

# U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview

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**Overview.** Congress authorizes, appropriates, and oversees U.S. foreign assistance for sub-Saharan Africa (“Africa”), which typically receives about a quarter of all U.S. foreign assistance (including humanitarian assistance) annually. Annual State Department- and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-administered assistance to Africa increased more than five-fold in the 2000s, largely due to increases in global health spending to help combat HIV/AIDS. Over the past decade, funding levels have fluctuated between \$6.5 and \$7.5 billion annually. This does not include funding allocated from global accounts or programs, such as humanitarian assistance, or funds provided through multilateral bodies, such as the United Nations and the World Bank. Other federal entities also administer programs in African countries, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Peace Corps, U.S. Development Finance Corporation, and the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture.

**Objectives and Delivery.** Unless noted, this report focuses on State Department- and USAID-administered funds. Over the past decade, approximately 70% of U.S. assistance for Africa has sought to address health challenges, primarily HIV/AIDS. Other assistance has aimed to foster agricultural development and economic growth; strengthen peace and security; improve education access and social service delivery; and strengthen democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG). Much of this funding is provided under multi-country initiatives focused largely or wholly on Africa, including the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President’s Malaria Initiative, Feed the Future, Prosper Africa, and Power Africa.

**The Biden Administration.** The Biden Administration has articulated priorities for U.S. engagement with Africa that are broadly consistent with those of its predecessors. Stated objectives include advancing global health; enhancing peace and security; promoting mutually beneficial economic growth, trade, and investment; strengthening democracy; and building resilience to address challenges related to health, climate change, food security, and other areas. In its FY2023 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) budget request, the Administration proposed \$7.77 billion in assistance specifically for Africa, up from \$7.65 billion in FY2021 actual nonemergency allocations. Health programs comprise roughly 75% of the FY2023 proposal, economic growth assistance 12%, peace and security assistance 6%, DRG programs 4%, and education and social service funding 4%. Top recipients would include Nigeria (\$610 million), Tanzania (\$565 million), Mozambique (\$558 million), Uganda (\$549 million), and Kenya (\$525 million).

**Issues for Congress.** The 117<sup>th</sup> Congress is considering the Biden Administration’s FY2023 budget request for Africa as it debates FY2023 appropriations. Congress will evaluate the FY2023 request for Africa in the context of other demands on U.S. attention and resources—including for security, economic, and humanitarian aid for Ukraine and ongoing efforts to combat COVID-19. More broadly, policymakers, analysts, and advocates continue to debate the funding levels, focus, and effectiveness of U.S. assistance programs in Africa. Some Members have questioned whether current assistance for Africa is sufficient and appropriately balanced between sectors given the broad scope of U.S. interests in the region. Congressional debate also has focused on the appropriate approach to U.S. engagement with undemocratic governments in the region, and on the possible unintended consequences associated with U.S. foreign assistance, among other considerations. That comprehensive regional- or country-level breakouts of U.S. assistance are not routinely made available in public budget documents may complicate congressional oversight, inhibit efforts to assess impact, and obscure policy dilemmas. Congress may continue to assess whether executive branch departments and agencies provide sufficient programmatic, funding, and impact evaluation information to Congress to enable effective oversight and timely responses to identified challenges.

Congress has shaped U.S. assistance for Africa through annual appropriations legislation directing allocations for certain activities and countries. Congress has also enacted appropriations provisions and other legislation prohibiting or imposing conditions on aid to specific countries in Africa, and on certain kinds of assistance, on various grounds (e.g., related to trafficking in persons, child soldiers, terrorism, military coups, and religious freedom). Security assistance has been a focus of congressional scrutiny: Congress has restricted certain kinds of support for foreign security forces implicated in human rights abuses, and the 117<sup>th</sup> Congress has acted to enhance congressional oversight of U.S. security assistance for Africa.

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## Introduction

This report is intended to serve as a primer on U.S. foreign assistance funding and programming for sub-Saharan Africa (“Africa”) to inform Congress as it authorizes, appropriates funds for, and oversees such engagement. This report focuses primarily on funds and programs administered by the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and includes more limited discussion of select assistance managed by other U.S. departments and agencies. A separate CRS report, CRS Report R45428, *Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Issues and U.S. Engagement*, discusses U.S. policy toward and engagement in Africa.

### Scope and Definitions

Unless otherwise indicated, this report discusses State Department- and USAID-administered assistance allocated specifically for African countries and regional programs. It does not comprehensively discuss funding allocated for African countries via global accounts and programs that are not allocated by country or region in annual State Department *Congressional Budget Justifications* (CBJs), which provide information on the planned allocation of appropriated assistance.<sup>1</sup> Unless otherwise noted, figures refer to actual allocations of funding appropriated in given fiscal year (hereinafter, “allocations”).<sup>2</sup>

## Historic Trends and Key Rationales


Africa has received a growing share of annual U.S. foreign assistance over the past two decades, accounting for 36% of State Department- and USAID-administered funding allocated for specific regions in FY2021 (latest available), up from 31% in 2011 and 10% in 2001.<sup>3</sup> U.S. assistance for the region grew markedly during the 2000s (see **Figure 1**), as Congress appropriated substantial funds to support the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which the Bush Administration launched in 2003 with bipartisan support in Congress. As discussed below, assistance to combat HIV/AIDS remains by far the largest category of U.S. assistance for Africa. Development and security aid for Africa also increased during the 2000s, albeit to a lesser extent. U.S. assistance for Africa was comparatively flat over the past decade, generally fluctuating between \$7.6 billion and \$8.3 billion in annual inflation-adjusted dollars.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See CRS In Focus IF11515, *U.S. Foreign Assistance: Budget Development and Execution*, by Nick M. Brown.

<sup>2</sup> “Actual” allocations reflect a final plan for the use of appropriated funding, though agencies may continue to transfer or reprogram assistance, subject to availability and legislative authorities.

<sup>3</sup> CRS calculations based on allocation data provided in Country/Account Summaries (“Spigots”) in State Department CBJs for FY2003, FY2013, and FY2023. Calculations do not include funding for the Peace Corps, humanitarian assistance, or funding categorized as “Other.”

<sup>4</sup> CRS calculation based on allocations for FY2011-FY2021, drawn from State Department CBJs for FY2013-FY2023; constant FY2022 dollars based on deflators from Office of Management and Budget Historic Budget Tables, FY2022.

**Figure I. U.S. Assistance for Africa, Select State Department and USAID Accounts**

**Source:** CRS graphic, based on State Department *Congressional Budget Justifications* (CBJs) for FY2003-FY2023.

**Notes:** CSD=Child Survival and Disease Programs; CSH=Child Survival and Health Programs; DA=Development Assistance; ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; GHP=Global Health Programs; IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; PKO=Peacekeeping Operations. Calculations do not include funding allocated from global accounts or programs.

These figures do not include funds administered through global accounts or programs, such as humanitarian assistance. They also exclude funds administered by other U.S. federal entities, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and Department of Defense (DOD), and U.S. contributions to international financial institutions and other multilateral bodies, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and United Nations (U.N.) agencies.

