Updated November 14, 2022
Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies
Both the 2022 National Defense Strategy and senior U.S.
diversity in the images on which the systems were trained,
defense and intelligence officials have identified a number
while some natural language processing programs have
of emerging technologies that could have a disruptive
developed gender bias. Such biases could hold significant
impact on U.S. national security in the years to come. These
implications for AI applications in a military context.
technologies include
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems
artificial intelligence,
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) are a class
lethal autonomous weapon systems,
of weapon systems capable of independently identifying a
hypersonic weapons,
target and employing an onboard weapon system to engage
directed energy weapons,
and destroy the target without manual human control.
biotechnology, and
LAWS require computer algorithms and sensor suites to
quantum technology.
classify an object as hostile, make an engagement decision,
As these technologies continue to mature, they could hold
and guide a weapon to the target. This capability would
significant implications for congressional oversight, U.S.
enable the system to operate in communications-degraded
defense authorizations and appropriations, military concepts
or -denied environments where traditional systems may not
of operations, and the future of war.
be able to operate.
Artificial Intelligence
LAWS are not yet in widespread development, and some
Although the U.S. government has no official definition of
senior military and defense leaders have expressed concerns
artificial intelligence, policymakers generally use the term
about the ethics of ever fielding such systems. For example,
AI to refer to a computer system capable of human-level
in 2017 testimony before the Senate Armed Services
cognition. AI is further divided into three categories:
Committee, then-Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
narrow AI, general AI, and artificial superintelligence.
General Paul Selva stated, “I do not think it is reasonable
Narrow AI systems can perform only the specific task that
for us to put robots in charge of whether or not we take a
they were trained to perform, while general AI systems
human life.” Currently, there are no domestic or
would be capable of performing a broad range of tasks,
international legal prohibitions on the development of
including those for which they were not specifically trained.
LAWS; however, an international group of government
Artificial superintelligence refers to a system that could
experts has begun to discuss the issue. Approximately 30
exceed human-level cognition across most tasks. General
countries have called for a preemptive ban on the systems
AI systems and artificial superintelligence do not yet—and
due to ethical considerations, while others have called for
may never—exist.
formal regulation or guidelines for development and use.
DOD Directive 3000.09 establishes department guidelines
Narrow AI is currently being incorporated into a number of
for the development and fielding of LAWS to ensure that
military applications by both the United States and its
they comply with “the law of war, applicable treaties,
competitors. Such applications include but are not limited
weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of
to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; logistics;
engagement.”
cyber operations; command and control; and semi-
autonomous and autonomous vehicles. These technologies
Hypersonic Weapons
are intended in part to augment or replace human operators,
Hypersonic weapons—which fly at speeds of at least Mach
freeing them to perform more complex and cognitively
5—are in development in a number of countries, including
demanding work. In addition, AI-enabled systems could (1)
the United States. There are two categories of hypersonic
react significantly faster than systems that rely on operator
weapons:
input, (2) cope with an exponential increase in the amount
Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) are launched from a
of data available for analysis, and (3) enable new concepts
rocket before gliding to a target. (When HGVs are
of operations, such as swarming (i.e., cooperative behavior
mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon
in which unmanned vehicles autonomously coordinate to
system is often referred to as a hypersonic boost-glide
achieve a task) that could confer a warfighting advantage
weapon.)
by overwhelming adversary defensive systems.
Hypersonic cruise missiles (HCM) are powered by
high-speed engines throughout the duration of their
Narrow AI could, however, introduce a number of
flight.
challenges. For example, such systems may be subject to
In contrast to ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons do not
algorithmic bias as a result of their training data or models.
follow a ballistic trajectory and can maneuver en route to
Researchers have repeatedly discovered instances of racial
their destination, making defense against them difficult.
bias in AI facial recognition programs due to the lack of
Currently, no such defense against hypersonic weapons
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies
exists, and experts disagree on the affordability and
potential to “alter genes or create DNA to modify plants,
technological feasibility of hypersonic missile defense
animals, and humans. Such biotechnologies could be used
options.
