Updated October 17, 2022
Burkina Faso: Conflict and Military Rule
Burkina Faso has experienced two military coups in 2022,
officers loyal to Compaoré. Kaboré was Burkina Faso’s
ending a brief period of elected civilian leadership after a
first post-independence leader to enter office via elections.
historic democratic transition in 2014-2015. On September
30, 2022, Captain Ibrahim Traoré ousted Lt. Col. Paul-
Figure 1. Burkina Faso at a Glance
Henri Sandaogo Damiba, who had taken power in a coup
eight months earlier. Traoré, age 34 and a combat veteran,
is now serving as “transition president.” He has pledged to
adhere to the previous junta’s commitment to holding
elections by July 2024.
Developments in Burkina Faso underscore the country’s
escalating security crisis and suggest that regional leaders’
efforts to deter coups have fallen short. Since 2020, military
officers have also seized power in Mali, Guinea, Chad, and
Sudan. Some Members of Congress have called for
increased U.S. efforts to address military coups in Africa,
including during a July 2022 Senate hearing on the Sahel
region. Congress also provides and oversees U.S.
governance, stabilization, and security aid for the Sahel.
The latest coup in Burkina Faso comes amid tensions in the
military and on the streets over authorities’ inability to stem
gains by regional insurgencies linked to Al Qaeda and the
Islamic State. Days before Captain Traoré seized power, a

