatic efforts. Recent ballistic missile
weapons. North Korea restarted its plutonium production
tests and military parades suggest that North Korea is
facilities after it withdrew from a nuclear agreement in
continuing to build a nuclear warfighting capability
2009, and is operating centrifuge uranium enrichment
designed to evade regional ballistic missile defenses. Such
plants at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and possibly at
an approach likely reinforces a deterrence and coercive
Kangson. A March 2022 IAEA report says that there were
diplomacy strategy—lending more credibility as it
no indications of operations at its Radiochemical
demonstrates capability—but it also raises questions about
Laboratory (reprocessing) plant since its last reprocessing
crisis stability and escalation control. Congress may choose
campaign from February to July 2021. The IAEA notes
to examine U.S. policy in light of these advances.
ongoing operation of the Yongbyon Experimental Light
Water 5MW(e) Reactor since July 2021. Spent fuel from
According to the U.S. intelligence community’s 2022
that reactor is reprocessed at the Radiochemical Laboratory
annual threat assessment, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un
to extract plutonium for weapons. In September 2022, the
views nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) as “the ultimate guarantor of his
IAEA reported ongoing uranium mining, milling, and
concentration activities at Pyongsan. Fissile material
totalitarian and autocratic rule of North Korea and believes
production in large part determines the number and type of
that over time he will gain international acceptance as a
nuclear power.”
nuclear warheads a country is able to build.
Nuclear Warheads
United States policy as well as United Nations resolutions
Outside experts estimate that North Korea has produced
call on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons. In a
enough fissile material for between 20 to 60 warheads. A
September 9, 2022, speech to North Korea’s Supreme
People’
2021 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report says
s Assembly, Kim Jong Un rejected denuclearization
that North Korea “retains a stockpile of nuclear weapons.”
talks and vowed the country would continue developing its
“
Another goal of a nuclear weapons program is to lower the
nuclear power.” The Assembly adopted a new law that
size and weight of a nuclear warhead for deployment on
reportedly expands the conditions under which North Korea
missiles. A July 2017 DIA assessment and some outside
would use nuclear weapons to include possible first use in
observers asserted North Korea had achieved the level of
situations that threaten the regime’s survival. The Biden
Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review
miniaturization required to fit a nuclear device on weapons
said, “Any
ranging from short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to
nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). Kim Jong-un in
its Allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the
January 2021 said that the country was able to “miniaturize,
end of that regime.”
lighten and standardize nuclear weapons and to make them
Nuclear Testing
tactical ones.”
North Korea has tested a nuclear explosive device six times
Missile Development
since 2006. Each test produced underground blasts
North Korea conducted an unprecedented 63 ballistic
progressively higher in magnitude and estimated yield.
missile test launches in 2022 according to U.S. government
North Korea conducted its most recent test on September 3,
officials. U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions
2017. A North Korean press release stated it had tested a
prohibit North Korea’s development of the means of
hydrogen bomb (or two-stage thermonuclear warhead) that
delivering conventional and nuclear payloads, in addition to
it was perfecting for delivery on an intercontinental ballistic
the nuclear weapons themselves. UNSC resolutions
missile.
specifically ban “all ballistic missile tests” by North Korea.
In April 2018, North Korea announced that it had achieved
A ballistic missile is a projectile powered by a rocket
its goals, would no longer conduct nuclear tests, and would
engine until it reaches the apogee of its trajectory, at which
close down its Punggye-ri nuclear test site. It dynamited the
point it falls back to earth using earth’s gravity. Ballistic
entrances to two test tunnels in May 2018 prior to the first
missiles can deliver nuclear and large conventional
Trump-Kim summit. In an October 2018 meeting with
payloads at high speed and over great distances. They are
then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Kim Jong-un
categorized as short-range, medium-range, or long-range
“invited inspectors to visit the [test site] to confirm that it
(intercontinental) based on the distance from the launch site
has been irreversibly dismantled,” but this did not occur.
to the target.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports say
North Korea is developing nuclear weapons and delivery
North Korea began restoring test tunnels in March 2022.
systems that possess certain critical features: mobility,
reliability, potency, precision, and survivability. Mobile
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North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs
weapons have increased survivability compared with fixed
North Korea has committed to expanding the performance
launch sites and static stockpiles. Reliability, potency,
of its precision guided tactical weapons. The KN-24 and
precision and in-flight maneuverability work together to
KN-25 pose significant threats to South Korea and U.S.
maximize the impact of North Korea’s limited quantity of
assets on the peninsula. The KN-24 is a tactical system with
weapons, launchers, and warheads. A key element to North
a mobile launcher, solid propellant, and relatively large
Korean missile doctrine, therefore, is continued testing to
payload. The KN-24 demonstrates the guidance system and
develop, ensure, and demonstrate these features.
in-flight maneuverability to achieve precision strikes.