to enhance [or degrade] the performance of military
personnel. The proliferation of synthetic biology—used to
According to open-source reporting, Russia fielded its first
create genetic code that does not exist in nature—may
HGV—the Avangard—in December 2019. China has
increase the number of actors that can create chemical and
conducted successful hypersonic weapons tests and has also
biological weapons” and could additionally enable the
reportedly fielded an operational HGV. The United States is
creation of adaptive camouflage, cloaking devices, or
unlikely to field an operational HGV system before 2023.
lighter, stronger, and—potentially—self-healing body and
Although HCM technology is less mature than HGV
vehicle armor. U.S. adversaries may be less restrained in
technology, reports suggest that it could be fielded by
both researching and applying biotechnology, particularly
Russia in 2023 and by China in 2025.
as it relates to human performance modification and
Analysts disagree about the strategic implications of
biological weapons.
hypersonic weapons. Some have identified two factors that
could hold significant implications for strategic stability:
Quantum Technology
(1) the weapon’s short time-of-flight, which, in turn,
Quantum technology, which employs the principles of
compresses the timeline for response, and (2) its
quantum physics, has not yet reached maturity; however, it
unpredictable flight path, which could generate uncertainty
could hold significant implications for the future of
about the weapon’s intended target and therefore heighten
encryption and stealth technologies. GAO reports that
the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in the
DOD, State, DHS, and the ODNI have assessed that
event of a conflict. Other analysts have argued that the
“quantum communications could enable adversaries to
strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are minimal
develop secure communications that U.S. personnel would
because U.S. competitors such as China and Russia already
not be able to intercept or decrypt. Quantum computing
possess the ability to strike the United States with
may allow adversaries to decrypt [unclassified, classified,
intercontinental ballistic missiles, which, when launched in
or sensitive] information, which could enable them to target
salvos, could overwhelm U.S. missile defenses.
U.S. personnel and military operations.”
Directed Energy Weapons
Quantum technology could have other military applications,
such as quantum sensing, which could theoretically enable
DOD defines directed energy (DE) weapons as those using
significant improvements in submarine detection, rendering
concentrated electromagnetic energy, rather than kinetic
the oceans “transp
energy, to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy
arent.” This could, in turn, hold
equipment, facilities, and/or personnel.” DE weapons—
implications for the survivability of the U.S. sea-based
often colloquially referred to as “lasers”—
nuclear deterrent. Quantum sensing could also provide
could be used by
alternative positioning, navigation, and timing options that
ground forces in counter rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-
could in theory allow militaries to continue to operate at full
RAM) or short-range air defense (SHORAD) missions.
performance in GPS-degraded or GPS-denied
They could offer low costs per shot and nearly limitless
environments. Military application of quantum technologies
magazines that, in contrast to existing conventional
could be constrained, however, by the fragility of quantum
systems, could enable an efficient and effective means of
states, which can be disrupted by minute movements,
defending against missile salvos and swarms of uninhabited
changes in temperature, or other environmental factors.
vehicles. Theoretically, DE weapons could also provide
options for boost-phase missile intercept, given their speed-
CRS Products
of-light travel time; however, as in the case of hypersonic
missile defense, experts disagree on the affordability and
CRS Report R46458, Emerging Military Technologies: Background
technological feasibility of this application.
and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.
CRS Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence and National Security,
High-powered microwave (HPM) weapons, a subset of DE
by Kelley M. Sayler.
weapons, could be used as a nonkinetic means of disabling
CRS In Focus IF11150, Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal
electronics, communications systems, and improvised
Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelley M. Sayler.
explosive devices in the event of a conflict. In addition, the
U.S. military has explored using HPM in a nonlethal “heat
CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and
ray” system for crowd control; however, the system was
Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.
recalled—likely due to ethical and operational
CRS Report R46925, Department of Defense Directed Energy
considerations.
Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by
Kelley M. Sayler.
Biotechnology
CRS Report R44824, Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9, by
Biotechnology leverages life sciences for technological
Marcy E. Gallo et al.
applications. A number of developments in biotechnology
CRS In Focus IF11836, Defense Primer: Quantum Technology, by
hold potential implications for national security. As a 2018
Kelley M. Sayler.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report notes, the
Departments of Defense, State (State), and Homeland
Security (DHS), and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI), all assess that biotechnologies, such as
the low-cost gene-editing tool CRISPR-Cas9, have the
Kelley M. Sayler, Analyst in Advanced Technology and
Global Security
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Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies
IF11105
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