Updated July 20, 2022
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Cuban Political and Economic Developments
more than 1,000 protesters, civil society activists, and
Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a
bystanders. Hundreds of the July 11 protestors have been
government that has sharply restricted freedoms of
tried and convicted, including more than 25 minors. As of
expression, association, assembly, and other basic human
the end of June 2022, the human rights group Cuban
rights since the early years of the 1959 Cuban revolution.
Prisoners Defenders (CPD) reported that Cuba had 999
political prisoners (up from 152 on July 1, 2021), of which
Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro as president in
730 were imprisoned and considered prisoners of
2018 and as head of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) at
conscience by CPD, 240 were under some form of
its eighth party congress in April 2021. The departure of
conditional release, and 30 were imprisoned for other
Castro and other older leaders from the PCC’s Politburo
politically motivated acts.
reflects the generational change in Cuban leadership that
began several years ago. While in power (2006-2018), Raúl
U.S. Policy
Castro (who succeeded his brother, longtime leader Fidel
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
Castro) began to move Cuba toward a mixed economy with
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
a stronger private sector, but his government’s slow,
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
gradualist approach did not produce major improvements.
isolating the Cuban government. The Obama
Cuba adopted a new constitution in 2019 that introduced
Administration initiated a policy shift away from sanctions
some reforms but maintained the state’s dominance over the
and toward engagement and the normalization of relations.
economy and the PCC’s predominant political role.
Changes included the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a
state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015); the
The Cuban economy has been hard-hit by the economic
restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015); and eased
shutdown associated with the Coronavirus Disease 2019
restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
(COVID-19) pandemic; Venezuela’s economic crisis,
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
which has reduced Venezuelan financial support; and U.S.
(2015-2016). In contrast, the Trump Administration
economic sanctions. Cuba reports the economy contracted
introduced new sanctions in 2017, including restrictions on
almost 11% in 2020 and 2% in 2021. Some economists
transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban
estimate a slight contraction in 2021 but project over 3%
military. By 2019, the Trump Administration had largely
growth in 2022. This forecast could change due to the
abandoned engagement and significantly increased
impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the global
sanctions, particularly on travel and remittances.
economy, including increases in food and fuel prices. In
early 2021, Cuba unified its dual currency system; the long-
In its initial months, the Biden Administration announced it
debated reform spurred inflation, estimated at almost 300%
was conducting a review of policy toward Cuba, with
by the end of 2021 but forecast to decline to 10% by the
human rights a core pillar, and would review policy
end of 2022, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit.
decisions made by the prior Administration. In the
aftermath of the Cuban government’s harsh response to the
Cuba’s public health response to the pandemic initially kept
July 11 protests, the Biden Administration criticized Cuba’s
cases and deaths low, but both increased in late 2020 and
repression and imposed targeted sanctions on those
surged until August 2021. The country experienced another
involved. In July and August 2021, the Treasury
surge in cases in January 2022 due to the Omicron variant,
Department imposed four rounds of financial sanctions on
but deaths remained low because of high vaccination rates.
three Cuban security entities and eight officials. Between
As of mid-July 2022, Cuba reported 8,529 deaths since the
November 2021 and July 2022, the State Department
pandemic began (with one of the lowest mortality rates in
announced four rounds of visa restrictions against 50
the hemisphere) and had fully vaccinated 88% of its
individuals involved in repressing protesters.
population with its own COVID-19 vaccines.
In May 2022, the Administration announced several Cuba
Increased Repression. Beginning in November 2020, the
policy changes aimed at increasing support for the Cuban
government cracked down on the San Isidro Movement
people. The Administration increased immigrant visa
(MSI), a civil society group opposed to restrictions on
processing at the U.S. Embassy in Havana and said it would
artistic expression. On July 11, 2021, anti-government
reinstate the Cuban Family Reunification Parole program. It
demonstrations broke out in Havana and in cities and towns
eased some travel restrictions by reauthorizing scheduled
throughout the country, with thousands of Cubans
and charter flights to locations beyond Havana, reinstating
protesting economic conditions (food and medicine
group people-to-people travel. It eased some restrictions on
shortages, blackouts) and long-standing concerns about the
sending cash remittances to Cuba by eliminating the dollar
lack of freedom of expression. The government responded
and frequency limits for family remittances and restoring
with harsh measures, including widespread detentions of
the category of donative remittances. The Administration
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
also announced that it would increase support for
treatment, national security challenges, and U.S.
independent Cuban entrepreneurs.
government coordination of the response to the incidents.
