Updated January 12, 2023
Removal of Inspectors General: Rules, Practice, and
Considerations for Congress
In 1978, Congress passed the Inspector General Act (IG
removed only with agreement of seven out of nine postal
Act; P.L. 95-452) with the intent to improve oversight
governors and only “for cause.”
within certain executive branch agencies. During the floor
debate on the legislation, Senator Thomas Eagleton
The 30-day notice requirement was established under the
described independence as the “most important”
Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-409), and
characteristic of the inspectors general (Congressional
the requirement that notice include a “substantive rationale”
Record, vol. 124, part 29, October 22, 1978, p. 30952).
was added by the Securing Inspector General Independence
While this independence has been considered essential, it is
Act of 2022 (Title LII, Subtitle A, of P.L. 117-263).
also weighed against the fact that inspectors general (IGs)
Additionally, in most cases, the President must provide
are situated within the agencies and that their dual mission
Congress with written notice 15 days before placing an IG
is to report to both their home agencies and Congress. This
on non-duty status and generally cannot do so at all during
calls for consideration of the balance between independence
the 30-day notice period before removal of an IG.
from and general supervision by agencies.
Acting IGs, some of whom have served in that capacity for
The removal procedures for IGs fall between removal
years at a time, may not enjoy the same removal protections
without limitations and removal only for cause and have
as confirmed IGs. The status of acting IGs in positions
been considered an integral element of IG independence
subject to Senate confirmation is dictated by the Federal
since 1978. Nonetheless, Presidents have removed IGs, and
Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (5 U.S.C. §§3345-3349c;
those actions have raised concerns in Congress regarding
see CRS Report R44997, The Vacancies Act: A Legal
the independence of IGs. In addition, Congress has
Overview, by Valerie C. Brannon).
considered and enacted additional removal requirements
since 1978.
Removal Practice
There are several examples of presidents removing IGs. A
This In Focus provides an overview of the current removal
common theme across those examples, which are outlined
procedure for IGs, identifies past presidential removals, and
below, is concern from Congress that removals have the
discusses potential issues for Congress.
potential to undermine the actual and perceived
independence of IGs.
Removal Procedure
The removal procedure for presidentially appointed IGs is
President Reagan’s Removal of All Inspectors
found in Section 3(b) of the IG Act (5 U.S.C. Appendix, as
General
amended). The section reads in part:
During presidential transitions, turnover of most political
appointees is the norm. New presidents have the authority
An Inspector General may be removed from office
to remove IGs at the start of their Administrations and make
by the President. If an Inspector General is removed
their own nominations. However, following such action at
from office or is transferred to another position or
the start of the Reagan Administration, practice has
location within an establishment, the President shall
disfavored removal of IGs during presidential transitions.
communicate in writing the substantive rationale,
including detailed and case-specific reasons for any
One of President Ronald Reagan’s first official acts upon
such removal or transfer to both Houses of
his inauguration on January 20, 1981, was to remove all 15
Congress (including the appropriate congressional
confirmed and acting IGs then working across the executive
committees), not later than 30 days before the
branch. This action appears to have caused bipartisan
concern in Congress. On February 3, 1981, an article in the
removal or transfer. Nothing in this subsection shall
New York Times quoted Representatives L. H. Fountain and
prohibit a personnel action otherwise authorized by
Frank Horton, the chair and ranking member of the House
law, other than transfer or removal.
Committee on Government Operations, respectively, as
For the IGs appointed by agency heads, which are listed in
saying that the move had the potential to politicize, and
Section 8G(2) of the IG Act, the same notice rule applies,
thereby undermine, the position of IG (Robert Pear, “Ouster
except that the head of the agency, rather than President,
of All Inspectors General by Reagan Called Political
appoints and removes the IG. For agencies headed by
Move,” New York Times, February 3, 1981, p. B14).
boards, committees, or commissions, removal requires the
written concurrence of two-thirds of the members. The
The controversy dissipated after President Reagan’s
inspector general for the U.S. Postal Service may be
nominees (including a number of the previously removed
IGs) met with the approval of Congress. By the time the
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

