Updated October 3, 2022
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Cuban Political and Economic Developments
The government responded with harsh measures, including
Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a
widespread detentions of protesters, civil society activists,
government that has sharply restricted freedoms of
and bystanders. Hundreds of the July 2021 protestors have
expression, association, assembly, and other basic human
been tried and convicted, including more than 25 minors.
rights since the early years of the 1959 Cuban revolution.
The human rights group Cuban Prisoners Defenders (CPD)
reported that Cuba had 1,016 political prisoners at the end
Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro as president in
of August 2022 (up from 152 on July 1, 2021), of which
2018 and as head of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) at
743 were imprisoned and considered prisoners of
its eighth party congress in April 2021. The departure of
Castro and other older leaders from the PCC’s Politburo
conscience by CPD, 242 were under some form of
conditional release, and 31 were imprisoned for other
reflects the generational change in Cuban leadership that
politically motivated acts.
began several years ago. While in power (2006-2018), Raúl
Castro (who succeeded his brother, longtime leader Fidel
U.S. Policy
Castro) began to move Cuba toward a mixed economy with
a stronger private sector, but his government’s slow,
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
gradualist approach did not produce major improvements.
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
Cuba adopted a new constitution in 2019 that introduced
some reforms but maintained the state’s dominance over the
isolating the Cuban government. The Obama
Administration initiated a policy shift away from sanctions
economy and the PCC’s predominant political role.
and toward engagement and the normalization of relations.
The Cuban economy has been hard-hit by the economic
Changes included the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a
shutdown associated with the Coronavirus Disease 2019
state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015); the
(COVID-19) pandemic; Venezuela’s economic crisis,
restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015); and eased
which has reduced support from that country; and U.S.
restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
sanctions. Cuba reports the economy contracted by 10.9%
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
in 2020, grew by 1.3% in 2021, and projects it will expand
(2015-2016). In contrast, the Trump Administration
by 4% in 2022. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
introduced new sanctions in 2017, including restrictions on
forecasts 3.2% growth in 2022 and projects 4.6% growth in
transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban
2023. This growth forecast could change due to the impact
military. By 2019, the Trump Administration had largely
of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the global economy,
abandoned engagement and significantly increased
including food and fuel prices; an August 2022 fire that
sanctions, particularly on travel and remittances.
severely damaged Cuba’s main oil storage facility; and
In its initial months, the Biden Administration announced it
Hurricane Ian, which caused severe damage to western
was conducting a review of policy toward Cuba, with
Cuba in late September 2022 and a power outage across the
human rights a core pillar, and would review policy
country that sparked protests.
decisions made by the prior Administration. In the
Cuba unified its dual currency system in 2021; the long-
aftermath of the Cuban government’s harsh response to the
debated reform spurred inflation, estimated to be between
July 11 protests, the Biden Administration criticized Cuba’s
200% and 500% by the end of 2021 but forecast to decline
repression and imposed targeted sanctions on those
to 59% by the end of 2022, according to the EIU.
involved. In July and August 2021, the Treasury
Department imposed four rounds of financial sanctions on
Cuba’s public health response to the pandemic initially kept
three Cuban security entities and eight officials. Between
cases and deaths low, but both surged in the summer of
November 2021 and July 2022, the State Department
2021. The country experienced another surge in cases in
announced four rounds of visa restrictions against 50
early 2022, but deaths remained low because of high
individuals involved in repressing protesters.
vaccination rates. As of early October 2022, Cuba reported
over 8,500 deaths since the pandemic began (with one of
In May 2022, the Administration announced several Cuba
the lowest mortality rates in the hemisphere) and had fully
policy changes aimed at increasing support for the Cuban
vaccinated 88% of its population with its own vaccines.
people. The Administration increased immigrant visa
processing at the U.S. Embassy in Havana and said it would
Increased Repression. Beginning in November 2020, the
reinstate the Cuban Family Reunification Parole (CFRP)
government cracked down on the San Isidro Movement
program. It eased travel restrictions by reauthorizing
(MSI), a civil society group opposed to restrictions on
scheduled and charter flights to cities beyond Havana and
artistic expression. On July 11, 2021, anti-government
reinstating group people-to-people travel. It eased
demonstrations broke out in Havana and throughout the
restrictions on sending cash remittances by eliminating the
country, with thousands of Cubans protesting economic
dollar and frequency limits for family remittances and
conditions (food and medicine shortages, blackouts) and
reauthorizing donative remittances to Cuban nationals. The
long-standing concerns about the lack of political freedoms.
