INSIGHTi

Political Reforms in Kazakhstan
October 11, 2022
Kazakhstan, a U.S. partner in areas such as counterterrorism, regional security, and nuclear
nonproliferation, is implementing political reforms as it faces a range of domestic and international
challenges. Following unprecedented unrest in January 2022, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has
moved to consolidate power while his country confronts difficult geopolitical dynamics in the wake of
Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Reforms introduced by Tokayev are restructuring
Kazakhstan’s political system and annulling the privileged position of former President Nursultan
Nazarbayev, who held office for nearly three decades. While authorities tout ongoing reforms as moving
the country in a more democratic direction, skeptics question the degree to which Kazakhstan will
implement genuine democratization. In September, Tokayev called for a snap presidential election; he is
widely expected to win a second term in the vote, scheduled for November 20. Some Members of
Congress have expressed interest in expanding U.S. engagement with Kazakhstan, and in Kazakhstan’s
reform process.
January Unrest
On January 2, 2022, peaceful demonstrations broke out in Kazakhstan’s western oil-producing region
over an increase in fuel prices. The protests quickly spread throughout the country, expanding to
encompass grievances over corruption and economic inequality, with much of the anger directed at
Nazarbayev and his family. By January 6, the protests had become the largest and most violent unrest in
Kazakhstan’s history, leaving over 200 people dead. Some Members of Congress condemned the
violence, calling on Kazakhstani authorities to respect human rights. Some scholars assess that in addition
to peaceful protestors with genuine economic and political demands and opportunistic looters who took
advantage of the unrest, the events involved “organized provocateurs,” who attacked government
facilities and law enforcement. President Tokayev referred to the events as an “attempted coup.” Many
analysts contend that figures associated with Nazarbayev and his family took advantage of genuine
popular protests to pursue an intra-elite power struggle.
As Tokayev moved to control the situation, he appealed for assistance from the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), a Russia-led security alliance to which Kazakhstan belongs. In the first deployment
in the organization’s history, a CSTO mission of approximately 2,500 troops from Russia, Armenia,
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Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan arrived on January 6 and remained in Kazakhstan until the following
week.
“De-Nazarbayevification” and Political Reforms
In the aftermath of the January unrest, President Tokayev consolidated power, removing Nazarbayev
associates and family members from positions of authority. What some observers term the “de-
Nazarbayevification” of Kazakhstan is ongoing. In September, Kazakhstan’s capital, which Tokayev had
renamed Nur-Sultan in Nazarbayev’s honor in 2019, reverted to its previous name, Astana.
In a move some analysts see as part of Tokayev’s efforts to reduce Nazarbayev’s influence, Kazakhstan
held a constitutional referendum on June 5, 2022. Voters approved a range of changes curtailing some
presidential powers and removing mentions of Nazarbayev from the constitution. Tokayev said the
constitutional changes would shift Kazakhstan from a “super-presidential form of government to a
presidential republic with a strong parliament.” Following additional legislation passed in September that
extends the presidential term from five years to seven and imposes a one-term limit, a snap presidential
election was set for November 20, two years ahead of schedule.
Analysts assess the vote is intended, as one wrote, to “underline that [Tokayev] is his own man and no
longer reliant on Nazarbayev’s patronage.” Skeptical observers see the election as a “one-horse race”
devoid of genuine competition. All three parties in parliament are backing Tokayev. Although Tokayev’s
vision for a “New Kazakhstan” includes development of a “multipolar party system” and “fair and free
political competition,” some analysts express doubt as to the degree of political pluralism Kazakhstan’s
government will allow.
Implications of Russia’s War in Ukraine
In January, some analysts posited that the CSTO intervention would undermine Kazakhstan’s multi-
vector foreign policy and increase the country’s dependence on Russia, raising concerns about
Kazakhstan’s sovereignty; others dismissed such apprehensions. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine, Kazakhstan has maintained its “diplomatic balancing act,” and Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has
not shifted in favor of Russia. Astana has repeatedly expressed support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity
and provided humanitarian aid. While polling indicates public opinion on the war is divided, some
analysts see Kazakhstan as increasingly distancing itself from Russia in response to the ongoing conflict.
Some observers see the war in Ukraine as having enabled Tokayev to reinvent himself as a “truly
independent figure,” arguing that the snap election is intended to give Tokayev “a popular mandate to
rule, as distinct from a mandate from either Nazarbayev or Putin.”
Because of close economic ties between Russia and Kazakhstan, the war places Kazakhstan in a difficult
position. The country is facing significant inflation and supply chain disruptions. In the two weeks
following Russia’s September announcement of “partial mobilization,” more than 200,000 Russian
citizens officially entered Kazakhstan, of whom about 50,000 remain in the country. Tokayev stated his
government would “ensure their safety.” Some outside observers see this influx of Russians fleeing
mobilization as a “humanitarian crisis in the making.”
Issues for Congress
Congress could consider what opportunities exist for developing U.S.-Kazakhstan relations given shifting
geopolitics, and how the United States might effectively support democratization in Kazakhstan. While
some analysts see Kazakhstan as a potential avenue for sanctions evasion by Russia, Kazakhstani officials
have asserted their intention to abide by U.S. and European sanctions. The State Department has stated

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the United States seeks to minimize the impact of those sanctions on Kazakhstan. In light of the war and
related sanctions, Kazakhstan aims to diversify its trade relationships. Sanctions on Russia may present
opportunities for Kazakhstan as companies consider relocating their operations or redirecting transit
routes through Kazakhstan. Members may wish to consider how U.S. engagement can aid Central Asian
nations in reducing their dependence on Russia, although some observers see China as the potential
beneficiary of any such distancing. Some Members have called for an international investigation into
Kazakhstan’s response to the January unrest, and a State Department review of security assistance to
Kazakhstan in order to ensure accountability for alleged human rights violations.

Author Information

Maria A. Blackwood

Analyst in Asian Policy




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