INSIGHTi
Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: European
Union Responses and U.S.-EU Relations
Updated December 8, 2022
The 27-member European Union (EU) has implemented a wide range of policy responses to Russia’s
2022 war against Ukraine. EU actions and coordination with the United States are of interest to Congress
given the EU’s role as an important U.S. partner.
Key EU Responses
Sanctions
The EU has imposed several rounds of increasingly punitive sanctions—or restrictive measures—
intended to cripple Russia’s ability to finance the war against Ukraine, enact costs on Russia’s elites, and
diminish Russia’s economic base. Imposing sanctions requires unanimity among EU members.
As of early December 2022, EU sanctions on Russia’s government and financial, business, defense,
technology, and media sectors include
Freezing the assets of 118 entities (including key banks) and 1,241 individuals (primarily
Russian officials and elites), to whom travel bans also apply.
Imposing debt and equity restrictions on certain banks and companies.
Restricting transactions with Russia’s central bank and blocking access to its reserve
holdings.
Banning transactions with certain Russian state-owned military-industrial enterprises.
Disconnecting 10 leading Russian financial institutions—including Sberbank, Russia’s
largest bank—from SWIFT (the world’s dominant international financial messaging
system).
Broadening export controls on dual-use goods and technologies.
Banning certain exports in the aviation, maritime, and technology sectors (e.g.,
semiconductors) and the export of luxury goods to Russia.
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Prohibiting imports of steel and other raw materials, spirits, seafood, and gold (including
jewelry) from Russia.
Closing EU airspace, seaports, and roads to Russian aircraft, ships, and freight operators,
respectively.
Suspending the broadcasting activities of five Russian state-owned media outlets.
EU energy dependence on Russia has made targeting its energy sector challenging, but the EU has
approved progressively tougher sanctions in this area, including
Prohibiting most imports of Russian crude oil and petroleum products, with an exemption
for crude oil delivered by pipeline. The EU expects these sanctions, which began taking
effect in early December 2022, to apply to around 90% of Russian oil imports.
Banning oil transport services. An exemption finalized in early December 2022 allows
EU companies to provide such services for Russian oil sold to non-EU countries at or
below an agreed Group of Seven (G7) price cap of $60 a barrel (aimed at reducing
Russia’s oil revenues while keeping global energy markets stable).
Banning EU exports of oil refining technologies.
Prohibiting Russian coal imports.
Although the EU has not prohibited Russian natural gas imports, Russia has reduced gas flows to Europe
and the EU is working to end its reliance on Russian energy (see below). The EU is planning additional
sanctions on Russia and considering using frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine. (Also see CRS
Insight IN11869, Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: Overview of U.S. Sanctions and Other Responses.)
Military Assistance
Through its European Peace Facility (EPF), the EU has committed €3.1 billion to date in military
assistance financing for Ukraine, including for lethal equipment (€2.8 billion) and nonlethal supplies
(€180 million). The EPF also is providing over €100 million for an EU training mission for Ukraine’s
armed forces. Member states may be reimbursed from the EPF for assistance provided since the start of
2022. EU members’ bilateral military assistance to Ukraine totals an estimated €8.6 billion (as of
November 2022).
Financial and Other Aid
In 2022, the EU, its member states, and European financial institutions collectively mobilized €19.7
billion in financial, humanitarian, and emergency assistance for Ukraine (with €9.2 billion from the EU
budget, €3.2 billion from European financial institutions, and €7.3 billion in member state contributions).
The EU has proposed up to €18 billion in financial assistance for 2023 (in the form of favorable loans).
The EU also coordinates the delivery of in-kind emergency supplies to Ukraine. A temporary protection
mechanism provides Ukrainian nationals who have fled with immediate residency rights and access to
benefits throughout the EU. (Also see CRS Insight IN11882, Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis in
Ukraine.)
Addressing Energy Dependence
Russia’s war in Ukraine has heightened longstanding concerns about EU dependence on Russian energy
imports, in particular natural gas. Russia substantially reduced gas pipeline deliveries to the EU in 2022.
By late 2022, pipeline gas from Russia accounted for roughly 8% of EU gas imports (down from 40% in
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early 2022), although EU imports of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) increased somewhat during the
same period. The EU has pledged to phase out Russian fossil fuel imports before 2030.
U.S.-EU Cooperation and Congressional Interests
The United States and the EU have cooperated closely in responding to Russia’s aggression against
Ukraine. Many sanctions are identical or substantively similar. The two partners have worked together to
establish a task force on sanctions enforcement, to suspend Russia’s preferential trade treatment under
World Trade Organization rules, and to formulate the new G7 price cap on Russian oil exports.
In March 2022, President Biden committed to help the EU reduce its dependency on Russian gas, in part
by boosting LNG shipments to the EU. A new U.S.-EU task force on energy security is to implement this
and other goals. Some in the EU, however, are frustrated with high U.S. LNG prices.
Some U.S. officials appear concerned that Europe’s energy crisis and economic difficulties could pressure
EU governments to moderate policies toward Russia and Ukraine, potentially weakening sanctions or
increasing calls for negotiations, or impeding EU financial support to Ukraine. EU financial aid
disbursements faced some delays in 2022, but such disbursements accelerated by the end of the year.
Some in Congress may be interested in evaluating the extent and pace of EU assistance to Ukraine and
monitoring U.S.-EU coordination.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also has implications for several EU initiatives of possible interest to
Congress:
Security and Defense. The war could prompt greater EU efforts to improve military
capabilities and strengthen the NATO-EU partnership.
Energy and Climate Policies. Russia’s actions could accelerate EU energy
diversification efforts, bolster the European Green Deal, and present opportunities for
U.S.-EU clean energy cooperation. The EU worries, however, that new U.S. subsidies for
green technologies could divert trade and investment away from the EU. A U.S.-EU task
force is seeking to address EU concerns.
EU Enlargement. Traditionally, strong bipartisan support has existed in Congress for EU
enlargement. In June 2022, the EU declared Ukraine and Moldova official candidates for
membership. Joining the EU typically takes many years.
Author Information
Kristin Archick
Specialist in European Affairs
Disclaimer
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