Updated August 5, 2022
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Cuban Political and Economic Developments
been tried and convicted, including more than 25 minors.
Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a
The human rights group Cuban Prisoners Defenders (CPD)
government that has sharply restricted freedoms of
reported that Cuba had 999 political prisoners at the end of
expression, association, assembly, and other basic human
June 2022 (up from 152 on July 1, 2021), of which 730
rights since the early years of the 1959 Cuban revolution.
were imprisoned and considered prisoners of conscience by
CPD, 240 were under some form of conditional release, and
Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro as president in
30 were imprisoned for other politically motivated acts.
2018 and as head of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) at
its eighth party congress in April 2021. The departure of
U.S. Policy
Castro and other older leaders from the PCC’s Politburo
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
reflects the generational change in Cuban leadership that
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
began several years ago. While in power (2006-2018), Raúl
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
Castro (who succeeded his brother, longtime leader Fidel
isolating the Cuban government. The Obama
Castro) began to move Cuba toward a mixed economy with
Administration initiated a policy shift away from sanctions
a stronger private sector, but his government’s slow,
and toward engagement and the normalization of relations.
gradualist approach did not produce major improvements.
Changes included the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a
Cuba adopted a new constitution in 2019 that introduced
state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015); the
some reforms but maintained the state’s dominance over the
restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015); and eased
economy and the PCC’s predominant political role.
restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
The Cuban economy has been hard-hit by the economic
(2015-2016). In contrast, the Trump Administration
shutdown associated with the Coronavirus Disease 2019
introduced new sanctions in 2017, including restrictions on
(COVID-19) pandemic; Venezuela’s economic crisis,
transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban
which has reduced support from that country; and U.S.
military. By 2019, the Trump Administration had largely
sanctions. Cuba reports the economy contracted by 10.9%
abandoned engagement and significantly increased
in 2020, grew by 1.3% in 2021, and is projected to expand
sanctions, particularly on travel and remittances.
by 4% in 2022. Some economists estimate a slight
contraction in 2021 but project over 3% growth in 2022.
In its initial months, the Biden Administration announced it
This forecast could change due to the impact of Russia’s
was conducting a review of policy toward Cuba, with
invasion of Ukraine on the global food and fuel prices. In
human rights a core pillar, and would review policy
early 2021, Cuba unified its dual currency system; the long-
decisions made by the prior Administration. In the
debated reform spurred inflation, estimated at almost 300%
aftermath of the Cuban government’s harsh response to the
by the end of 2021 but forecast to decline to 10% by the
July 11 protests, the Biden Administration criticized Cuba’s
end of 2022, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit.
repression and imposed targeted sanctions on those
involved. In July and August 2021, the Treasury
Cuba’s public health response to the pandemic initially kept
Department imposed four rounds of financial sanctions on
cases and deaths low, but both surged in the summer of
three Cuban security entities and eight officials. Between
2021. The country experienced another surge in cases in
November 2021 and July 2022, the State Department
early 2022, but deaths remained low because of high
announced four rounds of visa restrictions against 50
vaccination rates. As of early August 2022, Cuba reported
individuals involved in repressing protesters.
over 8,500 deaths since the pandemic began (with one of
the lowest mortality rates in the hemisphere) and had fully
In May 2022, the Administration announced several Cuba
vaccinated 88% of its population with its own vaccines.
policy changes aimed at increasing support for the Cuban
people. The Administration increased immigrant visa
Increased Repression. Beginning in November 2020, the
processing at the U.S. Embassy in Havana and said it would
government cracked down on the San Isidro Movement
reinstate the Cuban Family Reunification Parole (CFRP)
(MSI), a civil society group opposed to restrictions on
program. It eased travel restrictions by reauthorizing
artistic expression. On July 11, 2021, anti-government
scheduled and charter flights to cities beyond Havana and
demonstrations broke out in Havana and throughout the
reinstating group people-to-people travel. It eased
country, with thousands of Cubans protesting economic
restrictions on sending cash remittances by eliminating the
conditions (food and medicine shortages, blackouts) and
dollar and frequency limits for family remittances and
long-standing concerns about the lack of political freedoms.
reauthorizing donative remittances to Cuban nationals. The
The government responded with harsh measures, including
Administration also announced that it would increase
widespread detentions of protesters, civil society activists,
support for independent Cuban entrepreneurs.
and bystanders. Hundreds of the July 2021 protestors have
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Increased Irregular Migration. Driven by Cuba’s difficult
117th Congress: Legislative Action on Cuba
economic conditions and political repression, irregular
For FY2022, the Biden Administration requested $12.973
Cuban migration to the United States has surged over the
million for the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) and $20
past year. In FY2021, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
million for Cuba democracy programming. In the
reported almost 39,000 border enforcement encounters of
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103,
Cubans at the Southwest land border. In the first nine
Division K) and its explanatory statement, Congress fully
months of FY2022, Cuban encounters at the Southwest land
funded the Administration’s OCB request, although it did
border rose to over 155,000. U.S. maritime interdiction of
not specify an amount for Cuba democracy programming.