Policymakers, analysts, and advocates continue to debate the value and appropriate balance of U.S. assistance programs in Africa. Proponents contend that foreign assistance helps African countries address pressing challenges (e.g., development and humanitarian needs) while advancing U.S. national interests, such as by bolstering U.S. economic relations abroad and promoting U.S. influence vis-à-vis that of global competitors such as China and Russia.<sup>5</sup> Some also contend that U.S. assistance reflects U.S. values of charity and global leadership.<sup>6</sup>

Critics have alleged that foreign aid may create market distortions or dependencies, or have other unintended consequences, such as prolonging conflicts or strengthening undemocratic regimes.<sup>7</sup> Some African commentators have criticized the nature of donor-recipient relationships, describing them as shaped primarily by donor prerogatives rather than by the needs and demands of recipient countries, or as benefitting international implementers over local authorities and organizations.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Stephen A. O'Connell, "What the U.S. Gains From its Development Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa," *EconoFact*, January 31, 2017.

<sup>6</sup> For more on the rationales and objectives of U.S. foreign assistance, see CRS Report R40213, *Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy*, by Emily M. Morgenstern and Nick M. Brown.

<sup>7</sup> For a critical assessment of foreign assistance in Africa, see, for example, Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, *A Plan to Reform U.S. Security Assistance*, Center for American Progress, 2021; and Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009).

<sup>8</sup> See, e.g., testimony by Degan Ali and Ali Mohamed in House Foreign Affairs Committee, "Shifting the Power: Advancing Locally-Led Development and Partner Diversification in U.S. Development Programs," hearing, 117<sup>th</sup>

More broadly, some Members and others have called for a reorientation of U.S. engagement in Africa to deemphasize U.S. assistance relative to U.S. commercial engagement, calling for “trade, not aid” to promote development in the region.<sup>9</sup> Other considerations related to U.S. assistance for Africa and issues for Congress are discussed below (see “Outlook and Issues for Congress”).

## Recent Funding Trends, Objectives, and Delivery

Since FY2017, health assistance has constituted approximately three-quarters of annual U.S. assistance for Africa; HIV/AIDS-related funding alone typically accounts for around half of all State Department- and USAID-administered assistance for the region in a given fiscal year.<sup>10</sup> Agriculture and other economic programs generally have comprised the second-largest focus area of U.S. assistance for Africa, accounting for around 9% of average annual allocations since FY2017, followed by peace and security programs (7%), education and social services funding (4%) and democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) assistance (4%).<sup>11</sup>

U.S. assistance for Africa totaled \$7.65 billion in FY2021 allocations, including supplemental global health security funds provided in the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA, P.L. 117-2) but excluding emergency assistance appropriated for Sudan under Title IX of P.L. 116-260 as well as humanitarian assistance.<sup>12</sup> Broadly consistent with past years, health programs comprised roughly 78% of FY2021 assistance, followed by funds to promote economic growth, advance peace and security, enhance education and other social service delivery, and strengthen democracy, human rights, and governance.

## Health Assistance

Congress funds U.S. health assistance for Africa primarily through appropriations to the Global Health Programs account, which is administered partly by the State Department (GHP-State) and partly by USAID (GHP-USAID). Health assistance to improve access to water and sanitation, however, is generally funded under the Development Assistance (DA) account.

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
Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> Sess., September 23, 2021; U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Mark Lowcock, “What’s Wrong with the Humanitarian Aid System and How to Fix It,” remarks at Center for Global Development, April 2021.

<sup>9</sup> See, e.g., remarks by Representative Karen Bass in House Foreign Affairs Committee roundtable, “Roundtable: Celebrating African Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Leadership,” May 25, 2021; Adva Saldinger, “Q&A: US Representative Ted Yoho on his foreign aid philosophy,” *Devex*, February 24, 2017.

<sup>10</sup> CRS calculations based on FY2017-FY2021 data provided by USAID, May 2022. In FY2017, the State Department revised the Standardized Program Structure and Definitions (SPSD) framework under which U.S. foreign assistance is categorized by program area and activity, complicating assessments of longer-term sectoral funding trends.

<sup>11</sup> CRS calculations based on data provided by USAID, May 2022. Figures reflect averages from FY2017-FY2021.

<sup>12</sup> State Department, *CBI for FY2023*. Specifically, this includes \$367 million in global health security in development (GHSD) assistance provided in ARPA to enable comparison with the Biden Administration’s FY2023 request, which—in a departure from past budget requests—disaggregates most GHSD funding by country. It excludes \$700 million in emergency funding for Sudan appropriated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Title IX of P.L. 116-260).

**Figure 2. Health Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and Element**

**Source:** CRS graphic. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2023.

**HIV/AIDS.** Most U.S. health assistance for Africa supports HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment efforts under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)—a State Department-led, interagency effort that Congress first authorized during the George W. Bush Administration and reauthorized through 2023 in P.L. 115-305.<sup>13</sup> GHP-State is the primary vehicle for HIV/AIDS assistance for Africa, though USAID partly manages such funding, and USAID administers some additional HIV/AIDS assistance via GHP-USAID. Nigeria, Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia were the top recipients of HIV/AIDS assistance allocations in FY2021.

**Malaria.** Programs to prevent and treat malaria typically constitute the second-largest category of U.S. health assistance for the region.<sup>14</sup> Such funding is largely provided through the USAID-led President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), which focused on 24 African “focus countries” (out of 27 worldwide) as of July 2022. Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which together account for roughly 40% of annual malaria cases globally, regularly rank as the leading recipients of U.S. counter-malaria assistance in Africa.<sup>15</sup>

**Maternal and Child Health, Family Planning, and Reproductive Health.** African countries have made strides in maternal and child health in recent decades, yet stark challenges persist; as a region, Africa accounts for an estimated two-thirds of global maternal deaths and has the world’s highest neonatal and under-five mortality rates.<sup>16</sup> U.S. maternal and child health programs aim to improve maternal, newborn, and early childhood care. Family planning and reproductive health

<sup>13</sup> See CRS In Focus IF11018, *Global Trends in HIV/AIDS*, by Sara M. Tharakan, and CRS In Focus IF10797, *PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act: Expiring Authorities*, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.

<sup>14</sup> See CRS In Focus IF11146, *Global Trends: Malaria*, by Sara M. Tharakan.

<sup>15</sup> Malaria burden figures from World Health Organization (WHO), *World Malaria Report 2021*, 2021.

<sup>16</sup> WHO, U.N. Children’s Fund, U.N. Population Fund, World Bank, and U.N. Population Division, *Trends in Maternal Mortality, 2000 to 2017*, 2019; U.N. Inter-Agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation, *Levels & Trends in Child Mortality: Report 2021*, 2021.



programs, meanwhile, support access to contraception, along with efforts to end child marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting, gender-based violence, and other reproductive health issues.<sup>17</sup>

**Global Health Security.** U.S. health assistance for Africa includes some funding for pandemic preparedness and response activities, though most such assistance is channeled through global accounts and programs or administered by other U.S. agencies, such as the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, it also has included aid to help African countries counter the disease and its effects (see **Text Box**).

