Updated December 12, 2022
U.S.-North Korea Relations
North Korea’s advances in nuclear weapons and missile
2004 act expired at the end of FY2022, and the special
capabilities since 2016 under its leader Kim Jong-un have
envoy position has been vacant since January 2017. Amid
catapulted Pyongyang from a threat to U.S. interests in East
signs that basic human needs inside North Korea are not
Asia to a potential direct threat to the U.S. homeland. U.S.
being met, some Members of Congress have proposed
policy on North Korea (officially known as the Democratic
offering food and medical aid packages to Pyongyang
People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) has focused
and/or easing the process for obtaining sanctions waivers
primarily on the DPRK’s nuclear weapon and missile
and licenses for those delivering humanitarian aid.
programs. Other U.S. concerns include illicit DPRK
activities, such as cyberattacks and cyber-crime, as well as
the potential resumption of small-scale conventional attacks
against U.S. ally South Korea (officially known as the
Republic of Korea, or ROK). Congress has expressed
particular concern about the state of human rights in North
Korea, passing laws directing the State Department to
prioritize pressuring the Pyongyang regime to improve
human rights conditions.
Since U.S.-DPRK negotiations on the latter’s nuclear
weapons program broke down in 2019, North Korea largely
has ignored attempts by the United States and ROK to

