Updated December 28, 2022
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Cuban Political and Economic Developments
long-standing concerns about the lack of political freedoms.
Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a
The government responded with harsh measures, including
government that has sharply restricted freedoms of
widespread detentions of protesters, civil society activists,
expression, association, assembly, and other basic human
and bystanders. Hundreds of the July 2021 protestors have
rights since the early years of the 1959 Cuban revolution.
been tried and convicted, including more than 25 minors.
The human rights group Cuban Prisoners Defenders (CPD)
Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro as president in
reported that there were 1,034 political prisoners at the end
2018 and as head of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) at
of November 2022 (up from 152 on July 1, 2021), of which
its eighth party congress in April 2021. The departure of
Castro and other older leaders from the PCC’s Politburo
751 were imprisoned and considered prisoners of
conscience by CPD, 253 were under some form of
reflects the generational change in Cuban leadership that
conditional release, and 30 were imprisoned for other
began several years ago. While in power (2006-2018), Raúl
politically motivated acts.
Castro (who succeeded his brother, longtime leader Fidel
Castro) began to move Cuba toward a mixed economy with
U.S. Policy
a stronger private sector, but his government’s slow,
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
gradualist approach did not produce major improvements.
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
Cuba adopted a new constitution in 2019 that introduced
some reforms but maintained the state’s dominance over the
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
isolating the Cuban government. The Obama
economy and the PCC’s predominant political role.
Administration initiated a policy shift away from sanctions
The Cuban economy has been hard-hit by the economic
and toward engagement and the normalization of relations.
shutdown associated with the Coronavirus Disease 2019
Changes included the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a
(COVID-19) pandemic; Venezuela’s economic crisis,
state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015); the
which has reduced support from that country; and U.S.
restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015); and eased
sanctions. Cuba reports the economy contracted by 10.9%
restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
in 2020 and grew by 1.3% in 2021; in November 2022, the
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
government cut its 2022 growth forecast from 4% to 2%.
(2015-2016). In contrast, the Trump Administration
Cuba’s growth forecast has been affected by a slower
introduced new sanctions in 2017, including restrictions on
recovery of the tourism sector, the impact of Russia’s
transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban
invasion of Ukraine on the global economy (including food
military. By 2019, the Trump Administration had largely
and fuel prices), an August 2022 fire that severely damaged
abandoned engagement and significantly increased
Cuba’s main oil storage facility, and Hurricane Ian, which
sanctions, particularly on travel and remittances.
caused severe damage to western Cuba in late September
In its initial months, the Biden Administration announced it
2022 and a power outage across the country.
was conducting a review of policy toward Cuba, with
Cuba unified its dual currency system in 2021; the long-
human rights a core pillar, and would review policy
debated reform contributed to high inflation (with some
decisions made by the prior Administration. In the
estimates ranging from between 150% and 500% in 2021);
aftermath of the Cuban government’s harsh response to the
the Economist Intelligence Unit estimates that inflation
July 11, 2021 protests, the Biden Administration criticized
averaged 60% in 2022 and forecasts an average rate of
Cuba’s repression and imposed targeted sanctions on those
almost 37% in 2023.
involved. In July and August 2021, the Treasury
Department imposed four rounds of financial sanctions on
Cuba’s public health response to the pandemic initially kept
three Cuban security entities and eight officials. Between
cases and deaths low, but both surged in the summer of
November 2021 and July 2022, the State Department
2021. The country experienced another surge in cases in
announced four rounds of visa restrictions against 50
early 2022, but deaths remained low because of high
individuals involved in repressing protesters.
vaccination rates. As of December 2022, Cuba reported
over 8,500 deaths since the pandemic began (with one of
In May 2022, the Administration announced several Cuba
the lowest mortality rates in the hemisphere) and had fully
policy changes aimed at increasing support for the Cuban
vaccinated 88% of its population with its own vaccines.
people. The Administration increased immigrant visa
processing at the U.S. Embassy in Havana and said it would
Increased Repression. Beginning in November 2020, the
reinstate the Cuban Family Reunification Parole (CFRP)
government cracked down on the San Isidro Movement
program. It eased travel restrictions by reauthorizing
(MSI), a civil society group opposed to restrictions on
scheduled and charter flights to cities beyond Havana and
artistic expression. On July 11, 2021, anti-government
reinstating group people-to-people travel. It eased
demonstrations broke out in Havana and throughout the
restrictions on sending cash remittances by eliminating the
country, with thousands of Cubans protesting economic
conditions (food and medicine shortages, blackouts) and
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
dollar and frequency limits for family remittances and
Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 117-46) in September
reauthorizing donative remittances to Cuban nationals.
