Updated July 15, 2022
Iraq and U.S. Policy
Sadrist Resignations Recast Government patronage politics, corruption, oil dependence, and armed
Formation Process
non-state actors.
In June 2022, Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr directed his
Challenges Await New Government
supporters to withdraw from the Council of Representatives
Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi remains as a caretaker,
(COR, Iraq’s unicameral legislature), recasting the political
dynamics of the country’s long delayed government
but observers do not expect he will serve a second term. His
term began in May 2020, after months of political deadlock
formation process. Iraq held a national election in October
following his predecessor’s protestor-demanded resignation
2021 for the 329 members of the COR, the “largest bloc” of
in late 2019. Negotiations leading to Kadhimi’s nomination
whom the constitution tasks with nominating a president
occurred during a period of escalating U.S.-Iran tensions in
and designating a new prime minister. Negotiations among
Iraq. Attacks by Iran-backed groups targeting U.S. and
Iraqi political groups since the election to identify the new
COR’s
Coalition forces—and their Iraqi hosts—have tested Prime
largest bloc became deadlocked.
Minister Al Kadhimi throughout his tenure and continue.
Sadr and his supporters had won the most seats (73) in the
The United States has condemned a series of indirect fire
October 2021 election and had proposed forming a
and infrastructure attacks in the Kurdistan region, including
“national majority” government in cooperation the
a March 2022 missile attack from Iran.
Taqaddum (Progress) movement of COR Speaker
Figure 1. Iraq
Mohammed al Halbousi (37 seats), the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) (31 seats), and others. Sadr’s Shia
Arab rivals in the Coordination Framework (CF) bloc,
including former prime minister Nouri al Maliki and Hadi
al Ameri of the pro-Iran Fatah (Conquest) coalition, insisted
on forming an inclusive government according to the
informal rules of the prevailing political system, which
provide for nominally proportional power sharing but
remain patronage-based and can facilitate corruption. Sadr
had sought to exclude Maliki from the new government,
and Sadr has portrayed his supporters’ withdrawal as a
refusal to participate in government with unspecified
“corrupt” parties.
COR leaders have sworn in new members to replace the
resigned Sadrists, with independents and Shia parties
gaining seats as a result. The Sadrists’ exit leaves their CF
rivals and the CF’s coalition partners as the COR’s apparent
largest bloc. Sadr has positioned his movement to act in
opposition to the next government. A CF-led government
may revisit electoral reforms that benefitted Sadrists and