Outside experts assess that the North Koreans may
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
ultimately intend the KN-24 to serve as a dual capable
North Korea improved its ability to strike the continental
system.
United States with an ICBM through a series of tests in
The KN-25 blurs the line between rocket and missile;
2017 and again in 2022. U.S. Representative to the United
however, it achieves the same effect as a traditional SRBM
Nations Linda Thomas Greenfield noted at a UN Security
by delivering destructive effects on a precision target at
Council meeting that the November 18, 2022, test was
“DPRK’s eighth ICBM launch this
significant range thanks to advanced avionics, inertial and
year.” The DPRK first
satellite guidance systems, and aerodynamic structures. The
successfully test-launched two liquid-propellant, road-
KN-25 carries a conventional payload up to 380 km,
mobile ICBMs in 2017: the Hwasong-14 (U.S. designated
allowing it to strike any target in South Korea. Tests in
KN-20) and Hwasong-15 (U.S. designated KN-22). North
2019 and 2020 demonstrate that a crew can launch the four
Korea displayed a larger new Hwasong-17 ICBM at an
rockets composing the KN-25 system at 20-second
October 2020 military parade and began test launching it in
intervals. Since the KN-25 is a more economical system
2022. The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses it is
“probably designed to deliver multiple warheads.”
than traditional SRBMs, the North Koreans may seek to fire
Analysts
large numbers of these rockets in salvos to overwhelm the
point to the larger diameter and propulsion capability,
ability of an adversary’s missile defense systems to
potentially allowing it to carry multiple warheads. In
successfully engage all incoming projectiles. Salvo firing
addition, in December 2022 North Korea static (or ground)
projectiles gives them the greatest likelihood of
tested an ICBM solid-propellant rocket motor, potentially
accomplishing their intended effect in the face of even the
for a land-based or submarine-based ICBM. Reliability of
most advanced missile defense systems.
these systems remains uncertain. Without further testing,
neither the North Koreans nor others can assess whether the
The newest missiles—including the Hwasong-14,
missiles or components will function as designed.
Hwasong-15, Hwasong-17, KN-15, KN-23, KN-24, and
KN-25—demonstrates mobility, potency, precision, and has
Short- and Medium-Range Missiles
characteristics that make the missiles difficult to defeat in
North Korean SRBMs and medium-range ballistic missiles
flight. These traits suggest that the North Korean test
(MRBM), precision-guided multiple launch rocket systems
program may be intended to increase the reliability,
(MLRS), and artillery pose the most acute near-term threats
effectiveness, and survivability of their ballistic missile
to other nations. Advances in these systems demonstrate a
force.
shift toward solid propellants and satellite guidance
systems; advances that could carry over to larger, more
The recent advances in North Korea’s ballistic missile test
potent systems like the Hwasong series ICBMs. These
program appear to be directed at developing capabilities to
developments provide the projectiles greater mobility and
defeat or degrade the effectiveness of missile defenses
survivability prior to launch and greater precision on target.
deployed in the region: Patriot, Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD), and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
In the MRBM category, the KN-15 poses the greatest threat
(THAAD). In addition, North Korea’s progress with
to North Korea’s regional adversaries and exhibits
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) suggests an
advanced technology. Known in North Korea as the
effort to counter land-based THAAD missile defenses by
Pukguksong-2, the KN-15 is a solid-propellant missile
launching attacks from positions at sea outside the
capable of striking mainland Japan and carrying a nuclear
THAAD’s radar field of view, although local Aegis BMD
or conventional payload—known as dual capable. The
systems could likely still track these projectiles. The
North Koreans fire the missile from a tracked vehicle,
Pukgugsong-3 SLBM was successfully tested beginning in
which gives the system mobility and makes prelaunch
late 2019. According to a 2021 DIA report, North Korea
targeting of the system difficult.
has said this SLBM, to be launched from a ballistic missile
submarine, will be cold-launched, solid-fueled and “will
The KN-23 SRBM exemplified a notable advance to the
carry a nuclear warhead.” North Korea has also unveiled
North Korean inventory in the smaller category of weapons.
longer-range SLBMs, the Pukguksong-4 and Pukguksong-
The May 2019 tests of two KN-23 missiles revealed an
5.
atypical flight path. On terminal approach to its target, the
KN-23 conducted a “pull-up” maneuver, intended to
North Korean tests have demonstrated growing success and,
complicate the ability of ground-based interceptors to
coupled with increased operational training exercises,
destroy the hostile missile in flight by increasing its speed
suggest a pattern designed to strengthen the credibility of
and angle of attack to the target. The KN-23 can strike any
North Korea’s regional nuclear deterrent strategy.
location on the Korean peninsula with either a conventional
or nuclear payload and uses a solid-propellant.
Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation
IF10472
https://crsreports.congress.gov
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10472 · VERSION 23 · UPDATED