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Administration also announced that it would increase
and State Department personnel who experience certain
support for independent Cuban entrepreneurs.
brain injuries. The National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2022 (P.L. 117-81), approved in December 2021, has
Increased Irregular Migration. Driven by Cuba’s difficult
provisions to address health care and treatment, national
economic conditions and political repression, irregular
security challenges, and U.S. government coordination of
Cuban migration to the United States has surged over the
the response to the incidents.
past year. U.S. Customs and Border Protection reported
over 39,000 border enforcement encounters of Cuban
117th Congress: Legislative Action on Cuba
migrants nationwide in FY2021 and almost 198,000 Cubans
For FY2022, the Biden Administration requested $12.973
during the first 11 months of FY2022 (through August),
million for the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) and $20
with the overwhelming majority at the Southwest land
million for Cuba democracy programming. In the
border. U.S. maritime interdiction of Cubans also has
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103,
increased, with the Coast Guard reporting 838 interdictions
Division K) and its explanatory statement, Congress fully
in FY2021 and 6,182 in FY2022.
funded the Administration’s OCB request, although it did
not specify an amount for Cuba democracy programming.
U.S. and Cuban officials held migration talks in April 2022
(the first such talks since 2018) on the implementation of
For FY2023, the Administration requested $13.432 million
bilateral migration accords. In September 2022, the
for OCB and $20 million for Cuba democracy funding. The
Administration announced that the U.S. Embassy in Havana
House Appropriations Committee’s reported FY2023
would resume full immigrant visa processing in early
foreign aid appropriations bill, H.R. 8282 (H.Rept. 117-
2023—the first time since 2017.
401), would provide $12.973 million for OCB (same as for
FY2022), while an explanatory statement to the Senate bill,
Selected U.S. Sanctions
S. 4662, would recommend $13.891 million. The House bill
Transactions with the Cuban Military. In 2017, the State
would provide $20 million for democracy programs, with
Department published a list of entities controlled by the
not less than $5 million to support private enterprise,
Cuban military, intelligence, or security services with
private business organizations, and people-to-people
which direct financial transactions would disproportionately
educational and cultural activities; the bill would also
benefit those services or personnel at the expense of the
provide for the operation of, and improvements to, U.S.
Cuban people or private enterprise. This “Cuba restricted
diplomatic facilities in Cuba, and costs associated with
list” includes 231 entities (ministries, hotels, businesses).
additional U.S. diplomatic personnel.
Travel and Remittances. Since 2019, U.S. restrictions
On July 20, 2022, the House rejected (163-260) an
have prohibited travel by cruise ships and by private and
amendment (H.Amdt. 300) to H.R. 8294, a six-bill FY2023
corporate aircraft. Since 2020, most U.S. travelers have
appropriations measure that would have prevented any
been prohibited from staying at over 400 hotels and private
funds from being used to enforce a U.S. sanctions provision
residences identified as owned or controlled by the Cuban
prohibiting private financing for U.S. agricultural exports.
government. In 2020, a prohibition against processing
remittances through “Cuba restricted list” entities resulted
On human rights, the House and Senate approved H.Res.
in Western Union terminating its services to Cuba.
760 and S.Res. 310, in November and August 2021,
respectively; both condemned Cuba’s repression, and called
Terrorism Designations. Since May 2020, pursuant to the
for the release of those detained. The Senate also passed
Arms Export Control Act, the Secretary of State has
S.Res. 37 in April 2021, expressing solidarity with the MSI;
included Cuba on an annual list of countries certified as not
S.Res. 81 in May 2021, honoring Las Damas de Blanco, a
cooperating fully with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. In early
woman-led human rights group; S. 2045 in July 2021, to
January 2021, pursuant to several laws, the Secretary of
rename the street in front of the Cuban Embassy after a
State designated Cuba as a state sponsor of international
democracy activist; and S.Res. 489 in January 2022,
terrorism, citing its harboring of several U.S. fugitives and
commending Cuban democracy and human rights activists.
members of Colombia’s National Liberation Army.
Members of Congress have introduced a wide variety of
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel
other legislative initiatives on Cuba in the 117th Congress.
Between late 2016 and May 2018, 26 U.S. Embassy
These include bills that would ease or lift sanctions or
Havana community members suffered a series of
promote engagement and bills that would impose further
unexplained injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive
sanctions or restrictions on Cuba. Other initiatives focus on
issues. In December 2020, the National Academies of
immigration parole programs for family reunification and
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine released a report
for Cuban medical professionals.
concluding the most plausible mechanism for the source of
For further information on such legislative initiatives, see
the health symptoms was directed pulsed radio frequency
CRS Report R47246, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 117th
energy. U.S. officials maintain that investigations into the
Congress. Also see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S.
cause or source of these anomalous health incidents have
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances; and CRS Insight
not reached a conclusion. A number of U.S. government
IN11937, Biden Administration’s Cuba Policy Changes.
and military officials worldwide have reported these
symptoms since 2016.
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 117-46) in September
IF10045
2021 authorizing payment to Central Intelligence Agency
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
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