Updated January 9, 2023
China Primer: U.S.-China Relations
U.S.-China Competition
limitations on their activities. Xi himself did not travel
Congress has intensified its legislative and oversight
abroad for 32 months. The November 2022 Biden-Xi
activity related to the People’s Republic of China (PRC or
meeting, held on the sidelines of a gathering of the G-20
China) in response to growing concerns about PRC actions
nations in Bali, Indonesia, was the two leaders’ first in-
and intentions. Upon his election as House Speaker in the
person meeting of the Biden Administration. Having so far
118th Congress, Kevin McCarthy identified the ruling
met his counterparts outside China, Secretary of State
Communist Party of China (CPC) as one of two U.S. “long-
Antony J. Blinken is scheduled to make his first visit to
term challenges” for the House to address, the other being
China in his current position in early 2023.
the national debt. To investigate issues related to China, the
Speaker restated his intention to establish a bipartisan
In 2021, the State Department and the PRC’s Ministry of
Select Committee on China in the 118th Congress.
Foreign Affairs established joint working groups to address
a limited set of issues. The groups, which continue to meet,
The Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Administration presents the United
have made modest progress on such issues as visas for
States as engaged in geopolitical competition with China
journalists, the cases of American citizens subject to
over the shape of the future global order, part of a broader
arbitrary PRC exit bans, and diplomatic reciprocity.
contest between democracies and autocracies. The
Following then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to
Administration’s October 2022 National Security Strategy
Taiwan in August 2022, the PRC government formally
outlines a three-part strategy for “out-competing” China:
suspended cooperation with the United States in several
first, to invest in competitiveness, innovation, resilience,
areas, including transnational crime and counternarcotics;
and democracy at home; second, to align U.S. efforts with
suspended climate-change talks; and cancelled meetings of
those of allies and partners; and third, to “compete
several military-to-military dialogues. Climate-change talks
responsibly with the PRC to defend our interests and build
have since resumed.
our vision for the future.” The document states that the
Administration also seeks to “engage constructively with
In December 2022, the State Department launched a new
the PRC wherever we can.” Following a November 2022
Office of China Coordination, known as “China House.” In
meeting with China’s top leader, CPC General Secretary Xi
a statement, the department said the office would draw on
Jinping, Biden noted, “We’re going to compete vigorously.
regional and functional expertise from across the
But I’m not looking for conflict.”
department to meet “the most complex and consequential
geopolitical challenge we face.” The Central Intelligence
Top PRC officials have decried the U.S. government’s
Agency (CIA) launched a dedicated China Mission Center
identification of China as the leading U.S. competitor and
in 2021. CIA Director William J. Burns said at the time that
dismissed the Administration’s assertion of a struggle
it would allow CIA to strengthen its work on “the most
between democratic governance and authoritarianism as a
important geopolitical threat we face in the 21st century.”
“false narrative.” They have also condemned congressional
actions, including China-related provisions of the James M.
Select Issues in U.S.-China Relations
Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
Fiscal Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263). A PRC readout of the
Taiwan
Biden-Xi meeting paraphrased Xi as saying the two
Since then-Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the PRC has
countries need to “explore the right way to get along with
stepped up military activity around the island. The White
each other” and seek “peaceful coexistence.”
House says Biden raised the PRC’s “coercive and
increasingly aggressive actions toward Taiwan” in his
Mechanics of the Relationship
meeting with Xi. In a post-meeting press conference, Biden
Under the Biden Administration, in-person interactions
said he made clear that differences between Beijing and
between U.S. and PRC officials at all levels have been
Taipei should be “peacefully resolved.” He also stated that
limited. That situation is related in large part—though not
he did not see “any imminent attempt on the part of China
exclusively—to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
to invade Taiwan.” The PRC claims sovereignty over self-
pandemic. The PRC government kept China’s borders
ruled Taiwan and has long vowed to unify with it, by force
largely closed for nearly three years in an ultimately-failed
if necessary. Since 1979, the United States has maintained
effort to enforce a “zero-COVID” approach to the pandemic
official relations with the PRC and unofficial relations with
in China; borders re-opened on January 8, 2023. During this
Taiwan. To deter the PRC from use of force or coercion
period, China’s top diplomats met occasionally with U.S.
against Taiwan, the 117th Congress passed the Taiwan
counterparts outside China, senior U.S. officials who
Enhanced Resilience Act (Title LV, Subtitle A of P.L. 117-
traveled to China were subject to onerous COVID-19
263). See CRS In Focus IF10275, Taiwan: Political and
protocols, and U.S. diplomats in China faced severe
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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China Primer: U.S.-China Relations
Security Issues, and CRS In Focus IF11719, China Primer:
expressed concern about China’s state-driven economic,
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
trade, investment, and technology practices and the
challenges they pose to U.S. economic and technology
Human Rights
leadership. China continues to require the transfer of some
The Biden Administration and many Members have
critical U.S. capabilities to China as a condition for some
criticized PRC authorities’ treatment of ethnic and religious
U.S. firms to operate in strategic areas in the country. Some
minorities in the western PRC regions of Xinjiang and
Members have also expressed concern that China’s
Tibet, with the State Department assessing PRC actions in
practices distort markets and undermine fair competition as
Xinjiang to constitute genocide and crimes against
PRC firms expand globally in areas that China restricts
humanity. In the PRC’s Hong Kong Special Administrative
foreign firms from accessing domestically. China’s system
Region, Secretary Blinken has accused the CPC of having
blurs state and corporate interests, enabling its government
“imposed harsh anti-democratic measures under the guise
to deploy trade tools (e.g., in such areas as antidumping,
of national security.” In the 117th Congress, enacted
antitrust, standards, and procurement), economic coercion,
legislation seeking to support human rights in China
and espionage to advantage its firms and advance China’s
included the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (P.L.
industrial and other policies. Experts see the PRC state’s
117-78), which restricts Xinjiang-related imports. See CRS
expanding role in commercial activity—including an
In Focus IF12265, China Primer: Human Rights.
intensification of industrial policies and enactment of
national economic security policies since 2020—as
Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids
increasing the business and broader economic risks of U.S.
China ceased to be the primary source of illicit fentanyl
commercial ties with China.
entering the United States after the PRC imposed class-
Some Members have shown interest in addressing risks
wide controls over all fentanyl-related substances in 2019,
related to China’s digital platforms (e.g., TikTok) operating
In the context of the U.S. opioid epidemic, the U.S. focus is
in the United States and in exerting greater oversight over
now on addressing flows of uncontrolled PRC-produced
executive branch decisions on export control licensing and
precursor chemicals used to make fentanyl in third
foreign investment reviews. Congress has sought to
countries, primarily Mexico, and to stem illicit fentanyl-
promote U.S. industry in strategic (e.g., semiconductor) and
related financial flows linked to the PRC. The FENTANYL
emerging (e.g., electric vehicle) technologies and
Results Act (Title LV, Subtitle C of P.L. 117-263) provides
considered new guardrails on U.S. commercial and research
assistance to build the capacity of foreign law enforcement
ties with China, including outbound investment. Recently
agencies with respect to synthetic drugs, but bars such
enacted legislation intended to address these issues includes
assistance to the PRC or any of its law enforcement
the CHIPS Act of 2022 (Division A of P.L. 117-167), the
agencies. See CRS In Focus IF10890, China Primer: Illicit
Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-169), and the
Fentanyl and China’s Role.
Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business
Technology Transfer Extension Act of 2022 ( P.L. 117-
Relations with Russia and North Korea
183). See CRS In Focus IF11284, U.S.-China Trade
The United States has pressed China to help bring an end to
Relations, and CRS In Focus IF10964, “Made in China
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression in
2025” Industrial Policies: Issues for Congress.
Ukraine. Xi has expressed China’s opposition to the
threatened or actual use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, but

