Updated November 17, 2022
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Cuban Political and Economic Developments
The government responded with harsh measures, including
Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a
widespread detentions of protesters, civil society activists,
government that has sharply restricted freedoms of
and bystanders. Hundreds of the July 2021 protestors have
expression, association, assembly, and other basic human
been tried and convicted, including more than 25 minors.
rights since the early years of the 1959 Cuban revolution.
The human rights group Cuban Prisoners Defenders (CPD)
reported that there were 1,027 political prisoners at the end
Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro as president in
of October 2022 (up from 152 on July 1, 2021), of which
2018 and as head of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) at
743 were imprisoned and considered prisoners of
its eighth party congress in April 2021. The departure of
Castro and other older leaders from the PCC’s Politburo
conscience by CPD, 255 were under some form of
conditional release, and 29 were imprisoned for other
reflects the generational change in Cuban leadership that
politically motivated acts.
began several years ago. While in power (2006-2018), Raúl
Castro (who succeeded his brother, longtime leader Fidel
U.S. Policy
Castro) began to move Cuba toward a mixed economy with
a stronger private sector, but his government’s slow,
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
gradualist approach did not produce major improvements.
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
Cuba adopted a new constitution in 2019 that introduced
some reforms but maintained the state’s dominance over the
isolating the Cuban government. The Obama
Administration initiated a policy shift away from sanctions
economy and the PCC’s predominant political role.
and toward engagement and the normalization of relations.
The Cuban economy has been hard-hit by the economic
Changes included the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a
shutdown associated with the Coronavirus Disease 2019
state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015); the
(COVID-19) pandemic; Venezuela’s economic crisis,
restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015); and eased
which has reduced support from that country; and U.S.
restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
sanctions. Cuba reports the economy contracted by 10.9%
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
in 2020 and grew by 1.3% in 2021; in November 2022, the
(2015-2016). In contrast, the Trump Administration
government cut its 2022 growth forecast from 4% to 2%.
introduced new sanctions in 2017, including restrictions on
Cuba’s growth forecast has been affected by a slower
transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban
recovery of the tourism sector, the impact of Russia’s
military. By 2019, the Trump Administration had largely
invasion of Ukraine on the global economy (including food
abandoned engagement and significantly increased
and fuel prices), an August 2022 fire that severely damaged
sanctions, particularly on travel and remittances.
Cuba’s main oil storage facility, and Hurricane Ian, which
In its initial months, the Biden Administration announced it
caused severe damage to western Cuba in late September
was conducting a review of policy toward Cuba, with
2022 and a power outage across the country.
human rights a core pillar, and would review policy
Cuba unified its dual currency system in 2021; the long-
decisions made by the prior Administration. In the
debated reform spurred inflation (with some estimates
aftermath of the Cuban government’s harsh response to the
ranging from between 150% and 500% in 2021); the
July 11, 2021 protests, the Biden Administration criticized
Economist Intelligence Unit is forecasting almost 66%
Cuba’s repression and imposed targeted sanctions on those
inflation in 2022 and 44% in 2023.
involved. In July and August 2021, the Treasury
Department imposed four rounds of financial sanctions on
Cuba’s public health response to the pandemic initially kept
three Cuban security entities and eight officials. Between
cases and deaths low, but both surged in the summer of
November 2021 and July 2022, the State Department
2021. The country experienced another surge in cases in
announced four rounds of visa restrictions against 50
early 2022, but deaths remained low because of high
individuals involved in repressing protesters.
vaccination rates. As of November 2022, Cuba reported
over 8,500 deaths since the pandemic began (with one of
In May 2022, the Administration announced several Cuba
the lowest mortality rates in the hemisphere) and had fully
policy changes aimed at increasing support for the Cuban
vaccinated 88% of its population with its own vaccines.
people. The Administration increased immigrant visa
processing at the U.S. Embassy in Havana and said it would
Increased Repression. Beginning in November 2020, the
reinstate the Cuban Family Reunification Parole (CFRP)
government cracked down on the San Isidro Movement
program. It eased travel restrictions by reauthorizing
(MSI), a civil society group opposed to restrictions on
scheduled and charter flights to cities beyond Havana and
artistic expression. On July 11, 2021, anti-government
reinstating group people-to-people travel. It eased
demonstrations broke out in Havana and throughout the
restrictions on sending cash remittances by eliminating the
country, with thousands of Cubans protesting economic
dollar and frequency limits for family remittances and
conditions (food and medicine shortages, blackouts) and
reauthorizing donative remittances to Cuban nationals.
long-standing concerns about the lack of political freedoms.
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Increased Irregular Migration. Driven by Cuba’s difficult
brain injuries. The National Defense Authorization Act for
economic conditions and political repression, irregular
FY2022 (P.L. 117-81), approved in December 2021, has
Cuban migration to the United States has surged over the
provisions to address health care and treatment, national
past year. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
security challenges, and U.S. government coordination of
reported over 39,000 border enforcement encounters of
the response to the incidents.
