Updated September 29, 2022
U.S. Antipersonnel Landmine Use Policy
Current United States Policy on Anti-
In February 2004, the George W. Bush Administration
Personnel Landmines (APLs)
announced the United States would use persistent APLs
On June 21, 2022, National Security Council (NSC)
only in the DMZ until 2010, after which the United States
Spokesperson Adrienne Watson announced the United
would not use such mines anywhere. The Bush
States would “align its policy concerning use” of
Administration also indicated that the United States would
antipersonnel landmines (APLs) “outside of the Korean
develop alternatives to persistent landmines.
Peninsula” with key provisions of The Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Following a review of U.S. APL policy, the Obama
Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their
Administration announced several changes to that policy.
Destruction—commonly known as the Ottawa Convention.
An NSC spokesperson stated in June 2014 that the United
The convention requires States Parties to stop the
States would not in the future “produce or otherwise
production, use, and transfer of APLs, as well as to destroy
acquire any” APLs, including replacing expiring stockpiles.
all stockpiled APLs, except for the “minimum number
The Department of State noted in December 2014 that the
absolutely necessary” for training purposes. According to a
United States was “pursuing solutions that would be
June 21, 2022, White House fact sheet, the Biden
compliant” with the Ottawa Convention and that would
Administration arrived at this decision after conducting a
“ultimately allow us to accede to the convention while
“comprehensive policy review.”
ensuring that we are still able to meet our alliance
commitments” to South Korea.
Background
Following the 1991 end of the Cold War, a number of
In 2014 the Obama Administration announced the APL
governments began to question the utility of APLs in light
policy, which the Administration later issued in January
of increasing civilian and U.N. peacekeeper casualties
2016 as Presidential Policy Directive-37 (PPD-37). PPD-37
resulting from abandoned, unmarked, or unregistered
forbade the use of APLs “outside the Korean Peninsula,” as
minefields.
well as assisting, encouraging, or inducing “anyone outside
the Korean Peninsula to engage in activity prohibited by the
In 1996, President Clinton announced a policy that
Ottawa Convention.” Pursuant to this policy, the United
immediately discontinued U.S. use of “persistent APLs”
States would “undertake to destroy APL stockpiles not
except in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating North
required for the defense” of South Korea.
and South Korea. Persistent APLs lack self-destructing and
self-deactivating features. President Clinton also supported
In January 2020 the Department of Defense (DOD)
negotiation in the U.N. of a worldwide ban on APLs. In
announced a new APL policy. According to a January 31,
November 1996, the United States introduced a resolution
2020 DOD memorandum, President Trump, subsequent to
to the U.N. General Assembly urging governments “to
an internal DOD review, “decided to cancel” PPD-37. The
pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international
DOD memorandum permitted Combatant Commanders to
agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and
authorize the use of nonpersistent APLs regardless of
transfer” of APLs. While many governments supported
geographic location “when necessary for mission success in
such a ban, others were concerned that verifying such a ban
major contingencies or other exceptional circumstances.”
would be difficult and that APLs still played a useful role in
The new policy authorized DOD to “acquire, retain, and
military operations.
transfer a limited number of persistent landmines” for
training purposes.
At the conclusion of an October 1996 conference in Ottawa,
a number of governments agreed to work toward “the
During a January 31, 2020, press briefing, a DOD official
earliest possible conclusion of a legally-binding
noted the potential need for the United States to develop
international agreement to ban anti-personnel mines.”
new self-destructing APLs for use in accordance with the
Using language identical to the U.S.-sponsored version
new policy. The above-cited memorandum stipulated that
described above, the General Assembly adopted a
“Military Departments should explore acquiring landmines
resolution in December 1996 exhorting governments to
and landmine alternatives that could further reduce the risk
adopt an international ban on APLs. Following several
of unintended harm to noncombatants.”
multilateral meetings, a September 1997 conference in Oslo
adopted the Ottawa Convention text, and the treaty entered
Additional Information on June 2022
into force in 1999. The Clinton Administration declined to
APL Policy Decision
sign the Ottawa Convention, arguing then that the
A June 21, 2022 White House Fact Sheet stated the United
agreement would preclude U.S. use of APLs in the DMZ.