Source: Map generated by CRS using Department of State
resume dialogue. In 2022, Kim declared North Korea will
Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); DeLorme (2014).
never denuclearize. North Korea also has continued to test
missiles of various ranges and capabilities, including more
U.S. and ROK Approaches to the DPRK
than 60 ballistic missiles since the start of 2022, in violation
The Biden Administration says it is pursuing a “calibrated,
of U.N. Security Council (UNSC) requirements. The tests
practical approach” that “is open to and will explore
appear to have advanced the reliability and precision of the
diplomacy with North Korea” to eventually achieve “the
DPRK’s missile forces, and improved its ability to defeat
complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The
regional missile defense systems. In 2022, North Korea
Administration appears to envision offering some sanctions
tested intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) for the
relief in exchange for steps toward denuclearization. This
first time since 2017. Since early 2022, many observers
approach appears to align with that of South Korean
have seen evidence that North Korea is preparing to
President Yoon Suk-yeol, who assumed office in May 2022
conduct its seventh nuclear weapons test, which would be
and has hardened Seoul’s stance toward the DPRK. Since
its first since 2017. North Korea has undertaken its missile
Yoon’s inauguration, Washington and Seoul have shifted
tests despite hardships resulting from near-total closure of
the alliance’s emphasis from diplomacy to deterrence, for
its borders since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.
instance by expanding the size and scope of bilateral
military exercises. They have offered Pyongyang
As the DPRK demonstrates greater military capability,
unconditional humanitarian assistance, and Yoon has
some Members of the 117th Congress have pushed the
pledged to provide large-scale economic assistance if North
Biden Administration to offer greater incentives for North
Korea “embarks on a genuine and substantive process for
Korea to return to negotiations. Others have sought to
denuclearization.” Pyongyang has rejected these offers. The
require the Administration to tighten pressure by enacting
Biden Administration has responded to the DPRK’s missile
additional sanctions legislation. In December 2022, a
tests by introducing new unilateral sanctions designations,
bicameral agreement on the FY2023 National Defense
dispatching U.S. military assets to Northeast Asia, and
Authorization Act (NDAA, H.R. 7776, as amended) would
reinvigorating U.S.-South Korea-Japan security
require the President to develop a strategy to combat the
cooperation. U.S. officials say they have communicated to
DPRK’s “repressive information environment” and
North Korea their willingness to meet without
authorize $10 million annually for five years to increase
preconditions, and that “the ball is in [Pyongyang’s] court.”
U.S.-government sponsored broadcasting and information
dissemination into North Korea. Some Members support
U.S. and International Sanctions
reauthorizing the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004,
North Korea is the target of scores of U.S. and UNSC
which seeks to elevate U.S. policy on the DPRK’s human
sanctions. Collectively, UNSC sanctions prohibit North
rights record, including the appointment of a special envoy
Korea from exporting over 80% of the items it sold abroad
for North Korean human rights issues. Authorities in the
in 2016, as well as most types of financial interactions with
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U.S.-North Korea Relations
DPRK individuals and entities. Important North Korean
ballistic missile tests appear aimed at advancing the
imports, such as oil, are capped. Additionally, in 2016,
reliability of its solid fuel and guidance systems, and its
2017, and 2019 Congress passed, and Presidents Obama
ability to thwart regional missile defenses. U.S. officials
and Trump signed, legislation expanding U.S. sanctions
also have voiced concerns about Pyongyang’s improving
(P.L. 114-122, P.L. 115-44, and P.L. 116-92). Both
cyber capabilities, which the regime could use for
Administrations issued executive orders and designations to
retaliation, coercion, espionage, and/or financial gain.
authorize and apply sanctions against North Korean entities.
In September 2017, for instance, the Trump Administration
North Korea’s Human Rights Record
issued an executive order to authorize secondary sanctions
Various reports portray extreme human rights abuses by the
on individuals or entities that trade with North Korea and
North Korean government over many decades, including a
on foreign financial institutions that conduct transactions
system of prison camps housing approximately 100,000
related to DPRK trade.
political prisoners. In 2016, the State Department—acting
in accordance with the North Korea Sanctions and Policy
The U.N. has documented North Korea’s efforts to evade
Enhancement Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-122)—identified Kim
sanctions, including ship-to-ship transfers of massive
and other DPRK officials as responsible for human rights
amounts of oil and coal in the waters off China’s and
violations and created requirements for the President to
Russia’s coasts. During 2022, U.S.-led efforts at the UNSC
certify human rights improvements in order to suspend or
to adopt new sanctions were blocked by China and Russia.
terminate sanctions. In 2014, a U.N. Human Rights Council
In contrast, from 2006 to 2017, both countries supported the
commission concluded that North Korea had committed
adoption of 10 sanctions resolutions at the UNSC following
“crimes against humanity” and argued that the individuals
North Korean ICBM and/or nuclear tests. China accounts
responsible should face charges.
for over 90% of North Korea’s trade. Kim could be
emboldened if he perceives that Beijing and Moscow are
The DPRK’s Internal Situation
becoming more reliable partners, including due to China
Kim has been DPRK leader since he succeeded his father in
and Russia’s increased strategic competition with the
2011. After assuming power, Kim, who is believed to be in
United States and its allies. The State Department says
his late 30s, conducted several purges of high-level officials
Russia is buying North Korean rockets and artillery shells
to solidify his status as paramount leader. For the first
for use in its war in Ukraine.
several years of his tenure, the DPRK economy appeared to
expand, in part due to the government allowing previously
Nuclear, Missile, and Cyber Capabilities
prohibited markets and granting enterprises somewhat
North Korea has said its nuclear weapons are intended to
greater autonomy. Since 2016, when the UNSC began to
deter an attack by the United States. Some analysts worry
impose sectoral sanctions, growth appears to have fallen, in
that the DPRK may become emboldened to launch attacks
part due to the near-collapse of DPRK exports as trading
if it believes it has developed a sufficiently robust deterrent,
partners implemented sanctions.
or to use nuclear blackmail to achieve other policy
objectives. In its 2022 worldwide threat assessment, the
Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the North
U.S. intelligence community said that Kim views nuclear
Korean government has largely closed the country’s
weapons and ICBMs as “the ultimate guarantor of his
borders and imposed restrictions on economic activities.
totalitarian and autocratic rule of North Korea.” In 2022,
Between January 2020 and January 2022, North Korea’s
North Korea adopted a new law that expands the conditions
official trade, which already had been reduced to a trickle
under which North Korea would use nuclear weapons to
due to sanctions, fell by nearly 90%. The difficulty of
include non-nuclear attacks and situations that threaten the
importing food and agricultural products during the border
regime’s survival.
shutdown, combined with poor weather, appears to have
exacerbated North Korea’s chronic food shortages. The
North Korea has tested six nuclear devices: in 2006, 2009,
U.N. estimates that over 10 million North Koreans, roughly
2013, twice in 2016, and in 2017. Since the Six-Party
40% of the population, are undernourished. However, there
nuclear talks (among China, Japan, North Korea, Russia,
are few outward signs that the economic difficulties are
South Korea, and the United States) broke down in 2009,
threatening the regime’s stability or compelling North
North Korea has restarted its nuclear facilities that produce
Korea to engage with the United States or South Korea.
fissile material for nuclear weapons. The U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency reportedly has assessed that North
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs
Korea has successfully developed a nuclear warhead that is
Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
“miniaturized” or sufficiently small enough to be mounted
Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation
on long-range ballistic missiles.
Dianne E. Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy
Legislation
North Korea’s resumption of ICBM tests in 2022 appear to
be an effort to improve its ability to strike the United States.
IF10246
Additionally, the DPRK’s 2021 and 2022 short-range


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U.S.-North Korea Relations


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10246 · VERSION 15 · UPDATED

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