Cuban migrants nationwide in FY2021 and over 224,000 in
FY2022, with the overwhelming majority at the Southwest
117th Congress: Legislative Action on Cuba
land border. For October 2022, the first month of FY2023,
For FY2022, the Biden Administration requested $12.973
CBP reported almost 30,000 encounters of Cuban migrants.
million for the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) and $20
U.S. maritime interdiction of Cubans also has increased,
million for Cuba democracy programming. In the
with the Coast Guard reporting 838 interdictions in
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103,
FY2021; 6,182 in FY2022; and in FY2023, as of mid-
Division K) and its explanatory statement, Congress fully
November 2022, over 2,000 Cuban migrants.
funded the Administration’s OCB request. Although the
law did not specify an amount for Cuba democracy
U.S. and Cuban officials held semiannual migration talks in
programming, the Administration estimates an allocation of
April 2022 (the first since 2018), and again in November
$20 million, the amount requested.
2022, on the implementation of bilateral migration accords.
The Administration announced in September 2002 that the
For FY2023, the Administration requested $13.432 million
U.S. Embassy in Havana would resume full immigrant visa
for OCB and $20 million for Cuba democracy funding. The
processing in early 2023—the first time since 2017.
House Appropriations Committee’s reported FY2023
foreign aid appropriations bill, H.R. 8282 (H.Rept. 117-
Selected U.S. Sanctions
401), would provide $12.973 million for OCB (same as for
Transactions with the Cuban Military. In 2017, the State
FY2022), while an explanatory statement to the Senate bill,
Department published a list of entities controlled by the
S. 4662, would recommend $13.891 million. The House bill
Cuban military, intelligence, or security services with
would provide $20 million for democracy programs, with
which direct financial transactions would disproportionately
not less than $5 million to support private enterprise,
benefit those services or personnel at the expense of the
private business organizations, and people-to-people
Cuban people or private enterprise. This “Cuba restricted
educational and cultural activities; the bill would also
list” includes 231 entities (ministries, hotels, businesses).
provide for the operation of, and improvements to, U.S.
diplomatic facilities in Cuba, and costs associated with
Travel and Remittances. Since 2019, U.S. restrictions
additional U.S. diplomatic personnel.
have prohibited travel by cruise ships and by private and
corporate aircraft. Since 2020, most U.S. travelers have
On July 20, 2022, the House rejected (163-260) an
been prohibited from staying at over 400 hotels and private
amendment (H.Amdt. 300) to H.R. 8294, a six-bill FY2023
residences identified as owned or controlled by the Cuban
appropriations measure that would have prevented any
government. In 2020, a prohibition against processing
funds from being used to enforce a U.S. sanctions provision
remittances through “Cuba restricted list” entities resulted
prohibiting private financing for U.S. agricultural exports.
in Western Union terminating its services to Cuba.
On human rights, the House and Senate approved H.Res.
Terrorism Designations. Since May 2020, pursuant to the
760 and S.Res. 310, in November and August 2021,
Arms Export Control Act, the Secretary of State has
respectively; both condemned Cuba’s repression, and called
included Cuba on an annual list of countries certified as not
for the release of those detained. The Senate also passed
cooperating fully with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. In early
S.Res. 37 in April 2021, expressing solidarity with the MSI;
January 2021, pursuant to several laws, the Secretary of
S.Res. 81 in May 2021, honoring Las Damas de Blanco, a
State designated Cuba as a state sponsor of international
woman-led human rights group; S. 2045 in July 2021, to
terrorism, citing its harboring of several U.S. fugitives and
rename the street in front of the Cuban Embassy after a
members of Colombia’s National Liberation Army.
democracy activist; and S.Res. 489 in January 2022,
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel
commending Cuban democracy and human rights activists.
Between late 2016 and May 2018, 26 U.S. Embassy
Members of Congress have introduced a wide variety of
Havana community members suffered a series of
other legislative initiatives on Cuba in the 117th Congress.
unexplained injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive
These include bills that would ease or lift sanctions or
issues. In December 2020, the National Academies of
promote engagement and bills that would impose further
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine released a report
sanctions or restrictions on Cuba. Other initiatives focus on
concluding the most plausible mechanism for the source of
immigration parole programs for family reunification and
the health symptoms was directed pulsed radio frequency
for Cuban medical professionals.
energy. U.S. officials maintain that investigations into the
For further information on such legislative initiatives, see
cause or source of these anomalous health incidents have
CRS Report R47246, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th
not reached a conclusion. A number of U.S. government
Congress. Also see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S.
and military officials worldwide have reported these
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances.
symptoms since 2016.
Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 117-46) in September
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
2021 authorizing payment to Central Intelligence Agency
IF10045
and State Department personnel who experience certain
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 100 · UPDATED

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