has otherwise expressed solidarity with Putin. The FY2023
Cooperation and Assurances
NDAA requires a report on whether and how the PRC has
Areas the two governments have identified for cooperation
provided support to Russia with respect to the war in
include climate change, global macroeconomic stability,
Ukraine. The Biden Administration has also pressed China
global food security, and public health. The current rapid
to do more to restrain North Korean leader Kim Jong-un,
spread of COVID-19 in China appears to be driving strong
who in 2022 presided over an unprecedented number of
PRC interest in reviving health-related exchanges. Biden
missile tests, including multiple intercontinental ballistic
and Xi also appear to have used their November 2022
missile (ICBM) tests, in violation of U.N. resolutions. In
meeting to clarify their intentions, with the goal of
2022, the PRC joined Russia in vetoing a U.S.-led draft
lessening the risk that miscalculations lead to conflict.
U.N. resolution that would have tightened sanctions against
According to the PRC readout of the meeting, Xi told Biden
North Korea over its missile launches. See CRS In Focus
that, “China does not seek to change the existing
IF12100, China-Russia Relations.
international order or interfere in the internal affairs of the
United States, and has no intention to challenge or displace
Trade, Investment, and Technology
the United States.” In a press conference after the meeting,
China was the United States’ fourth-largest goods trading
in addition to stating that he does not seek conflict, Biden
partner in 2021 (with the European Union considered as
said he believes that there “need not be a new Cold War.”
one trading partner). Two-way foreign direct investment
The PRC readout paraphrased Biden as saying that the
(FDI) flows have slowed since 2016, while investment and
United States “respects China’s system, and does not seek
commercial ties not included in FDI data—technology
to change it,” “does not seek to revitalize alliances against
licensing, research, venture capital, and financial
China,” and “does not support Taiwan independence.” The
investments—have expanded.
less-detailed White House readout of the meeting did not
China is a large market for U.S. firms but poses significant
mention those reported statements.
trade barriers, unfair practices, and a lack of reciprocity in
key areas for these firms. Many Members of Congress have
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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China Primer: U.S.-China Relations

IF10119
Karen M. Sutter, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance


Disclaimer
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congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10119 · VERSION 51 · UPDATED

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