Updated November 3, 2022
Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook
Since Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine in February
noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps, which it had been
2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have successfully
seeking to develop along NATO standards before the war.
defended against and pushed back Russian forces in many
The UAF continued to face issues with retention,
regions, despite several apparent disadvantages. The UAF
professional development, and funding. As described
has demonstrated a great deal of flexibility over the course
previously, the high proportion of trained veterans, many
of the conflict to date, as well as an ability to integrate
with combat experience, mitigated to some degree the need
Western security assistance and training in its military
for an established NCO corps to train and command new
campaigns. The UAF continues to face obstacles sustaining
recruits.
momentum against Russian forces. Ukraine’s resistance has
come with losses in personnel and equipment, and both
Second, the UAF’s need for immediate reinforcements
sides face risks entering the winter season.
creates pressure to deploy troops with only basic training.
To sustain combat operations in the current conflict,
Since early 2022, the Biden Administration and Congress
however, the UAF has continued training recruits to staff
have firmly supported Ukraine’s defense of its territorial
professional units, conduct complex operations, and operate
integrity against Russia’s invasion. The UAF’s evolving
advanced weapon systems.
state may be of interest to Congress as Members continue to
weigh options and conduct oversight over policies to
Equipment
support Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression.
To date, the UAF has sustained significant equipment
losses. Some UAF units appear to be operating without
Personnel
mechanized or motorized vehicle support, likely due to
Some observers note that the UAF’s impressive overall
losses and maintenance issues. Despite losses, Western
performance to date has been due in part to the experience
security assistance and UAF resilience in repairing and
and motivation of its personnel. The UAF continues to
maintaining equipment has been crucial to UAF successes.
benefit from high levels of recruitment and motivation.
Repurposing captured Russian equipment during recent
High losses, however, pose a continued challenge to the
offensives likely has mitigated some losses but is unlikely
UAF’s ability to maintain effective, sustained operations.
to be sufficient to meet UAF needs or provide long-term
relief for its equipment needs.
After Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the UAF
gained important combat experience fighting Russian-led
Ukrainian officials have emphasized their need for long-
forces in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk
range rocket and artillery systems to counter Russia’s
(known as the Donbas). This led to a large proportion of
quantitative and qualitative advantage in long-range fire. At
trained and experienced veterans among Ukraine’s
the start of the war, Ukraine still relied on Soviet and
population. These veterans and other volunteers (including
Russian 122mm and 152mm caliber rocket and artillery
foreign recruits) were quickly mobilized into Ukraine’s new
systems. Ukraine also had a smaller number of longer-range
volunteer Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) and Reserve
220mm and 300mm rocket systems, but it is unclear how
without the need for lengthy training. The high level of
many are still in service.
experience and training among recruits meant they were
able to operate artillery, tank, and support systems that
The UAF’s access to materials, components, and
traditionally require more time for reservists or volunteers
ammunition to operate and repair Soviet- and Russian-era
to master. These units have been crucial in supporting
equipment has long been a source of concern. Although
regular UAF units and enabling them to spearhead
some Central and Eastern European defense industries are
operations and counteroffensives.
compatible with Soviet and early Russian equipment,
observers say these industries likely do not have sufficient
Since the beginning of the 2022 war, the UAF reportedly
capacity to support Ukraine. Additionally, Russian forces
has suffered high levels of casualties. Losses are likely
have targeted Ukraine’s domestic defense industry,
higher among regular UAF and Special Forces units,
affecting its ability to produce and maintain equipment
leading to a greater reliance on TDF and Reserve units.
(including complex weapon systems) to meet UAF needs.
Unlike the initial period of the war, when most recruits
However, during recent advances in Kharkiv and Luhansk,
were veterans, most new recruits and volunteers have little
the UAF captured large amounts of Russian equipment,
military experience and, as a result, take longer to train.
much of which has been redeployed after repairs.
The UAF faces two major hurdles to training and deploying
Ukraine’s air force and air defenses have proven effective
new personnel. First, at the time of the invasion, Ukraine
thus far in limiting Russian air superiority. Russia retains
did not have a fully developed professional
air superiority in certain regions, however, and continues to
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Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook
target Ukrainian air defenses. It is unclear how many
Current Military Performance and
operational medium- and long-range air defense systems
Outlook
Ukraine retains, and frontline UAF units primarily rely on
Over eight months into the war, the UAF appears to have
short-range man-portable air defense (MANPAD) systems.