2021 authorizing payment to Central Intelligence Agency
and State Department personnel who experience certain
Increased Irregular Migration. Driven by Cuba’s difficult
brain injuries. The National Defense Authorization Act for
economic conditions and political repression, irregular
FY2022 (P.L. 117-81), approved in December 2021, has
Cuban migration to the United States has surged over the
provisions to address health care and treatment, national
past year. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
security challenges, and U.S. government coordination of
reported over 39,000 border enforcement encounters of
the response to the incidents.
Cuban migrants nationwide in FY2021 and over 224,000 in
FY2022, with the overwhelming majority at the Southwest
117th Congress: Legislative Action on Cuba
land border. For the first two months of FY2023, CBP
For FY2022, the Biden Administration requested $12.973
reported over 65,000 encounters of Cuban migrants. U.S.
million for the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) and $20
maritime interdiction of Cubans also has increased, with the
million for Cuba democracy programming. In the
Coast Guard reporting 838 interdictions in FY2021; 6,182
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103,
in FY2022; and in FY2023, 3,724 Cuban migrants as of
Division K) and its explanatory statement, Congress fully
December 20, 2022.
funded the Administration’s OCB request. Although the
law did not specify an amount for Cuba democracy
U.S. and Cuban officials held semiannual migration talks in
programming, the Administration estimates an allocation of
April 2022 (the first since 2018), and again in November
$20 million, the amount requested.
2022, on the implementation of bilateral migration accords.
The Administration announced that the U.S. Embassy in
For FY2023, the Administration requested $13.432 million
Havana would resume full immigrant visa processing on
for OCB and $20 million for Cuba democracy funding.
January 4, 2023—the first time since 2017.
Congress provided $12.973 million for Cuba broadcasting
in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (H.R. 2617,
Selected U.S. Sanctions
Division K), and its explanatory statement, and again did
Transactions with the Cuban Military. In 2017, the State
not specify an amount for democracy programs. The
Department published a list of entities controlled by the
explanatory statement also contained several Cuba-related
Cuban military, intelligence, or security services with
reporting requirements regarding consular services,
which direct financial transactions would disproportionately
illnesses suffered by U.S. government personnel, and
benefit those services or personnel at the expense of the
reforms undertaken by OCB to address deficiencies and
Cuban people or private enterprise. This “Cuba restricted
align its activities and personnel with its budget. The James
list” includes 231 entities (ministries, hotels, businesses).
M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263) also contained several Cuba-
Travel and Remittances. Since 2019, U.S. restrictions
related provisions, including two reporting requirements.
have prohibited travel by cruise ships and by private and
corporate aircraft. Since 2020, most U.S. travelers have
On July 20, 2022, the House rejected (163-260) an
been prohibited from staying at over 400 hotels and private
amendment (H.Amdt. 300) to H.R. 8294, a six-bill FY2023
residences identified as owned or controlled by the Cuban
appropriations measure that would have prevented any
government. In 2020, a prohibition against processing
funds from being used to enforce a U.S. sanctions provision
remittances through “Cuba restricted list” entities resulted
prohibiting private financing for U.S. agricultural exports.
in Western Union terminating its services to Cuba.
Terrorism Designations. Since May 2020, pursuant to the
On human rights, the House and Senate approved H.Res.
Arms Export Control Act, the Secretary of State has
760 and S.Res. 310, in November and August 2021,
included Cuba on an annual list of countries certified as not
respectively; both condemned Cuba’s repression, and called
cooperating fully with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. In early
for the release of those detained. The Senate also passed
January 2021, pursuant to several laws, the Secretary of
S.Res. 37 in April 2021, expressing solidarity with the MSI;
State designated Cuba as a state sponsor of international
S.Res. 81 in May 2021, honoring Las Damas de Blanco, a
terrorism, citing its harboring of several U.S. fugitives and
woman-led human rights group; S. 2045 in July 2021, to
members of Colombia’s National Liberation Army.
rename the street in front of the Cuban Embassy after a
democracy activist; and S.Res. 489 in January 2022,
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel
commending Cuban democracy and human rights activists.
Between late 2016 and May 2018, 26 U.S. Embassy
Members of Congress introduced a wide variety of other
Havana community members suffered a series of
legislative initiatives on Cuba in the 117th Congress. These
unexplained injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive
included bills that would have eased or lifted sanctions or
issues. In December 2020, the National Academies of
promote engagement and bills that would have imposed
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine released a report
further sanctions or restrictions on Cuba. Other initiatives
concluding the most plausible mechanism for the source of
focused on immigration parole programs for family
the health symptoms was directed pulsed radio frequency
reunification and for Cuban medical professionals.
energy. U.S. officials maintain that investigations into the
cause or source of these anomalous health incidents have
For further information on such legislative initiatives, see
not reached a conclusion. A number of U.S. government
CRS Report R47246, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th
and military officials worldwide have reported these
Congress. Also see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S.
symptoms since 2016.
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances.
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview

IF10045
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 101 · UPDATED

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