Removal of Inspectors General: Rules, Practice, and Considerations for Congress
Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and Human
Steven Linick, because he no longer had the “fullest
Resources of the House Committee on Government
confidence” in Linick (letter from Donald Trump, to
Operations held a hearing on April 1, 1981, Chairperson
Speaker Nancy Pelosi, May 15, 2020).
Fountain stated that his concerns had been eased by the fact
that five of the former IGs had been renominated and the
In each case, legislators objected to the lack of specificity in
Administration had made other commitments to support the
these notices (see, for example, letter from Senator Chuck
IG system.
Grassley et al. to Donald Trump, April 8, 2020). Senators
ultimately received more information from the Obama
Chairperson Fountain also described the impact of the
Administration (letter from Norm Eisen, Special Counsel
removals:
for Ethics and Government Reform, to Senators Joseph
Lieberman and Susan Collins, June 16, 2009).
This action undoubtedly had an adverse effect on
the operations of the offices whose directors were
The “specific rationale” requirement of the Securing
abruptly removed. Much more serious damage was
Inspector General Independence Act discussed above
done, however, by the perception that Inspectors
appears to address congressional disclosure concerns.
General were being viewed in the same light as
political appointees, who expect to be removed with
It has sometimes been suggested that other IGs have
each change in administrations (U.S. Congress,
resigned under threat of removal since 1978. Because it is
House Committee on Government Operations,
not possible to describe these cases with certainty from the
Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and
publicly available materials, they are not discussed here.
Nonetheless, because such actions may impact the
Human Resources, Oversight of Offices of
independence of IGs, Congress may monitor or investigate
Inspector General, 97th Cong., 1st sess., April 1,
reports of such incidents.
1981, pp. 1-2).
Considerations for Congress
Presidential Transitions After Reagan
The removal of IGs has remained a topic of interest for
Following the actions at the beginning of the Reagan
Congress since 1978. Below are some aspects of the issue
Administration, some Members of Congress have been
that Congress may consider.
proactive in informing new Administrations that they
expect IGs to remain in their positions notwithstanding the
Effectiveness of New Procedures
change in Administration. For instance, in both 1988 and
Congress enacted new procedures related to the removal of
1992, Senators John Glenn and William Roth, the chair and
IGs in December 2022. Based on past history, it may be
vice chair of the Senate Committee on Governmental
years before a President chooses to remove an IG.
Affairs, sent letters to Presidents-elect George H.W. Bush
Nonetheless, Congress may wish to monitor how Presidents
and Bill Clinton emphasizing this position. Since 1981, IGs
implement these new requirements, especially whether they
have remained in their positions during each presidential
act in a way that undermines congressional intent or
transition.
expectations.
Recent Presidential Removals of Inspectors
Additional Removal Protections
General
Congress might also consider additional actions that would
There are also at least three instances of a President acting
limit IG removal. The most frequently discussed of these
to remove an IG since 2008:
options has been to allow removal of IGs only for reasons

that fall within a provided definition of good cause. The
On June 11, 2009, President Barack Obama notified
version of the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 that
Congress that he was removing the IG of the
initially passed the House (H.R. 928, 110th Congress, as
Corporation for National Community Service, Gerald
engrossed by the House), for instance, provided that IGs
Walpin. President Obama’s stated reason for Walpin’s
would serve for fixed seven-year terms and could be
removal was that he no longer had “the fullest
confidence”
removed only for one of nine specified reasons (including
in Walpin (letter from Barack Obama to
malfeasance, gross mismanagement, and similar
Nancy Pelosi, June 11, 2009).
justifications).
 On April 3, 2020, President Donald Trump notified
Constitutional Limits on Congress’s Policy Options
Congress that he was removing the IG of the
Some policy options that limit the removal of executive
Intelligence Community, Michael Atkinson, because he
no longer had the “fullest confidence” in
branch officials could raise separation of powers concerns.
Atkinson
Congress may explore those issues before enacting
(letter from Donald Trump, to Senators Richard Burr
legislation that could later be challenged in the courts.
and Mark Warner, April 3, 2020). The removal
requirements for the IG for the Intelligence Community
are under Title 50, Section 3033(c)(4), of the United
Ben Wilhelm, Analyst in Government Organization and
States Code.
Management

IF11546
On May 15, 2020, President Trump notified Congress of
his intent to remove the IG for the State Department,


https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

Removal of Inspectors General: Rules, Practice, and Considerations for Congress


Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11546 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED

---