military-protected convoy was hit by a massive insurgent
Source: CIA World Factbook, IMF; 2022 figures unless noted.
attack that killed dozens of soldiers and civilians. Traoré
has accused his predecessor of failing to secure the country
Armed Islamist violence emerged in Burkina Faso around
or provide better equipment and pay for troops. Rivalry
2016, as conflicts expanded in neighboring Mali. Military
among specialized units—to which both Traoré and
casualties rose, while President Kaboré faced growing
Damiba belong—may also have been a motivating factor.
public demands for greater security, job creation,
governance reforms, and accountability for abuses under
Junta members appear to be considering whether to limit
the Compaoré regime. Among other controversial actions,
counterterrorism cooperation with former colonial power
Kaboré oversaw the expansion of state-backed militias and
France in favor of greater support from Russia. French
“volunteer” fighters that human rights groups accused of
troops are stationed in Burkina Faso and provide security
abuses. He was reelected in 2020 in a vote that local civil
assistance; officials in successive Burkinabè governments
society observers deemed satisfactory, although opposition
have asserted a desire to “diversify” the country’s security
leaders initially claimed fraud, while security threats
partnerships. Captain Traoré initially alleged that France
prevented voting in several areas. On January 24, 2022,
was supporting a countercoup attempt by his predecessor,
Kaboré was ousted in the coup led by Lt. Col. Damiba.
while protesters waved Russian flags and attacked the
Terrorism and Insurgency
French embassy and cultural centers. In neighboring Mali,
the junta has contracted with U.S.-sanctioned Wagner
Burkina Faso enjoyed relative peace prior to 2016. That
Group, a Russian private military firm, deepening a rift
year, regional Al Qaeda affiliates carried out an attack in
with France, which withdrew its military forces from Mali
Ouagadougou that killed 30 people, including an American,
in August 2022. Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prighozin
while a local Islamist insurgency emerged in the rural north.
praised Traoré’s seizure of power in a statement.
Attacks escalated in 2017 after regional Al Qaeda affiliates
merged to form the Malian-led Group for Supporting Islam
Background
and Muslims (aka JNIM). JNIM and a former splinter
Burkina Faso has a history of military mutinies, coups, and
movement known as the Islamic State-Greater Sahara (IS-
social unrest, though it was seen as relatively stable under
GS) now control much of the countryside. In 2018, JNIM
former authoritarian leader Blaise Compaoré, who came to
claimed a complex assault on the Burkinabè military’s
power in a 1987 coup. A towering and controversial figure
headquarters and the French embassy in the capital.
in West African politics, Compaoré was ousted in a popular
uprising in 2014 while trying to bypass constitutional term
Burkina Faso’s northern and eastern regions have been the
limits. Civilian politician Roch Marc Christian Kaboré was
most affected by conflict. In the north, JNIM has exploited
elected in 2015, after a failed coup attempt by senior
ethnic tensions and state neglect, as well as grievances over
corruption, patronage politics, social stratification, and land
disputes. The east is a stronghold of IS-GS, a former
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Burkina Faso: Conflict and Military Rule
splinter faction and rival that has reportedly cultivated ties
slowed from 5.7% in 2019 to 1.9% in 2020 amid the effects
with criminal networks. IS-GS notably claimed the 2017
of the COVID-19 pandemic, before rebounding to 6.9% in
deadly ambush of U.S. soldiers in neighboring Niger.
2021, according to the International Monetary Fund.
Several factors may explain why violence has spread so
Insurgent violence has caused largescale displacement and
quickly despite Burkina Faso’s history of religious and
crippled the health and education systems in parts of the
ethnic tolerance. Mali-based insurgents appear to have lent
country. As of mid-2022, over 1.5 million Burkinabè (about
support to cross-border allies, and have long threatened to
7% of the population) were internally displaced, and about
attack countries, like Burkina Faso, that have deployed
29,000 had fled as refugees, according to U.N. data. Over
U.N. peacekeeping troops to Mali. Compaoré’s ouster, and
4,000 schools were shuttered due to insecurity, affecting
the transitional government’s decision in 2015 to dissolve
over 700,000 children. Most of the country’s northern and
his elite presidential guard, arguably disrupted the state
eastern districts were facing “crisis” or “emergency” level
security apparatus and may have upset rumored tacit
food insecurity as of September 2022, according to the
arrangements with regional insurgents. Longstanding
Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET).
minority Christian dominance of the civil service and
Insurgent groups have besieged towns in an apparent effort
political elite reportedly also spurred tensions. Since 2016,
to force residents into submission and preclude cooperation
abuses by state security forces and state-backed militias and
with state security forces, reportedly causing severe
vigilantes—including extrajudicial killings and torture—
shortages of food and medicines in areas struggling with
may have driven insurgent recruitment, according to human
high levels of displacement. Insurgents also have attacked
rights advocates. Abuses have reportedly particularly
gold mines, threatening a major economic sector and
targeted minority ethnic Fulanis (alt. Peuls), who are
possibly extracting revenues from illicit gold smuggling.
Muslim and often livestock herders, reportedly prompting
In early 2022, U.N. officials warned that crises in the
some to turn to armed groups for protection or revenge.
central Sahel region (Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger) were
Rights advocates have also criticized laws that restrict
“outpacing” available relief funding. Since then, the ripple
publication of information on terrorist attacks or military
effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on global food, fuel, and
operations without state authorization, and criminalize
fertilizer supplies have created new challenges. FEWS NET
reports that could “demoralize” the armed forces.
has expressed particular concern for Burkina Faso, noting
its reliance on Russian imports for 20% of its wheat supply.
Regional Initiatives. The G5 Sahel, an intergovernmental
body comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, Mauritania,
U.S. Policy and Aid
and Niger, has sought to coordinate regional counter-
Prior to the January 2022 coup, the State Department
terrorism efforts with support from donors, including the
characterized bilateral relations as “excellent,” with U.S.
United States. A lack of capacity, mutual distrust, and
engagement focusing on regional security, development,
tensions over military rule have complicated these efforts.
and humanitarian relief efforts. In February, the State
Mali withdrew from the G5 Sahel in May 2022, prompting
Department announced it was applying coup-related
questions over the initiative’s future. The African Union
restrictions on aid to the government under §7008 of annual
and the Economic Community of West African States
foreign aid appropriations legislation. The restrictions
(ECOWAS) have pledged to increase regional security
primarily affect military aid, along with some development
efforts but with little concrete impact to date. ECOWAS
aid implemented through the government. Humanitarian aid
also is seeking to induce the region’s military juntas to hold
and democracy-related aid are exempt, as is certain internal
timely elections. The bloc has imposed targeted sanctions
security assistance that Congress has authorized
on junta members in Mali and Guinea, but not Burkina Faso
“notwithstanding” most legal restrictions. The Millennium
to date, citing satisfaction with the latter’s election timeline.
Challenge Corporation has separately terminated a planned
$450 million aid compact that was to focus on electricity
French Military Operations. France has conducted
access, citing statutory eligibility requirements.
counterterrorism operations in the Sahel region for nearly a
decade, with U.S. logistical and intelligence support. The
The United States allocated about $66 million in bilateral
former colonial power’s role has fueled some criticism and
aid for Burkina Faso in FY2021 (latest publicly reported),
protests, including in Burkina Faso. French troops withdrew
focusing primarily on health, along with basic education
from Mali—their former operational focus—in 2022 amid
and governance. Additional health and development aid,
worsening tensions with the junta there. France’s operations
including COVID-19-related assistance, has been provided
in Burkina Faso remain limited compared to Mali pre-2022,
through regional and global programs.
or to Niger, which has absorbed some of the French troops
Prior to 2022, Burkina Faso received substantial additional
leaving Mali. In 2019, French forces intervened to free two
security assistance through State Department- and Defense
French hostages in Burkina Faso from possible JNIM
Department-administered regional and global programs
custody, and also freed a South Korean and an American
focusing on counterterrorism and peacekeeping capacity. In
hostage whose capture had not been previously reported.
2020, U.S. officials publicly threatened to review and
Humanitarian Emergency
possibly suspend security assistance unless Burkinabè
Landlocked with a largely agrarian workforce, Burkina
authorities addressed human rights concerns. Congress, in
Faso is one of the world’s poorest countries. Food
the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act, required
insecurity is widespread; remittances from Burkinabè
the executive branch to submit a “plan to address gross
workers in wealthier coastal states are a lifeline for many
violations of human rights and civilian harm” in Sahel
households. Exports of cotton and gold are key sources of
countries, including Burkina Faso (P.L. 116-283, §1294).
tax revenues and foreign exchange. Economic growth
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Burkina Faso: Conflict and Military Rule

IF10434
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs


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