Cubans also has increased, with the Coast Guard reporting
838 interdictions in FY2021 and over 3,700 in FY2022, as
For FY2023, the Administration requested $13.432 million
of early August 2022. U.S. and Cuban officials held
for OCB and $20 million for Cuba democracy funding. The
migration talks in April 2022 (the first such talks since
House Appropriations Committee’s reported FY2023
2018) on the implementation of bilateral migration accords.
foreign aid appropriations bill, H.R. 8282 (H.Rept. 117-
401), would provide $12.973 million for OCB (same as for
Selected U.S. Sanctions
FY2022), while an explanatory statement to the Senate bill,
Transactions with the Cuban Military. In 2017, the State
S. 4662, would recommend $13.891 million. The House bill
Department published a list of entities controlled by the
would provide $20 million for democracy programs, with
Cuban military, intelligence, or security services with
not less than $5 million to support private enterprise,
which direct financial transactions would disproportionately
private business organizations, and people-to-people
benefit those services or personnel at the expense of the
educational and cultural activities; the bill would also
Cuban people or private enterprise. This “Cuba restricted
provide for the operation of, and improvements to, U.S.
list” includes 231 entities (ministries, hotels, businesses).
diplomatic facilities in Cuba, and costs associated with
additional U.S. diplomatic personnel.
Travel and Remittances. Since 2019, U.S. restrictions
have prohibited travel by cruise ships and by private and
On July 20, 2022, the House rejected (163-260) an
corporate aircraft. Since 2020, most U.S. travelers have
amendment (H.Amdt. 300) to H.R. 8294, a six-bill FY2023
been prohibited from staying at over 400 hotels and private
appropriations measure that would have prevented any
residences identified as owned or controlled by the Cuban
funds from being used to enforce a U.S. sanctions provision
government. In 2020, a prohibition against processing
prohibiting private financing for U.S. agricultural exports.
remittances through “Cuba restricted list” entities resulted
in Western Union terminating its services to Cuba.
On human rights, the House and Senate approved H.Res.
760 and S.Res. 310, in November and August 2021,
Terrorism Designations. Since May 2020, pursuant to the
respectively; both condemned Cuba’s repression, and called
Arms Export Control Act, the Secretary of State has
for the release of those detained. The Senate also passed
included Cuba on an annual list of countries certified as not
S.Res. 37 in April 2021, expressing solidarity with the MSI;
cooperating fully with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. In early
S.Res. 81 in May 2021, honoring Las Damas de Blanco, a
January 2021, pursuant to several laws, the Secretary of
woman-led human rights group; S. 2045 in July 2021, to
State designated Cuba as a state sponsor of international
rename the street in front of the Cuban Embassy after a
terrorism, citing its harboring of several U.S. fugitives and
democracy activist; and S.Res. 489 in January 2022,
members of Colombia’s National Liberation Army.
commending Cuban democracy and human rights activists.
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel
Among other bills, H.R. 198 would permit Cuban nationals
Between late 2016 and May 2018, 26 U.S. Embassy
to play U.S. professional baseball; H.R. 287, S. 689, and S.
Havana community members suffered a series of
3468 would prohibit the rescission of Cuba’s designation as
unexplained injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive
a state sponsor of terrorism until Cuba satisfies certain
issues. In December 2020, the National Academies of
conditions; H.R. 6907 would direct the reinstatement of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine released a report
processing CFRP program applications, and H.R. 2684
concluding the most plausible mechanism for the source of
would establish the program in U.S. immigration law; S.
the health symptoms was directed pulsed radio frequency
249 and H.R. 3625 would lift economic sanctions; S. 1694
energy. U.S. officials maintain that investigations into the
would lift trade restrictions; S. 2138 would allow certain
cause or source of these anomalous health incidents have
Cuban medical personnel working in third countries
not reached a conclusion. A number of U.S. government
admission into the United States; H.R. 5069 would direct
and military officials worldwide have reported these
the Secretary of State to facilitate unrestricted internet
symptoms since 2016. Congress enacted legislation (P.L.
access in Cuba; and H.R. 5557/S. 2990, among its
117-46) in September 2021 authorizing payment to Central
provisions, would impose sanctions on foreign persons for
Intelligence Agency and State Department personnel who
engaging in certain transactions related to Cuba.
experience certain brain injuries. The National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2022 (P.L. 117-81), approved in
Also see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on
December 2021, has provisions to address health care and
Travel and Remittances; CRS Insight IN11937, Biden
treatment, national security challenges, and U.S.
Administration’s Cuba Policy Changes; and CRS Report
government coordination of the response to the incidents.
R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress and
Through the Trump Administration.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
IF10045
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 97 · UPDATED