June 29, 2022
Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook
The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) continue to face
The UAF also faces two major hurdles to training and
disadvantages in seeking to defend Ukraine’s territorial
deploying new personnel. First, like many militaries,
integrity against Russian military forces. On the one hand,
Ukraine was in the process of developing a professional
since Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine in February
noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps along NATO
2022, the UAF has successfully defended against, and in
standards before Russia’s 2022 invasion. The UAF did not
some areas pushed back, Russian forces. On the other hand,
have a fully developed professional NCO corps by the time
this resistance has come with losses in personnel and
of the invasion and continued to deal with issues with
equipment, and the overall outlook for the war remains
retention, professional development, and funding. As
uncertain. The Biden Administration and Congress have
described previously, the high proportion of trained
expressed support for Ukraine’s defense of its territorial
veterans, many with combat experience, mitigated to some
integrity against Russia’s invasion. An understanding of the
degree the need for an established NCO corps to train and
evolving state of the UAF may be of interest to Congress as
command new recruits. However, with mounting UAF
it continues to weigh policies potentially supporting
losses and recruits with no experience as replacements,
Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression.
continuing the development of an effective NCO corps will
likely remain a major challenge and a key UAF priority.
Personnel
Some observers note that the UAF’s initially positive
Second, the UAF’s need for immediate reinforcements
overall performance is due in part to the experience and
creates pressure to train new recruits to only the bare
motivation of its personnel. The UAF has continued to
minimum levels. Training recruits to conduct complex
benefit from high levels of recruitment and motivation.
operations and operate advanced weapon systems takes
High losses, however, pose an ongoing challenge to the
longer, but both areas are widely considered necessary for
UAF’s ability to maintain effective and sustained
the UAF to sustain combat operations in the current
operations.
conflict.
Since 2014, the UAF has gained important combat
Equipment
experience fighting Russian-led forces in the Eastern
To date, the UAF also has sustained equipment losses.
Ukraine regions of the Donbas, which has led to a large
Some UAF units appear to be operating without
proportion of trained, experienced veterans among
mechanized or motorized vehicles support, likely due to
Ukraine’s population. These veterans and other volunteers
losses and maintenance issues. On June 15, Ukrainian
(including foreign recruits, some with previous military
Brigadier General Volodymyr Karpenko estimated that
experience) were quickly mobilized into Ukraine’s new,
some UAF units sustained losses of up to 50% of their
volunteer Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) and Reserve,
equipment. Although this could be an overestimation, it
without the need for lengthy training. Additionally, the high
also likely reflects the UAF’s need for further support
level of experience and training among the recruits meant
across tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery
they were able to operate artillery, tank, and support
systems.
systems that traditionally require time for reservists or
volunteers to master. These units were crucial in supporting
Ukrainian officials have emphasized their need for long-
and enabling regular UAF units to spearhead resistance and
range rocket and artillery systems to counter Russia’s
counteroffensives in multiple areas.
quantitative and qualitative advantage in long-range fire. At
the start of the war, Ukraine still relied on Soviet and
Since the beginning of the 2022 war, Ukraine reportedly
Russian 122mm and 152mm caliber rocket and artillery
has suffered high levels of casualties. In early June 2022,
systems. Ukraine also had a smaller number of longer-range
Ukrainian officials estimated losses of up to 100-200 killed
220mm and 300mm rocket systems, but it is unclear how
in action each day, but officials have not provided precise
many are still in service.
figures. Losses are likely higher among regular UAF and
Special Forces units, forcing a greater reliance on TDF and
The UAF relies primarily on Soviet-era and Russian
Reserve units. Due to losses and the need to rotate out
equipment. Russia has targeted Ukraine’s large defense
troops, Ukraine has had to recruit and train a substantial
industry with long-range missile strikes, affecting Ukraine’s
amount of replacements. Unlike the initial period of war
ability to maintain, repair, and produce equipment and
when most recruits were veterans, most new recruits and
ammunition to sustain operations. Ukraine’s capacity to
volunteers have little military experience. As a result, it
repair and maintain equipment is likely degraded due to
takes longer for the UAF to train new recruits.
Russian targeting, posing a hurdle to the UAF’s ability to
sustain operations. Additionally, the Ukrainian defense
industry is likely unable to produce complex systems in
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Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook
sufficient quantities for its current combat needs. Some
need for compatible types of ammunition, especially as the
Central and East European states maintain defense
UAF transitions to Western systems.
industries that are compatible with Soviet and early Russian
equipment, specifically in their production of small and
Current Military Performance and
artillery ammunition. Some observers estimate, however,
Outlook
that their production capacity is likely insufficient for
Over four months into the war, the UAF appears to be
Ukraine’s needs. Due to the artillery-intensive nature of the
focused on an attrition strategy of grinding down Russian
conflict, the UAF requires ammunition supplies to sustain
forces and holding territorial lines, specifically in the
operations.