independents in the 2021 election.
Sources: CRS, using ESRI and U.S. State Department data.
For the United States, the next government may be more
Iraqi and coalition forces ended the Islamic State (IS, aka
likely to reflect the influence of some pro-Iran groups, but
ISIS/ISIL) group’s control of territory in Iraq in 2017,
Iraqi observers do not expect the incoming administration
to rescind Iraq’s
creating space for Iraqis to seek more accountable
sovereign invitation for U.S. military
governance, improved service delivery, action against
advisors to remain in the country. A consensus-based
corruption, and greater economic opportunity. These
coalition government could lower the immediate risk of
demands drove mass protests in 2019 and 2020 that
political violence among rival blocs, but also may make
subsided as the Coronavirus Disease-2019 (COVID-19)
systemic reforms less likely. In the months ahead,
pandemic spread, but resurged in May 2021 with
unresolved popular demands and growing economic and
demonstrators insisting that the government identify and
environmental strains could reignite protests, including in
prosecute suspects in a series of assassinations and
the federally recognized Kurdistan region.
kidnappings of protest leaders, activists, and others. The
In assessing the government that emerges in Iraq, Congress
state’s use of force to contain and disperse protests, the
and the Biden Administration may weigh the benefits of
impunity surrounding violence against activists, and attacks
continued security cooperation and other bilateral ties
against foreign and Iraqi security forces have intensified
against risks to Iraq’s stability posed by the persistence of
public scrutiny of the government’s ability to act against
armed groups operating outside state control.
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Iraq and U.S. Policy
Data is incomplete, but as of July 15, Iraq had recorded
most seats in the KRG’s 2018 regional election. KRG
nearly 2.4 million COVID-19 cases with more than 25,200
elections set for October 2022 may be delayed. KDP leader
deaths. Iraq’s total population is more than 41 million
Masrour Barzani serves as KRG prime minister. His cousin
people; caseloads are likely underestimated.
Nechirvan Barzani is KRG president. Factional struggles in
the PUK’s leading Talibani family may affect prospects for
Continued dependence on oil revenues and expansive state
the party’s relations with the KDP and parties in Baghdad.
liabilities left Iraq vulnerable to financial collapse in 2020,
Convictions of journalists since 2020 have increased
as the systemic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic
foreign scrutiny of human rights in the Kurdistan region.
exacerbated underlying economic and fiscal challenges. Oil
prices in 2022 have been higher than expected, though the
Partnership with the United States
International Monetary Fund (IMF) reports Iraq’s non-oil
After a two-year bilateral strategic dialogue, U.S. and Iraqi
sector growth has slowed. The IMF describes the improved
leaders agreed in July 2021 on the transition of the U.S.
fiscal picture as an opportunity for change and has
military presence in Iraq to a non-combat advisory mission.
recommended “civil service reform … and containing the
wage bill, reducing inefficient energy subsidies,
In December 2021, U.S. and Iraqi officials confirmed
diversifying fiscal revenues, stemming losses in the
that all U.S. military personnel with a combat role had
electricity sector, [and] strengthening governance.” All of
been withdrawn from Iraq, with an undisclosed
these efforts could prove politically sensitive. The Biden
number remaining at the invitation of the Iraqi
Administration renewed a sanctions waiver on specific Iraqi
government with “a mission limited to advising,
energy purchases from Iran in March 2022; Iraq withholds
assisting and enabling the Iraqi Security Forces to
related payments in accordance with the waiver.
ensure ISIS can never resurge.”
Islamic State Remnants and Militias Pose Threats
Since March 2020, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad has
Iraqi forces continue to combat remaining Islamic State
operated under ordered departure rules because of “security
insurgents, who retain an ability to operate in rural areas,
conditions and restricted travel options as a result of the
especially in under-secured, disputed territories between the
COVID-19 pandemic.” The U.S. Consulate in Erbil remains
Kurdistan region and areas to the south secured by national
open; the State Department suspended operations at the
government forces. In February 2022, U.S. officials
U.S. Consulate in the southern city of Basra in 2018.
reported that IS fighters in Iraq had “a larger presence and
greater capability” than their IS counterparts in Syria.
U.S. assessments note that Iraq’s security forces depend on
coalition support for some operations. Congress has
In 2019, Iran-backed Iraqi groups expanded attacks on U.S.
authorized counter-IS train and equip programs for Iraq
targets, and in 2020, a U.S. strike in Iraq killed Iranian
through 2022, and has appropriated related funds available
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force
through September 2023, including aid to KRG forces
Commander Qassem Soleimani and Iraqi Popular
subject to the Iraqi government’s approval. Since 2014,
Mobilization Forces (PMF) leader Abu Mahdi al Muhandis.
Congress has appropriated more than $7.4 billion for
Iran retaliated with attacks on Iraqi sites hosting U.S.
counter-IS train and equip programs for Iraqis. Iraq also
forces. Intermittent rocket, drone, and improvised explosive
began receiving Department of Defense Global Train and
device (IED) attacks continue against U.S. and Iraqi targets.
Equip (10 U.S.C. §333) program aid in 2021.
2022 Russia-Ukraine War and Iraq
President Biden requested $358 million in counter-IS train
Iraq is experiencing indirect effects from Russia’s 2022
and equip funds for Iraq in 2023, including funds to aid the
invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing war. Higher prices in
Iraqi military, Counter Terrorism Service, and selected
global oil markets are generating higher oil export
Ministry of Interior forces. Of the request, $265 million
revenues, but war-driven changes in food commodity
would support KRG Peshmerga stipends, sustainment, and
markets are increasing food prices for Iraqis. Related
equipment. The House Appropriations Committee report on
protests have occurred, and the government has increased
its defense spending bill for 2023 (H.R. 8236) would make
spending on subsidies of food and gasoline imports.
$300 million in new funding available and would direct the
Views from the Kurdistan Region
Administration to use unobligated funds for the balance and
The United States partners with the Kurdistan Regional
to reduce future spending on Peshmerga stipends.
Government (KRG) of Iraq and supports the federal
U.S. aid in Iraq supports de-mining, public sector financial
region’s efforts to resolve differences with the national
management reform, U.N.-coordinated stabilization, and
government over oil production, the budget, disputed
other goals. The U.S. government has obligated more than
territories, and security. Following a 2017 KRG-sponsored
$405 million for stabilization of liberated areas since 2016,
independence referendum, the national government
including funds for religious and ethnic minority
reasserted control over some disputed territories and has
communities. Congress allocated $448.5 million for U.S.
maintained conditions on the transfer of funds to the KRG,
aid programs in Iraq in FY2022. President Biden is
contributing to the KRG’s fiscal strains. In February 2022,
Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court found the KRG’s oil and gas
requesting $355.3 million for FY2023, including $100
million less in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) aid. The
sector law unconstitutional. KRG-Baghdad negotiations
United States has provided more than $294.8 million in
have continued amid parallel government formation talks.
humanitarian aid for Iraq in FY2021 and FY2022.
The Erbil-based Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the
Suleimaniyah-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
are the largest Kurdish parties in the COR and won the
Affairs
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Iraq and U.S. Policy

IF10404


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