Increased Irregular Migration. Driven by Cuba’s difficult
117th Congress: Legislative Action on Cuba
economic conditions and political repression, irregular
For FY2022, the Biden Administration requested $12.973
Cuban migration to the United States has surged over the
million for the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) and $20
past year. In FY2021, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
million for Cuba democracy programming. In the
reported almost 39,000 border enforcement encounters of
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103,
Cubans at the Southwest land border. In the first nine
Division K), and its explanatory statement, Congress fully
months of FY2022, Cuban encounters at the Southwest land
funded the Administration’s OCB request, although it did
border rose to over 155,000. U.S. maritime interdiction of
not specify an amount for Cuba democracy programming.
Cubans also has increased but at lower levels, with the
The explanatory statement included several directives and
Coast Guard reporting 838 interdictions in FY2021; for
reporting requirements on Cuba.
FY2022, over 3,300 Cubans had been interdicted as of mid-
July 2022. U.S. and Cuban officials held migration talks in
For FY2023, the Administration requested $13.432 million
April 2022 (the first such talks since 2018) on the
for OCB and $20 million for Cuba democracy funding. The
implementation of bilateral migration accords.
House Appropriations Committee’s reported FY2023
foreign aid appropriations bill, H.R. 8282 (H.Rept. 117-
Selected U.S. Sanctions
401), would provide $12.973 million for OCB (same as for
Transactions with the Cuban Military. In 2017, the State
FY2022) and $20 million for democracy programs, with not
Department published a list of entities controlled by the
less than $5 million to support the development of private
Cuban military, intelligence, or security services with
enterprise, private business organizations, and people-to-
which direct financial transactions would disproportionately
people educational and cultural activities. The bill also
benefit those services or personnel at the expense of the
would provide for funding of the operation of, and
Cuban people or private enterprise. This “Cuba restricted
infrastructure and security improvements to, U.S.
list” includes 231 entities (ministries, hotels, businesses).
diplomatic facilities in Cuba, as well as costs associated
with additional U.S. diplomatic personnel in Cuba.
Travel and Remittances. Since 2019, U.S. restrictions
have prohibited travel by cruise ships and by private and
On human rights, the House and Senate approved H.Res.
corporate aircraft and have prohibited most U.S. travelers
760 and S.Res. 310, in November and August 2021,
from staying at over 400 hotels and private residences
respectively; both condemned Cuba’s repression, and called
identified as owned or controlled by the Cuban government.
for the release of those detained. The Senate also passed
In 2020, a prohibition against processing remittances
S.Res. 37 in April 2021, expressing solidarity with the MSI;
through “Cuba restricted list” entities resulted in Western
S.Res. 81 in May 2021, honoring Las Damas de Blanco, a
Union terminating its services to Cuba.
woman-led human rights group; S. 2045 in July 2021, to
rename the street in front of the Cuban Embassy after a
Terrorism Designations. Since May 2020, pursuant to the
democracy activist; and S.Res. 489 in January 2022,
Arms Export Control Act, the Secretary of State has
commending Cuban democracy and human rights activists.
included Cuba on an annual list of countries certified as not
cooperating fully with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. In early
Among other bills, H.R. 198 would permit Cuban nationals
January 2021, pursuant to several laws, the Secretary of
to play U.S. professional baseball; H.R. 287, S. 689, and S.
State designated Cuba as a state sponsor of international
3468 would prohibit the rescission of Cuba’s designation as
terrorism, citing its harboring of several U.S. fugitives and
a state sponsor of terrorism until Cuba satisfies certain
members of Colombia’s National Liberation Army.
conditions; H.R. 6907 would direct the Secretary of
Homeland Security to reinstate the processing of
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel
applications for parole under the Cuban Family
Between late 2016 and May 2018, 26 U.S. Embassy
Reunification Parole Program, and H.R. 2684 would
Havana community members suffered a series of
establish such a program in U.S. immigration law; S. 249
unexplained injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive
and H.R. 3625 would lift economic sanctions; S. 1694
issues. In December 2020, the National Academies of
would lift trade restrictions; S. 2138 would allow certain
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine released a report
Cuban medical personnel working in third countries
concluding the most plausible mechanism for the source of
admission into the United States; H.R. 5069 would direct
the health symptoms was directed pulsed radio frequency
the Secretary of State to facilitate unrestricted internet
energy. U.S. officials maintain that investigations into the
access in Cuba; and H.R. 5557/S. 2990, among its
cause or source of these anomalous health incidents have
provisions, would impose sanctions on foreign persons for
not reached a conclusion. A number of U.S. government
engaging in certain transactions related to Cuba.
and military officials worldwide have reported these
symptoms since 2016. Congress enacted legislation (P.L.
Also see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on
117-46) in September 2021 authorizing payment to Central
Travel and Remittances; CRS Insight IN11937, Biden
Intelligence Agency and State Department personnel who
Administration’s Cuba Policy Changes; and CRS Report
experience certain brain injuries. The National Defense
R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress and
Authorization Act for FY2022 (P.L. 117-81), approved in
Through the Trump Administration.
December 2021, has provisions to address health care and
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview

IF10045
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 96 · UPDATED

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