Donbas. The UAF has demonstrated a willingness to
conduct local counterattacks across the country. Ukrainian
Ukraine’s air force and air defenses have proven effective
Special Forces and local partisan forces reportedly have
thus far at limiting Russian air superiority. Russia retains air
conducted some raids into Russian-controlled territory.
superiority in certain regions, however, and continues to
target Ukrainian air defenses. It is unclear how many of
In addition, the UAF command structure appears to have
Ukraine’s medium- and long-range air defense systems
become more centralized, as opposed to the more localized
remain operational, and Russian targeting appears to limit
command structure exhibited earlier in the war. The UAF
their forward deployment, forcing frontline UAF units to
leadership appears to be consolidating reserves to contest
rely on short-range man portable air defense (MANPAD)
Russian advances in the Donbas. Some observers believe
systems.
the UAF decision to focus on an attrition strategy is
designed to exhaust Russian forces. However, with the
Role of U.S. and Western Security
Donbas a priority for reinforcements, it is unclear if the
Assistance
UAF can sustain counterattacks in other regions.
Since the start of Russia’s 2022 war, the United States has
Additionally, the UAF risks exhaustion due to casualties
provided Ukraine more than $6.1 billion in security
and requires a coherent strategy of rotating forces in and out
assistance. The United States and European allies and
of combat.
partners continue to contribute training, logistics,
intelligence, and military assistance. Observers note the
Russia’s armed forces retain advantages in force size,
tension between providing equipment and training for
equipment (specifically artillery and long-range fire), air
immediate use on the battlefield and the training required to
support, and electronic warfare. Some observers believe
effectively employ these systems over the longer term.
Russia’s advantages will probably decrease in time, since
Another concern is the impact of such assistance on U.S.
Russia’s ability to recruit and train new professional
and Western stockpiles and the time it will take for
soldiers in sufficient quantities without a national
domestic defense industries to replenish.
mobilization remains questionable. In contrast, Ukraine is
likely to continue to recruit large numbers of personnel. As
Training
mentioned, training these new recruits to a sufficient
Prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion, the United States and other
standard is expected to last as a core challenge.
allies contributed training and advice to the UAF. Current
efforts focus on training the UAF to operate and employ
These developments remain important factors for Congress
Western security assistance, specifically on advanced
to consider when discussing options to support Ukraine’s
systems. Due to the lengthy time required to effectively
defense. Some observers believe UAF capabilities will
train and maintain many Western systems, U.S. and
increase with continued U.S. and Western security
European allies are focusing on the minimum training
assistance, specifically artillery and long-range missile
necessary to operate in the field. This approach may
systems. Continued and sufficient UAF training in the
facilitate the rapid employment of these weapons on the
operation and maintenance of these systems will also likely
battlefield. However, without expertise to maintain and
determine the extent of the improvement in UAF
repair damaged equipment, the long-term effectiveness of
capabilities. The UAF has identified additional needs in
these weapons may be undermined. Observers also note the
logistics, medical evacuation and care, and intelligence.
UAF’s need for assistance and training in planning,
Communications problems endure, with Russian electronic
operations, and logistics.
warfare and a lack of reliable systems hindering the UAF’s
ability to coordinate operations. It is also unclear if the
Equipment
UAF will gain the ability to upscale its operations and
In the initial phase of the war, U.S. and European provision
conduct large-scale offensives to retake territory.
of anti-tank and MANPAD systems appeared crucial in
For more information, see the following:
supporting UAF defense against Russian forces. As the war
has evolved, however, so have the needs and requests of the
CRS Report R47068, Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military
UAF. Ukrainian officials note that Russia has had an
and Intelligence Aspects, by Andrew S. Bowen
advantage in artillery, specifically long-range, fire. In
response, U.S. and other Western governments are sending
CRS In Focus IF11862, Ukrainian Armed Forces, by
Ukraine advanced artillery, mobile artillery, and rocket
Andrew S. Bowen
systems. Once deployed, and if properly utilized, these
CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to
systems will likely increase UAF capabilities. Observers
Ukraine, by Christina L. Arabia, Andrew S. Bowen, and
note that the UAF’s ability to repair and maintain these
Cory Welt
systems will prove decisive. Ukrainian officials also note a
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Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook
IF12150
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European
Affairs
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12150 · VERSION 1 · NEW