regained momentum from Russian forces, conducting
offensives and retaking territory in the Kharkiv, Luhansk,
Role of U.S. and Western Security
and Kherson regions. The UAF continues to demonstrate
Assistance
high levels of operational flexibility, motivation, and
Since the start of Russia’s 2022 war, the United States has
capability. The UAF appears committed to capitalizing on
provided Ukraine more than $17.9 billion in security
reduced Russian military capability and demonstrating to
assistance. The United States and European allies and
foreign audiences its ability to retake territory, especially
partners also continue to contribute training, logistics, and
before winter.
intelligence. Observers note a possible tension between the
imperative to provide equipment and training for immediate
The UAF command structure appears to be more
use on the battlefield and the need to provide training to
centralized, as opposed to the more localized command
employ these systems effectively over the longer term.
structure exhibited earlier in the war. Nevertheless, the
There is also tension in balancing Ukrainian requests with
UAF command has demonstrated flexibility and a
concerns about escalating the conflict beyond territorial
willingness to adjust operations due to changing
defense. Another concern, some say, is the impact of such
circumstances, particularly at the unit level. It also appears
assistance on U.S. and Western stockpiles and the time it
the UAF continues to adopt NATO-style principles of
would take for domestic defense industries to replenish.
command, such as the delegation of authority to local
command as well as to junior and lower-level officers.
Training
Prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion, the United States and other
Russia’s armed forces retain some advantages in equipment
allies contributed training and advice to the UAF. Current
(specifically artillery and long-range fire), air support, and
training efforts focus on employing and operating Western
electronic warfare. Russia’s September 2022 decision to
security assistance and, increasingly, on basic infantry skills
announce mobilization comes after a recognition of drastic
and unit-level development.
losses and lack of personnel. In contrast, Ukraine is likely
to continue to recruit large numbers of personnel. The UAF
The UAF still faces pressure to deploy troops into the field
still relies on a core of professional units to conduct
with minimum training to replace losses, but it has
combined arms operations and spearhead operations,
increased efforts to prioritize advanced training to support
supported by TDF and Reserve units. As mentioned,
long-term development and the creation of new units
training new recruits to replace and expand these
capable of combined arms operations. Observers note,
professional units could prove decisive in the coming
however, the UAF’s ongoing need for assistance and
months. The Ukrainian government also may face further
training in planning, operations, and logistics.
infrastructure and resource constraints, including from
Russian targeting, which could affect UAF performance.
Equipment
In the initial phase of the war, U.S. and European provision
These developments may factor into congressional
of anti-tank and MANPAD systems appeared crucial in
decisionmaking on future options regarding whether and
supporting UAF operations. As the war has evolved,
how to support Ukraine’s defense. Some observers believe
however, Western security assistance has adjusted to the
UAF capabilities will continue to increase with continued
conditions and needs of the UAF. Western assistance has
U.S. and Western security assistance, especially in key
provided the UAF with capabilities to not only defend but
areas, such as air defenses. UAF training to operate and
also push back Russian forces, specifically artillery and
maintain these systems will likely determine the extent of
rocket artillery. Due to the almost total exhaustion of
the improvement in UAF capabilities. Ukrainian officials
ammunition for Soviet- and early Russian-era artillery, the
also note the importance of continued ammunition supplies,
UAF is increasingly dependent on Western artillery.
especially as the UAF depends increasingly on Western
Ukrainian officials continue to call for advanced systems
artillery. In addition, the UAF has identified needs in
such as tanks, fighters, and long-range missiles. In response
logistics, medical evacuation and care, and intelligence.
to continued Russian strikes against Ukrainian critical
Communications problems endure, with Russian electronic
infrastructure, observers note Ukraine’s need for air defense
warfare and a lack of reliable systems hindering the UAF’s
systems to protect critical infrastructure. The UAF also has
ability to coordinate operations and integrate intelligence.
appealed for more mobile air defense systems to protect
units as they advance and support offensive operations.
Also see CRS Report R47068, Russia’s War in Ukraine:
Military and Intelligence Aspects, by Andrew S. Bowen;
At the unit level, the UAF has identified protected mobility
CRS In Focus IF11862, Ukrainian Armed Forces, by
(e.g., armored vehicles) and unit-level fire support (e.g.,
Andrew S. Bowen; and CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S.
mortars) among its needs in order to exploit advances,
Security Assistance to Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia,
protect withdrawal, and support operations. Individual
Andrew S. Bowen, and Cory Welt.
supplies such as warm clothing, medical equipment, secure
communications, and food likely will play a key role in
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European
maintaining unit effectiveness through the coming winter.
Affairs
IF12150
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Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12150 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED

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