#### COVID-19-Related Assistance for Africa

As of March 31, 2022 (latest data available), USAID-administered support for COVID-19 responses in Africa totaled over \$1.8 billion, most of which was specially appropriated by Congress and represents an addition to regular annual foreign aid appropriations.<sup>18</sup> USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) administered a majority (\$1.3 billion) of such funding, with smaller amounts managed by the Bureau for Africa (\$353 million) and Bureau for Global Health (\$231 million). Ethiopia has been the largest recipient of U.S. COVID-19-related assistance in Africa by, with at least \$366 million in U.S. obligations as of March 2022, followed by South Sudan (\$182 million), Sudan (\$163 million), and Nigeria (\$104 million).

**Other Assistance.** Other U.S. health assistance for Africa, most administered by USAID, seeks to enhance access to improved water and sanitation facilities, improve nutrition, and combat tuberculosis. As discussed below (see “Selected Global Assistance for Africa”), the United States provides additional health funding for Africa through global programs as well as through contributions to multilateral health initiatives such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (the Global Fund).

## Economic Growth Assistance


As noted above, economic growth programs typically comprise the second-largest focus area of U.S. assistance for Africa. Congress funds such assistance primarily through the DA account, though some programs are funded via the Economic Support Fund (ESF).<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> See CRS Report R46215, *U.S. Bilateral International Family Planning and Reproductive Health Programs: Background and Selected Issues*. On differences between maternal and child health programs and family planning and reproductive health programs, see State Department, “Updated Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions,” April 19, 2016.

<sup>18</sup> Figures in this text box refer to obligated funds provided in the 2020 Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-123), the 2020 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act (P.L. 116-136), the 2021 American Rescue Plan Act (P.L. 117-2), and prior year funding. Figures do not include USAID support for GAVI COVAX, the multilateral vaccine initiative. USAID, “COVID-19 – Sub-Saharan Africa (Fact Sheet #4, FY2022),” March 31, 2022.

<sup>19</sup> The State Department and USAID jointly administer ESF funding; USAID manages DA.



**Figure 3. Economic Growth Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and Element**

**Source:** CRS graphic. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2023.

**Agricultural Development.** Support for agricultural development typically constitutes the largest category of U.S. economic growth assistance for Africa. Such programs seek to improve agricultural productivity by strengthening value chains, enhancing land tenure systems and access to markets, promoting climate-resilient farming practices, and funding agricultural research. Feed the Future (FTF), a USAID-led, interagency initiative launched by the Obama Administration to reduce food insecurity and enhance market-based economic growth, is the main channel for U.S. agricultural assistance for Africa; as of July 2022, there were eight African FTF focus countries, out of 12 globally.<sup>20</sup> The Global Food Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-195, reauthorized through 2023 in P.L. 115-266) endorsed an approach to U.S. food security assistance similar to FTF.

**Trade and Investment.** Prosper Africa, a USAID-led, multiagency initiative launched by the Trump Administration in 2019, is the primary vehicle for U.S. trade and investment assistance for Africa. It aims to spur U.S. and African market-led economic growth by substantially increasing two-way U.S.-African trade and investment ties, foster business environment reforms in Africa, and counter the economic influence of China and other U.S. global competitors.<sup>21</sup>

A range of U.S. assistance programs support trade capacity-building (TCB) efforts that aim to boost African countries' ability to trade with other countries and with the United States—the latter notably under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, P.L. 106-200, as amended),

<sup>20</sup> African FTF focus countries are Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda. FTF supports other countries under “aligned” and regional programs

<sup>21</sup> Prosper Africa primarily seeks to harmonize and provide a single point of access to the services and programs of 17 U.S. agencies and departments with trade and investment promotion and economic development mandates. See CRS In Focus IF11384, *The Trump Administration's Prosper Africa Initiative*, by Nicolas Cook and Brock R. Williams.

which provides duty-free treatment for U.S. imports from eligible African countries.<sup>22</sup> Over the last two decades, much of this activity has been channeled through two (formerly three) USAID-administered sub-regional trade and investment hubs, located in West and Southern Africa.

**Climate Change and Environment.** The State Department classifies a range of U.S. assistance to mitigate and address the impacts of climate change under the umbrella of economic growth assistance, though not all of this assistance is directly related to economic growth.<sup>23</sup> Under the Obama Administration, the United States sharply increased such funding, including for Africa; the Trump Administration took steps to largely end such assistance globally.

The Biden Administration has placed a high priority on responding to climate change globally and, as discussed below, has sought to increase climate change-related assistance for Africa (see “The Biden Administration and the FY2023 Request”). During the Biden Administration, the largest allocation of climate change-related assistance has been for Power Africa, a USAID-led electrification effort launched by the Obama Administration that provides technical assistance and advice, grants, loans, financial risk mitigation, and other assistance to support increased access to power, including renewable energy.<sup>24</sup> Facilitating individual power projects is a core focus of the initiative, which aims to create 30,000 megawatts of new power generation capacity and establish 60 million new connections in Africa by 2030.<sup>25</sup> Expanding energy access in the region is a standing U.S. policy goal under the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-121).

U.S. economic growth assistance also funds “environment” programs, activities related to natural resources that are not directly focused on climate change (e.g., conservation and countering wildlife crime). Funding for the Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE) is typically the largest allocation of annual environment assistance. Implemented by USAID and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (per congressional directives), CARPE promotes conservation and sustainable resource use in Central Africa’s Congo Basin.<sup>26</sup> Congress has supported efforts to curb wildlife trafficking and other environmental crime in Africa.<sup>27</sup>

**Other Economic Growth Efforts.** Other U.S. trade and investment assistance programs in Africa seek to aid economic policy reform and analysis, microenterprise lending and support, other private sector strengthening activity, and infrastructure development.

## Peace and Security Assistance

U.S. peace and security assistance for Africa principally refers to State Department-administered security assistance programs, which are authorized under Title 22 of the *U.S. Code*. Some such programs are implemented by the Department of Defense (DOD), some by other federal entities

<sup>22</sup> Among other activities, TCB assistance aims to help improve countries’ ability to negotiate and implement trade agreements, as well as customs procedures and processes, legal and regulatory structures for trade-related issues (e.g. intellectual property rights and labor and environmental protections), overall commercial environments, and infrastructure. See CRS In Focus IF10149, *African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)*, by Brock R. Williams, and CRS Report R47197, *African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Overview and Issues for Congress in Brief*, by Nicolas Cook, Brock R. Williams, and Rileigh K. Greutert.

<sup>23</sup> State Department, “Updated Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions.”

<sup>24</sup> The Trump Administration categorized Power Africa funding under a separate program classification, “Modern Energy Services,” which does not specifically refer to climate change.


<sup>25</sup> For more on Power Africa, see USAID, “Power Africa,” available at <https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica>.

<sup>26</sup> For more information, see CARPE, “About,” at <https://carpe.umd.edu/content/development-objectives>.

<sup>27</sup> See CRS Insight IN11227, *Foreign Assistance for International Conservation*, by Pervaze A. Sheikh and CRS In Focus IF11923, *Wildlife Poaching and Trafficking in Africa: An Overview*, coordinated by Katarina C. O’Regan.

(such as the Department of Justice), and others by private contractors.<sup>28</sup> Congress appropriates such assistance primarily via five accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). U.S. peace and security assistance also includes more limited funding for programs that aim to prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflicts, typically funded through DA and ESF. As discussed below, many countries receive additional U.S. peace and security assistance through global programs, and DOD administers security cooperation programs from DOD funds, complicating efforts to assess the extent of U.S. security assistance for any particular country.

**Figure 4. Peace and Security Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and Element**



**Source:** CRS graphic. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2023.

**Strengthening Military Partnerships and Capabilities.** Security force capacity-building and military professionalization constitute the largest category of annual peace and security assistance for Africa. As a region, Africa receives a tiny share of global FMF funding, which supports grant-based transfers of U.S.-origin military equipment and related training. Instead, most military assistance for Africa is provided through the PKO account, regularly the largest channel for Title 22 security assistance for the region—including for programs unrelated to peacekeeping per se (see **Text Box**). For over a decade, more than half of annual PKO funding for Africa has typically been allocated for Somalia, in support of an African Union (AU) stabilization and peace support operation in the country and a U.N. presence that aids the AU mission.<sup>29</sup> Most other PKO funding for Africa is generally requested and allocated for regional programs under the State

<sup>28</sup> See CRS Report R45091, *U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding Trends*, coordinated by Susan B. Epstein.

<sup>29</sup> Prior to the Biden Administration, successive Administrations had requested funding for the U.N. Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS, formerly known as the U.N. Support Office for AMISOM) via the State Department's Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities account, but Congress had appropriated such funds through PKO. In its budget requests to date, the Biden Administration has requested funding to support UNSOS under PKO, instead of CIPA.

Department's Africa Regional allocation. In the past five years, the State Department also has allocated PKO funding specifically for the Central African Republic, DRC, Liberia, and South Sudan in support of military professionalization and security sector reform.

U.S. assistance to strengthen military partnerships and capabilities also encompasses the IMET program, which supports professionalization, military exchanges, and English language instruction, generally in the United States. A majority of African countries participate in IMET.<sup>30</sup>

### **The Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Account**

PKO is the primary vehicle for State Department-administered security assistance to African countries, accounting for between half and three-quarters of annual Title 22 assistance allocated specifically for Africa over the past decade.<sup>31</sup> Despite its name, PKO supports not only peacekeeping capacity-building, but also counterterrorism, maritime security, and security sector reform activities. A separate account, Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA), funds U.S. assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping budgets.<sup>32</sup>

In addition to funding for Somalia, PKO funding wholly or partly funds a range of regional security programs, including the Africa Conflict Stabilization and Border Security (ACSBS) program, Africa Military Education Program (AMEP), Africa Maritime Security Initiative (AMSI), Africa Regional Counterterrorism (ARCT) program, and a nascent Countering Strategic Competitors (CSC) program, focused on addressing malign foreign influence. PKO funding also supports two interagency counterterrorism programs in Africa: the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PRACT, in East Africa) and Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP, focused on North and West Africa). Public budget documents do not disaggregate allocations for such programs by country. PKO funding for TSCTP is managed centrally, rather than regionally, and is discussed in greater detail below (see "Selected Global Assistance for Africa").

**Counterterrorism.** PKO also is the main funding vehicle for State Department-administered assistance to build the capacity of African security forces to disrupt and respond to terrorist threats. Other security assistance accounts, including NADR and FMF, also fund counterterrorism activities, while assistance focused on countering violent extremist ideology and recruitment among vulnerable populations is funded through ESF and DA. Somalia and Kenya have been top country recipients of Title 22 counterterrorism assistance, though most such funding is allocated to regional programs. Additional counterterrorism assistance for Africa is provided via global accounts and programs (see "Selected Global Assistance for Africa").

**Other Peace and Security Assistance.** The State Department also administers programs to build the capacity of law enforcement bodies and other justice sector institutions and personnel, funded primarily under INCLE. USAID, for its part, administers programs aimed at increasing citizens' access to justice, primarily funded through the DA account.

U.S. assistance also funds efforts to destroy excess or obsolete small arms and light weapons, ammunition, and unexploded ordnance, and improve management of weapons stockpiles. The State Department administers such programs, which are funded principally under NADR, in countries previously affected by violence that face challenges related to stockpile management and landmine removal (e.g., Angola), and those currently afflicted by conflict (e.g., Somalia).<sup>33</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Forty African countries received IMET allocations in FY2021.

<sup>31</sup> CRS calculation based on State Department CBJs for FY2012-FY2023. Calculation does not account for centrally managed assistance.

<sup>32</sup> See CRS In Focus IF10597, *United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding of U.N. Peacekeeping*, by Luisa Blanchfield.


<sup>33</sup> State Department, "U.S. Conventional Weapons Destruction in Africa: Stabilizing Conflict-Affected Areas and Setting the Stage for Development," April 4, 2022.

Conflict mitigation and stabilization programs, most funded under the DA and ESF accounts, aim to help prevent, mitigate, and resolve armed conflicts through support for early warning systems, peace and reconciliation initiatives, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts.

## Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG)

U.S. DRG programs in Africa seek to enhance democratic institutions, improve government accountability and responsiveness, and strengthen respect for human rights and the rule of law. Activities include efforts to strengthen civil society and independent media, enhance the capacity and effectiveness of state institutions, combat corruption, promote legal reform and justice sector operations and independence, and foster participatory political systems characterized by credible elections and other democratic processes. The DA and, to a lesser extent, ESF accounts are the main vehicles for such assistance, though some funding to help strengthen law enforcement and justice sector authorities is provided via INCLE.

**Figure 5. DRG Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and Element**



**Source:** CRS graphic. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2023.


Somalia, Nigeria, DRC, Liberia, South Sudan, and Kenya rank among the top recipients of U.S. DRG assistance in Africa over the past five years. Regional DRG assistance for Africa supports the Africa Regional Democracy Fund, a regional program primarily funded via ESF that supports programs across DRG focus areas to strengthen democratic institutions in the region.

## Education and Social Services

DA is the primary funding vehicle for U.S. education and social service assistance for Africa. U.S. basic, secondary, and higher education programs constitute the majority of U.S. education and social service support for Africa. Most such funding is allocated toward basic education programs, of which DRC has been the leading recipient since FY2017; Malawi has been the leading bilateral recipient of U.S. higher education assistance in Africa over the same period, as

Congress has directed allocations of higher education funding for Malawi in successive SFOPS appropriations (most recently, Section 7042(f) of P.L. 117-103).

**Figure 6. Education and Social Services Assistance for Africa in FY2021, by Program Area and Element**



**Source:** CRS graphic. Figures are CRS calculations based on data from State Department CBJ for FY2023.

U.S. higher education programs also include funding for the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), which provides training and mentorship, networking, and exchange-based fellowships to emerging African business, science, and civic leaders. Regional funding for YALI supports four Africa Regional Leadership Centers, based in Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, and South Africa, which provide training and professional development for participants. (The Mandela Washington Fellowship program, which brings YALI fellows to the United States to study at U.S. colleges and universities, is administered by the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and is not accounted for in regional budget allocations.)

## Selected Global Assistance for Africa

As noted above, topline regional assistance data do not account for U.S. assistance allocated for African countries via global accounts and programs—funds that are not disaggregated by region or country in public budget documents. This notably includes humanitarian assistance, which is appropriated on a global basis and allocated in response to needs and U.S. policy priorities, as well as a range of health and peace and security programs through which African countries receive considerable funding in addition to regional and country-specific allocations.

### Humanitarian Assistance

As a region, Africa generally receives a large share of annual U.S. humanitarian assistance funds, which are administered under various authorities and accounts, including USAID-administered International Disaster Assistance (IDA), State Department-administered Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA), and USAID-administered Food for Peace (FFP) assistance authorized under Title II of the Food for Peace Act



(P.L. 83-480, known as “P.L. 480”) and appropriated in the Agriculture appropriations bill.<sup>34</sup> IDA, MRA, ERMA, and FFP assistance for Africa totaled \$4.0 billion in FY2021 obligations, accounting for nearly 60% of the global total.<sup>35</sup> Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, and Nigeria were the top African recipient countries of such assistance in FY2021 obligations.<sup>36</sup>

## Health Assistance

The United States channels additional health assistance for Africa through global programs. This includes considerable funding (most via GHP-State) to support the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, which oversees PEPFAR, and replenishments of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (the Global Fund), both of which target a majority of their health assistance toward Africa.<sup>37</sup> Other global health assistance benefitting Africa includes GHP-USAID International Partnerships funding supporting contributions to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, and a range of U.S. special-focus health programs that operate, in large part, in Africa (e.g., aimed at eradicating neglected tropical diseases and addressing multi-drug resistant tuberculosis). As noted above, U.S. assistance to support African countries’ responses to COVID-19 has been channeled partly through country-specific programs and partly through U.S. contributions to multilateral initiatives, such as COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX).<sup>38</sup>

## Peace and Security Assistance

Many African countries receive U.S. peace and security assistance through global programs. This includes PKO funding provided under the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI), a program that builds the capacity of partner security forces to participate in international peacekeeping deployments. It also includes PKO funding for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).<sup>39</sup> The State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) manages PKO funding for GPOI and TSCTP. The State Department Bureau for Counterterrorism, meanwhile, manages the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF), a NADR-funded program to strengthen civilian counterterrorism capacities. CTPF programming in Africa has focused on the Sahel, East Africa, and the Lake Chad Basin region.

Other assistance helps African countries prevent, mitigate, and transition out of conflict. This includes most funding provided pursuant to the Global Fragility Act (GFA, Title V of Division J, P.L. 116-94), which authorized aid for preventing conflict and promoting stability through two funds: the State Department-administered Prevention and Stabilization Fund and the USAID-managed Complex Crises Fund. The Biden Administration has selected part of coastal West Africa (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo) and Mozambique as two of five global GFA focus areas. USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) provides short-term aid focused

<sup>34</sup> USAID also administers nonemergency food assistance authorized under FFP Title II, which supports countries to transition from emergency food assistance to agricultural development. See CRS Report R45422, *U.S. International Food Assistance: An Overview*, by Alyssa R. Casey and Emily M. Morgenstern and CRS Report R45879, *International Food Assistance: Food for Peace Nonemergency Programs*, by Emily M. Morgenstern.

<sup>35</sup> CRS calculation based on FY2021 obligations data from ForeignAssistance.gov, accessed June 14, 2022.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Global Fund, “Global Fund Overview.”

<sup>38</sup> See CRS Report R46633, *COVID-19 Vaccines: Global Health Issues*, coordinated by Sara M. Tharakan.

<sup>39</sup> Successive Administrations have requested non-PKO funding for TSCTP—including DA, ESF, INCLE, and NADR funding—on a regional or bilateral basis, while requesting PKO funds under the State Department’s Bureau of Military Affairs allocation. See Supplementary Tables in annual State Department Congressional Budget Justifications.



on averting conflict, fostering reconciliation, and supporting recoveries, funded via the TI account; as of July 2022, OTI had programs in coastal West Africa, Ethiopia, Niger, and Sudan.

## Other U.S. Department and Agency Assistance

While the State Department and USAID administer the majority of U.S. foreign assistance to Africa, other federal departments and agencies also manage or support aid programs in the region. For example, the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security, and the Treasury conduct technical assistance programs and other activities in Africa, and in some cases help implement State Department- and USAID-administered programs in the region.

Other U.S. federal departments and agencies that administer assistance for Africa include:

### The Department of Defense (DOD)

As noted above, DOD implements some State Department-administered security assistance in Africa. DOD also is authorized, under Title 10 of the *U.S. Code*, to use DOD appropriations to fund and conduct security cooperation activities with foreign partner militaries and internal security entities.<sup>40</sup> Most Title 10 assistance for Africa has been provided under DOD’s “global train and equip” authority, first established by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of FY2006 (P.L. 109-163). In the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328), Congress codified and expanded this authority under 10 U.S.C. §333 (“Section 333”), consolidating various capacity-building authorities that it had granted DOD on a temporary or otherwise limited basis. Section 333 authorizes DOD to provide training and equipment to foreign military and internal security forces to build their capacity to counter terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, and transnational crime, and to bolster maritime and border security and military intelligence.

Congress has authorized additional DOD security cooperation programs in Africa under global or Africa-specific authorities (e.g., to help combat the Lord’s Resistance Army rebel group in Central Africa between FY2012 and FY2017).<sup>41</sup> Comprehensive regional- or country-level funding data for DOD security cooperation programs are not publicly available.

### Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)

The MCC, which Congress authorized in 2004 (Title VI of Division D, P.L. 108-199), supports economic growth programs in developing countries that meet a range of governance and development benchmarks.<sup>42</sup> The MCC funds two types programs: five-year, large-scale investments known as “compacts” that are designed to address key “constraints to growth” identified during the project design phase, and smaller, shorter-term “threshold programs,” that aim to help countries address reforms necessary for them to become compact-eligible.

As of July 2022, the MCC was implementing six programs in Africa—compacts in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, and Senegal, and threshold programs in Gambia and Togo—jointly valued at

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<sup>40</sup> DOD uses the term “security assistance” to denote Title 22 (State Department-administered) programs, including those implemented by DOD, and the term “security cooperation” to denote activities authorized under Title 10. See CRS In Focus IF11677, *Defense Primer: DOD “Title 10” Security Cooperation*, by Christina L. Arabia.

<sup>41</sup> CRS Report R42094, *The Lord’s Resistance Army: The U.S. Response*, by Alexis Arieff, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, and Tomás F. Husted.

<sup>42</sup> See CRS Report RL32427, *Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues*, by Nick M. Brown.

\$1.97 billion.<sup>43</sup> A \$316 million compact in Ghana closed in June 2022, while a \$300 million compact for Lesotho was signed in May 2022; in March 2022, Kenya won approval to implement a threshold program.<sup>44</sup> Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Zambia also were developing compact proposals as of July 2022. The MCC has suspended or terminated compacts with some African governments for failing to meet MCC eligibility criteria. In late 2021, the MCC discontinued the development of a proposed threshold program for Ethiopia amid that country's civil conflict, and announced that it would "significantly reduce" funding for Benin under a planned joint compact with Niger due to concerns over democratic backsliding under Benin's current government.<sup>45</sup> In 2022, the MCC suspended the development of a proposed compact with Burkina Faso due to a military coup.<sup>46</sup>

## The Peace Corps

Peace Corps volunteers lead locally oriented programs focused on agriculture, economic development, youth engagement, health, and education.<sup>47</sup> As of FY2020, 45% of Peace Corps volunteers were serving in sub-Saharan Africa—by far the largest share of any region.<sup>48</sup> The Peace Corps is gradually returning volunteers to pre-pandemic levels. Conflicts and other crises in Africa have in some cases led the Peace Corps to suspend programming over concern for volunteer safety, with recent conflict-related suspensions in Mali (in 2015) and Burkina Faso (2017) and suspensions in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone during a 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak.

## African Development Foundation (USADF)

The USADF is a federally funded, independent nonprofit corporation, established by Congress under the African Development Foundation Act of 1980 (Title V of P.L. 96-533), that provides targeted grants worth up to \$250,000 that typically serve as seed capital for small-scale economic growth projects. The Foundation focuses on women- and youth-led entrepreneurship, agriculture and food security, and off-grid electricity projects, and also plays a role in selected multi-agency initiatives (e.g., Power Africa and YALI).

## The Biden Administration and the FY2023 Request

The Department of State-USAID Joint Regional Strategy for Africa, released in February 2022, identifies four priorities for U.S. engagement in Africa: advancing peace and security; increasing "mutually beneficial" economic growth, trade, and investment; strengthening democratic governance and respect for human rights; and building resilience to address challenges in health, climate change, food security, and other areas.<sup>49</sup> These goals are consistent with those articulated

<sup>43</sup> See MCC, "Where We Work," at <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work>.

<sup>44</sup> In 2019, the MCC cancelled a \$190 million worth of funds under Ghana's compact over concern with the Ghanaian government's termination of a private energy utility contract, reducing the compact's total value from \$498 million. On the recent approvals, see MCC, "MCC Board Approves Grants for Lesotho, Kenya to Drive Sustainable, Inclusive Economic Growth," April 1, 2022.

<sup>45</sup> MCC, "MCC's Board Selects Belize, Zambia for Grant Assistance," December 15, 2021.

<sup>46</sup> The MCC previously suspended a compact with Tanzania in 2016 due to a government crackdown on the political opposition, and curtailed implementation of a compact in Mali in 2012 due to a military coup.

<sup>47</sup> See CRS Report RS21168, *The Peace Corps: Overview and Issues*, by Nick M. Brown.

<sup>48</sup> Peace Corps, *Agency Financial Report: FY2020*, 2020.


<sup>49</sup> State Department and USAID, *Joint Regional Strategy for Africa*, 2022. During his first visit to Africa as Secretary

by previous Administrations. At the same time, the Biden Administration has proposed higher levels of annual foreign assistance for Africa than did the Trump Administration, and the Biden Administration's proposed assistance to help African countries respond to the impacts of climate change (discussed below) represents a departure from the approach of its predecessor.

## The FY2023 SFOPS Budget Request for Africa

The Biden Administration requested \$7.77 billion for Africa for FY2023, a 1.5% increase from FY2021 actual allocations. Noteworthy changes from FY2021 allocations include proposed decreases for HIV/AIDS, global health security, water and sanitation, and environment programs; increases for agriculture, trade and investment, and DRG programs; and a surge in funding for activities related to climate change.

**Figure 7. The FY2023 Request for Africa, by Account**



**Source:** State Department, *CBJ for FY2023*.

**Health.** At \$5.80 billion, health assistance comprises 75% of the FY2023 budget request for Africa. This would represent a decrease of \$262 million (4%) from FY2021 allocations, largely driven by proposed declines in funding for global health security, water and sanitation, and HIV/AIDS programming. Several other health activities would see funding increases (see **Text Box** below). Support for HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment would constitute two-thirds of FY2023 health assistance for Africa, and nearly half of all U.S. assistance for the region.

Broadly consistent with past years, Nigeria, Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda, and Zambia would be the leading recipients of U.S. health assistance in Africa.<sup>50</sup> The largest proportional increase in funding would be for USAID's West Africa Regional Mission, which would see a surge in

of State, in 2021, Secretary Blinken emphasized shared efforts to advance global health (including by combating COVID-19), respond to climate change, and foster inclusive economic growth, strengthen democracy, and advance security. Secretary Blinken, "The United States and Africa: Building a 21st Century Partnership," November 19, 2021.

<sup>50</sup> The request proposes \$550 million in health assistance for Nigeria, \$537 million for Tanzania, \$498 million for Mozambique, \$492 million for Uganda, and \$466 million for Zambia.

HIV/AIDS-related funding.

**Economic Growth (including Climate Change).** Economic growth assistance would see a 50% upswing from FY2021 allocations, with \$936 million requested for FY2023.<sup>51</sup> Aid for agriculture, the largest focus area of U.S. economic growth funding for Africa, would see a \$65 million increase from FY2021 (see **Text Box**). Trade and investment assistance would also increase, to \$134 million, including \$100 million for Prosper Africa and \$27 million requested separately for USAID’s East Africa, Southern Africa, and West Africa regional operating units. The request proposes \$20 million for USAID’s Africa Regional Bureau (AFR) for “Digital Africa,” intended to “foster the growth of an inclusive and resilient African digital ecosystem led by African communities and built on an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet.”<sup>52</sup>

The FY2023 request also proposes a \$174 million increase for climate change programs focused on adaptation, clean energy, and “sustainable landscapes” activities, which support ecosystem preservation and climate change-related carbon storage. Most climate change-related aid would be channeled through USAID’s AFR Bureau, including a proposed \$100 million for Power Africa—continuing the Biden

Administration’s trend of classifying Power Africa funding as “Clean Energy” assistance, as opposed to the Trump Administration’s classification of such assistance under “Modern Energy Services,” for which no funding is requested. Funding for environment-related activities not directly focused on climate change (e.g., conservation and countering wildlife crime) would see a \$46 million decrease, to \$92 million.

**Security Assistance.** The FY2023 request proposes \$461 million for peace and security programs in Africa, a \$19 million (4%) increase relative to FY2021 allocations. Changes from FY2021 would include increases for strengthening military partnerships and capabilities (+\$23 million) and counterterrorism (+\$11 million), and decreases for citizen security and law enforcement (-\$9 million) and transnational threats (-\$5 million). The PKO account would continue to be the primary vehicle for U.S. security assistance for Africa, with \$303 million requested. Around 70% (\$233 million) of the PKO request for Africa would be allocated for Somalia. The PKO request

#### Health Assistance for Africa: FY2023 Request vs. FY2021 Actual

**HIV/AIDS:** \$3.83 billion (-\$63 million from FY2021 actual)  
**Malaria:** \$692 million (+\$10 million)  
**Maternal/Child Health:** \$371 million (+\$14 million)  
**Family Planning/Reproductive Health:** \$368 million (+\$25 million)  
**Global Health Security:** \$193 million (-\$174 million)  
**Water Supply/Sanitation:** \$132 million (-\$87 million)  
**Tuberculosis:** \$115 million (+\$13 million)  
**Nutrition:** \$102 million (level with FY2021 actual)  
**Source:** State Department, *CBJ for FY2023*

#### Economic Growth Assistance for Africa: FY2023 Request vs. FY2021 Actual

##### Selected Program Areas

**Agriculture:** \$440 million (+\$65 million)  
**Trade/Investment (incl. Prosper Africa):** \$134 million (+\$98 million)  
**Environment:** \$92 million (-\$40 million)  
**Climate Change-Related Assistance**  
**Adaptation:** \$84 million (+\$76 million)  
**Clean Energy (incl. Power Africa):** \$114 million (+\$57 million)  
**Sustainable Landscapes:** \$51 million (+41 million)  
**Source:** State Department, *CBJ for FY2023*.

<sup>51</sup> FY2021 allocation figures in this paragraph do not include Food for Peace (FFP) Title II assistance.

<sup>52</sup> State Department, *CBJ for FY2023*, p. 226.

also includes \$3 million to support a “modest” Countering Strategic Competitors program “targeted against influence by strategic competitors in Sub-Saharan Africa.”<sup>53</sup>

**DRG.** DRG funding for Africa would increase by \$59 million (26%) relative to FY2021, to \$285 million. Good governance programming, which aims to enhance the effectiveness of government institutions and combat corruption, among other objectives, would see the largest absolute increase in funding. The request also proposes increases for activities to strengthen civil society, promote human rights, and support independent media. DRC, Kenya, Somalia, Liberia, and Sudan would be the top recipients of U.S. DRG funding in Africa.

**Education and Social Services.** Total education and social services funding for Africa would see a \$16 million (5%) decrease in FY2023, to \$282 million. DRC, Liberia, Malawi, and Senegal would be the largest recipients of basic education assistance in Africa, the largest category of U.S. education assistance for the region. The higher education request includes \$20 million in USAID Africa Regional funding for YALI, a \$10 million increase from FY2021 allocations.<sup>54</sup>

## Outlook and Issues for Congress

The 117<sup>th</sup> Congress is considering the Biden Administration’s FY2023 budget request for Africa as it debates FY2023 appropriations. Heavily weighted toward health programs, with the balance dedicated to longstanding economic development and security priorities, the FY2023 request for Africa closely resembles, in level and scope, recent-year allocations for the region—though it would expand regional climate change-related assistance considerably and provide funding for an emergent “Digital Africa” program, among other proposals.

In June 2022, the House Appropriations Committee released its FY2023 SFOPS appropriations bill (H.R. 8282) and accompanying report (H.Rept. 117-401). As reported to the House, among other provisions, that bill would allocate \$100 million for Power Africa (equal to the request) and \$80 million for Prosper Africa (\$100 million proposed). Somalia would receive \$233.2 million in PKO funding (level with the request), while \$59 million in PKO would be allocated for regional programs (roughly \$7 million above the proposal). As in past years, the bill would also impose directives, conditions, and reporting requirements on assistance to several African countries. Globally, report language recommends \$6.7 billion for HIV/AIDS programming, including \$2.0 billion to support the Seventh Replenishment of the Global Fund.<sup>55</sup>

Global developments may shape Congress’s assessment of needs, priorities, and budgetary decision-making related to U.S. assistance for Africa. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for instance, has generated new demands on U.S. engagement and resources in Europe, even as an accompanying surge in global food and fuel prices has worsened food insecurity across Africa.<sup>56</sup> As Congress sets its priorities for FY2023 assistance for Africa and continues to oversee U.S. programming in the region, Members may consider various issues, such as:

**Scale and Balance.** Members may debate whether U.S. assistance to Africa is suitably balanced among programmatic sectors given the scope of U.S. priorities in the region and commensurate

<sup>53</sup> State Department, *CBJ for FY2023*, p. 410.

<sup>54</sup> The request includes an additional \$20 million for YALI via the State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

<sup>55</sup> See Global Fund, “Seventh Replenishment,” at <https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/seventh-replenishment/>.

<sup>56</sup> CRS Insight IN11919, *Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Implications for Global Food Prices and Food Security*, by Rhoda Margesson et al.



with U.S. interests. Successive Administrations have articulated a diverse range of development, governance, and security objectives in Africa, yet U.S. assistance for the region remains largely weighted toward health programs. Some Members have called for a greater allocation of U.S. assistance to be dedicated to other stated U.S. priorities, such as fostering economic growth, expanding U.S.-Africa commercial ties, and mitigating conflict.<sup>57</sup> Others have defended the relative allocation of funding for health programs vis-à-vis other U.S. assistance for Africa.<sup>58</sup>

**Transparency and Oversight.** While this report provides approximate funding figures based largely on publicly available allocation data, comprehensive estimates of U.S. assistance for Africa and amounts dedicated to specific focus areas are difficult to determine. Because annual executive branch budget documents and congressional appropriations measures do not fully disaggregate funding by region or country, topline bilateral assistance figures for specific countries may understate (in some cases, substantially) the amount of assistance allocated for a given country once global and regional funding is considered.

Gaps in region- and country-level assistance data may partly reflect efforts to maintain flexibility in U.S. assistance programs, as in the case of humanitarian aid, which is appropriated to global accounts for subsequent allocation according to need and U.S. policy priorities. At the same time, Congress has not imposed rigorous country allocation reporting requirements evenly across U.S. foreign assistance programs. For instance, while DOD “global train and equip” assistance is subject to congressional notification and reporting requirements that capture information on country and security force unit recipient and assistance to be provided, there is no analogous reporting requirement governing State Department-administered security assistance.<sup>59</sup>

The 117<sup>th</sup> Congress has acted to enhance oversight of U.S. foreign assistance for Africa, notably security assistance. Section 6502 of the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) expanded the notification and reporting requirements associated with PKO assistance, for example. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program Act of 2022 (Division AA, P.L. 117-103), in addition to providing statutory authority for TSCTP, established congressional notification requirements on funding allocations and mandated regular reporting on progress in meeting TSCTP objectives and resolving past management deficiencies.

**Restrictions on U.S. Assistance.** Several African countries are (or previously have been) subject to restrictions on U.S. assistance pursuant to provisions in annual appropriations measures or other laws that Congress has enacted prohibiting or placing conditions on such aid on human rights and other grounds. Statutes establishing such conditions often accord the executive branch the discretion to designate countries for sanction or waive such restrictions. Congress may continue to debate the effectiveness of such restrictions as it oversees and assesses executive branch implementation. Related laws and considerations include:

- Section 7008 in SFOPS appropriations legislation (most recently, P.L. 117-103), which restricts certain U.S. assistance following a coup d'état.<sup>60</sup> As of June 2022,

<sup>57</sup> See, e.g., remarks by Representative Bass in House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Global Human Rights, *FY2022 Budget and U.S.-Africa Relations*, hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., December 1, 2021.

<sup>58</sup> See, e.g., remarks by Senator Rounds in Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, *FY2023 Budget Request for Africa*, hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., July 27, 2022.

<sup>59</sup> On U.S. counterterrorism activities in Africa and associated oversight challenges, see Testimony of Alexis Arieff, CRS Specialist in African Affairs, before the House Oversight Subcommittee on National Security, *U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Challenges in Africa*, 116th Cong., 1st sess., December 16, 2019.

<sup>60</sup> CRS In Focus IF11267, *Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid Appropriations*, by Alexis Arieff, Marian L. Lawson, and Susan G. Chesser; CRS Insight IN11854, *“An Epidemic of Coups” in Africa? Issues for Congress*, by

Section 7008 was in effect with regard to Burkina Faso (due to a coup in 2022), Guinea (2021), Mali (2020), and Sudan (1989). In contrast to most legislative restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, Section 7008 does not grant the executive branch the authority to waive such restrictions, which go into effect once the executive branch determines that a coup has taken place.

- The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292), which provides a list of escalating punitive actions (potentially including restrictions on U.S. assistance) for “Countries of Particular Concern” (CPCs), whose governments engage in or tolerate “particularly severe” religious freedom violations.<sup>61</sup> In the most recent CPC determinations, issued in late 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken re-designated Eritrea as a CPC and upheld existing sanctions on the country, while de-listing Nigeria. Some Members of Congress criticized Nigeria’s removal from the CPC list.<sup>62</sup>
- The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA, P.L. 106-386, as amended) and related legislation, which restrict “nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related assistance” for governments that the State Department determines do not meet minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons and are not making significant efforts to do so.<sup>63</sup> In its 2021 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, the State Department designated Comoros, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, and South Sudan for potential sanction pursuant to the TVPA; in late 2021, citing the U.S. national interest, President Biden partially waived associated restrictions on U.S. assistance in FY2022 for all four countries, with varying justifications.<sup>64</sup>
- The Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (CSPA, Title IV of P.L. 110-457, as amended) and related legislation, which restrict certain U.S. security assistance for countries in which governmental security forces or government-backed armed groups have recruited or used child soldiers.<sup>65</sup> In its 2021 TIP report, the Secretary of State designated DRC, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan pursuant to the CSPA. In October 2021, President Biden fully waived associated restrictions on U.S. security assistance in FY2022 for Nigeria, and partly waived them for DRC, Mali, Somalia, and South Sudan.<sup>66</sup>

Some countries have been subject to other legal restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, such as those imposed on governments that support international terrorism or are in external debt arrears. Congress has also included provisions in annual SFOPS appropriations measures restricting or placing conditions on certain assistance to specific African countries. In FY2022, these include conditions on IMET assistance for the countries of Africa’s Great Lakes region (Burundi, DRC,

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Alexis Arieff and Lauren Ploch Blanchard.

<sup>61</sup> CRS In Focus IF10803, *Global Human Rights: International Religious Freedom Policy*, by Michael A. Weber.

<sup>62</sup> See letter from Senators Marco Rubio, Josh Hawley, James Lankford, Kevin Cramer, Mike Braun, Jim Inhofe, and Tom Cotton to Secretary Blinken, December 13, 2021; see also Representative Chris Smith, “Biden’s retreat from the noble and necessary fight to protect victims of religious persecution in Nigeria,” November 23, 2021.

<sup>63</sup> CRS Report R44953, *The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report: Scope, Aid Restrictions, and Methodology*, by Michael A. Weber, Katarina C. O’Regan, and Liana W. Rosen.

<sup>64</sup> White House, “Memorandum on the Presidential Determination with Respect to the Efforts of Foreign Governments Regarding Trafficking in Persons,” December 21, 2021.

<sup>65</sup> CRS In Focus IF10901, *Child Soldiers Prevention Act: Security Assistance Restrictions*, by Michael A. Weber.

<sup>66</sup> White House, “Presidential Determination and Certification With Respect to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008,” 86 *Federal Register* 57525, October 18, 2021.



Rwanda, Republic of Congo, and Uganda) and restrictions on certain kinds of assistance for the central governments of South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.<sup>67</sup>

The so-called “Leahy Laws” restrict most kinds of State Department- and DOD-administered security assistance to individual units or members of foreign security forces credibly implicated in a “gross violation of human rights,” subject to certain exceptions.<sup>68</sup> The executive branch does not regularly publicize information on which units have been prohibited from receiving U.S. assistance pursuant to these laws.

**Country Ownership.** Most U.S. assistance for Africa is provided through multilateral or nongovernment actors—such as U.N. agencies, U.S. and international humanitarian organizations, and civil society groups—rather than through African governments. (Exceptions include U.S. security assistance for African security forces and some healthcare capacity-building programs.) Congress may thus debate the extent to which U.S. assistance enables partner African governments to take the lead in addressing their country’s socioeconomic development, security, and governance challenges. In some cases, providing assistance through nongovernment actors may enable the provision of assistance in contexts where a government is unable or unwilling to meet the needs of its population, and may help the United States better control and oversee the use of funds. Congress may debate, however, whether this mode of delivery adequately equips recipient country authorities to take responsibility for service provision, as well as whether it may limit U.S. influence with recipient country governments as opposed to budget support. Members also may consider the merits and status of the Biden Administration’s stated emphasis on increasing the share of U.S. assistance that is implemented by local partners (e.g., partner governments and local civil society organizations) as opposed to international actors.<sup>69</sup>

**Possible Unintended Consequences.** Some Members have raised concerns over potential unintended consequences of U.S. foreign assistance for African countries. For instance, some lawmakers have questioned whether providing security assistance to African governments with poor human rights records (e.g., Cameroon and Uganda) may strengthen abusive militaries and contribute to poor governance.<sup>70</sup> Amid a wave of military coups in Africa since 2020, some led by personnel who previously took part in U.S. training programs, some Members have questioned to what extent U.S. security assistance may have empowered coup leaders, or how U.S. security assistance could be adjusted in light of such events.<sup>71</sup> Proponents of U.S. security assistance may contend that aspects of such engagements—such as military professionalization and related training—work to enhance security sector governance and civil-military relations, and may thus

<sup>67</sup> Most recently, Section 7042(a) and Section 7042(i)-(j) of P.L. 117-103, Division K, Title VII.

<sup>68</sup> See CRS In Focus IF10575, *Global Human Rights: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”)*, by Michael A. Weber.

<sup>69</sup> Remarks by USAID Administrator Samantha Power at Georgetown University, November 4, 2021, available at <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/speeches/nov-4-2021-administrator-samantha-power-new-vision-global-development>.

<sup>70</sup> See, e.g. letter from Representatives Ilhan Omar, Karen Bass, and Sara Jacobs to Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin pertaining to Cameroon, March 9, 2022; letter from Senators Cory Booker and James Risch to Secretary of State Blinken pertaining to Uganda, March 4, 2021.

<sup>71</sup> See, e.g., remarks by Representative Sara Jacobs in House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Development, International Organizations, and Global Corporate Social Impact, “Improving the United States’ Ability to Prevent and Stabilize Conflict: Global Fragility Act Implementation,” 117<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., May 11, 2022, remarks by Senator Chris Van Hollen in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance,” 117<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., March 10, 2022; and remarks by Senator Mike Rounds in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Instability and the State of Democracy in the Sahel and the U.S. Policy Response,” hearing, 117<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess., July 12, 2022.

improve human rights practices by partner militaries.<sup>72</sup> Members continue to debate the appropriate approach to U.S. engagement with military regimes in Africa.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> For one evaluation of U.S. security assistance in Africa, see Stephen Watts et al. *Building Security in Africa: An Evaluation of U.S. security Sector Assistance in Africa from the Cold War to the Present*, 2018.

<sup>73</sup> See Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Instability and the State of Democracy in the Sahel."