States would not develop, produce, or acquire APLs; export
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U.S. Antipersonnel Landmine Use Policy
or transfer APLs; use APLs outside of the Korean
an assessment if Russia, China, or North Korea have
Peninsula; or assist, encourage, or induce anyone to engage
taken steps toward accession to the Ottawa Convention
in any activity prohibited by the Ottawa Convention.
and if the Administration’s new landmine policy would
According to the fact sheet, the United States would also
incentivize any of these governments to join the
destroy all APL stockpiles not required for the defense of
convention;
South Korea.
an assessment of the ability to effectively verify
Then Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Brown noted
compliance with the Ottawa Convention;
during an April 21, 2022, briefing that the United States had
an estimated 3 million APLs in its stockpile, but he did not
an assessment of bilateral discussions with States Parties
specify the number needed to defend South Korea.
to the Ottawa Convention regarding the implications of
Although South Korea “owns” all minefields in the DMZ,
remaining compliant with the terms of the Convention
U.S. accession to the Ottawa Convention would still
in light of Russian aggression;
prohibit the United States from meeting its defense
responsibilities to South Korea, Brown explained, citing the
a description of consultations with allies and partners
Ottawa Convention’s provision that parties must not “assist,
about the timeline, military effectiveness, and cost of
encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any
transferring treaty-compliant anti-personnel landmines,
activity prohibited” by the treaty. President Biden directed
including with Ukraine and the NATO Alliance; and
DOD “to undertake diligent efforts to pursue alternatives to
anti-personnel landmines that would be compliant with and
a description of consultations with the then President of
ultimately allow the United States to accede to the Ottawa
the Ottawa Convention regarding her statement from
Convention,” then NSC Spokesperson Watson stated.
April 5, 2022, regarding the use of anti-personnel mines
Asked during a June 21, 2022, briefing about the status of
in Ukraine.
such alternatives, then-Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Brown referred the questioner to DOD “for the specific
Potential Issues for Congress
acquisition and operational capabilities of future devices.”
The June 2022 APL policy potentially raises a number of
issues for consideration, including the following:
Congressional Activity
On September 21, 2022, the Ranking Members of the
If the Administration responds to the Ranking Member’s
Senate and House Armed Services Committees and the
September 21, 2022, letter, will Congress take
Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees sent a
legislative action on the current U.S. APL policy based
letter to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and
on the Administration’s response or lack thereof?
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressing their
concerns with the Administration’s new landmine policy,
How has alleged use of persistent APLs in the Ukraine
particularly with the overall review process cited by the
conflict shaped Administration thinking on the need
Administration. In the letter, Members requested the
for/utility of APLs?
Secretary of Defense provide the committees with
What are DOD’s plans for destroying the remaining
DOD policies or regulations derived from the new
U.S. APL stockpile? How many and what types of APLs
landmine policy, including methods for Combatant
will be destroyed? Where will this destruction take
Commanders to seek waivers to use APLs outside of the
place? What is the program timeline for the destruction
Korean peninsula;
of excess APLs, and what is the estimated budget
requirement for APL destruction?
a 10-year projection of inventory levels for all APLs;
Are there any current DOD or Service programs that
a 10-year projection of the cost to achieve the inventory
will need to be modified or terminated to comply with
levels projected above; and
the new APL policy? If so, what are the specific
programs involved and what are the associated
a 10-year cost projection to develop and produce new
operational and budgetary costs?
landmine munitions DOD deems necessary to meet the
demands of current operational plans.
What is the current status of DOD efforts to develop
alternatives to persistent APLs? What are the associated
Members also requested the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
budgetary costs of such efforts?
Staff provide an assessment of the effects of the elimination
of the existing anti-personnel landmine inventory. Finally,
Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces
the Members asked the Secretary of State to provide
Paul K. Kerr, Specialist in Nonproliferation
committees with
IF11440
a description of consultations with South Korea
regarding the landmine policy review cited by the Biden
Administration;
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U.S. Antipersonnel Landmine Use Policy
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11440 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED