INSIGHTi
Election Worker Safety and Privacy
Updated August 18, 2022
Concerns about election workers’ safety and privacy have been reported following the 2020 election, in
news reports and testimony before House and Senate committees. Some election workers have raised
concerns about physical safety while performing official duties, as well as more general threats outside
the workplace or related psychological effects. These threats, along with a perceived increase in
politically motivated job scrutiny, have led some to leave, or consider leaving, their roles.
This Insight provides a brief overview of recent developments, legislative proposals, and policy
considerations related to election worker safety and privacy.
Background
Federal law prohibits certain types of intimidation of or interference with election workers, including
intimidation to discourage serving as a poll watcher or election official or intimidation as a result of such
service (18 U.S.C. §245); interference by members of the Armed Forces with election officials’ exercise
of their duties (18 U.S.C. §593); and intimidation for helping voters register (52 U.S.C. §20511) or vote
(52 U.S.C. §§10307, 20511). Many states have laws that address other threats to election workers, such as
through privacy protections for election commissioners. More general laws—such as prohibitions against
voter intimidation (e.g. 52 U.S.C. §§10101, 10307, 20511) or harassing or threatening interstate
communications—might also apply to some conduct.
Some state and local officials have responded to recent reports of threats to election workers with
administrative action or legislative proposals. Election officials have included local law enforcement in
poll worker trainings, for example, and implemented new security measures in their offices. Bills to
establish new prohibitions or protections have been introduced or enacted in state legislatures, including a
Michigan proposal to prohibit intimidation of election workers, a Washington State bill to extend existing
privacy protections to election officials, and a Colorado law providing for new protections against doxing
and intimidation.
Recent Federal Developments
The executive branch has taken recent actions on election worker safety and privacy concerns. On July
29, 2021, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the creation of an Election Threats Task Force
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comprised of representatives of DOJ Offices, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and interagency
partners, such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “to address the rise in threats against
election workers, administrators, officials, and others associated with the electoral process.” DOJ
announced the first guilty plea in connection with the task force on June 16, 2022.
In addition to enforcement efforts, federal agencies have provided resources or support for election
workers. For example, DOJ, DHS, and the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) administer
certain grant funds that might be used to address threats to election workers. DHS’s Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) also offers publications and services to help election officials
respond to physical and online threats, the EAC has released a webpage and series of videos about
election official security, and the EAC’s Board of Advisors adopted a resolution condemning threats
against election workers and calling for additional agency resources to help protect them.
There has also been activity on the issue in Congress. Election administrators and other witnesses have
addressed recent threats to election workers in testimony to several congressional committees, including
the House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (June 21,
2022); House Homeland Security Committee (July 20, 2022); Committee on House Administration
(CHA) (July 28, 2021) and CHA subcommittees (June 22, 2022, and July 27, 2022); House Committee on
Oversight and Reform (August 11, 2022); Senate Committee on Rules and Administration (October 26,
2021, May 19, 2022, and August 3, 2022); and Senate Committee on the Judiciary (August 3, 2022).
On August 11, 2022, the majority staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Reform released a
report about the effects of election misinformation and disinformation, including threats to election
workers, that drew on responses from election officials to letters sent by the Committee and CHA. Some
Senators have also sent letters expressing concern over the threats to election workers; requesting updates
on the DOJ task force and making recommendations for its work with state and local officials and
election workers; requesting EAC guidance on resources for addressing threats and updates on its efforts
to support election officials; and asking DHS and the FBI to consider a public service announcement to
local law enforcement agencies about these threats and related federal resources.
Some bills introduced in the 117th Congress would address election worker security directly, including
through provisions that would
prohibit harassment of election workers with intent to interfere with or retaliate for
performance of official duties (H.R. 4064/S. 2155; H.R. 5746; S. 2093; S. 2747);
prohibit intimidation for the purpose of interfering with election administration duties
(H.R. 777);
prohibit physically damaging election infrastructure, with enhanced penalties for certain
types of threats and harms (H.R. 5746; H.R. 6872/S. 3142; S. 4; S. 2928);
extend a prohibition on certain types of intimidation in federal elections to intimidation
for processing ballots or tabulating, canvassing, or certifying votes (H.R. 5053/S. 2626;
H.R. 5746; S. 2747);
extend a prohibition on intimidating poll watchers and election officials to cases
involving violence or threats of harm to people or property and to election agents,
vendors, and contractors (S. 4; S. 2928);
prohibit intimidation of poll watchers, election officials, and election agents, vendors, and
contractors that involves violence or threats of harm, with enhanced penalties for certain
types of threats and harms (H.R. 5746; H.R. 6872/S. 3142);
prohibit removal or suspension of local election administrators except for specified
reasons, such as neglect of duty or malfeasance in office (H.R. 4064/S. 2155; H.R. 5746;
S. 2747);
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extend or create privacy protections for election workers and their families (H.R. 4064/S.
2155; H.R. 5314; H.R. 5746; S. 2093; S. 2747);
increase the penalty for violating a prohibition on intimidating poll watchers and election
officials (S. 4574); and
establish in statute a DOJ-led election officials security task force with representatives
from the FBI; the U.S. Marshals Service; CISA; the EAC; state and local prosecutors;
election officials; and election officials associations (H.R. 5314).
Legislation has also been introduced in the 117th Congress that would authorize or appropriate funding
states might choose to use to address threats to election workers. Recent appropriations measures have
provided (P.L. 117-103) or would provide (H.R. 8254; H.R. 8294) funding for improvements to the
administration of federal elections, for example, and the Enhanced Pay for Election Workers Act (H.R.
8015) would authorize a grant program for supplementing election worker pay. The Sustaining Our
Democracy Act (H.R. 7992/S. 4239) would authorize funding states could use to recruit, train, retain, and
protect election workers and prohibit use of the funding to intimidate election workers or remove election
administrators on grounds other than negligence, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.
Potential Considerations for Congress
As noted above, states, localities, and federal agencies have taken some steps to address threats to election
workers. Congress might choose to leave any further action to federal agencies under their existing
authorities or to state and local officials.
Members might also see a role for Congress in strengthening protections—or helping states and localities
strengthen protections—for election workers. The following questions might be relevant to Members who
are considering whether or how to engage with this issue.
How might threats be addressed? Would action be aimed at addressing obstacles to
enforcement of existing laws, for example, or at helping fund security efforts or
establishing new penalties, prohibitions, or protections?
What types of threats might be addressed? Would proposed action focus on activities
affecting election workers’ physical, psychological, or economic well-being or a
combination? Would it address threats to election workers while they were conducting
their official duties, in their private lives, or both?
Who might be covered by proposed protections? Would protections apply only to
election officials or also to volunteer workers, vendors and contractors, or family
members?
Author Information
Sarah J. Eckman
Karen L. Shanton
Analyst in American National Government
Analyst in American National Government
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
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Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
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