

 
 Legal Sidebari 
 
The Political Question Doctrine: Historical 
Background (Part 2) 
June 14, 2022 
This Legal Sidebar is the second in a six-part series that discusses the Supreme Court’s political question 
doctrine, which instructs that federal courts should forbear from resolving questions when doing so would 
require the judiciary to make policy decisions, exercise discretion beyond its competency, or encroach on 
powers the Constitution vests in the legislative or executive branches. By limiting the range of cases 
federal courts can consider, the political question doctrine is intended to maintain the separation of 
powers and recognize the roles of the legislative and executive branches in interpreting the Constitution. 
Understanding the political question doctrine may assist Members of Congress in recognizing when 
actions of Congress or the executive branch would not be subject to judicial review. For additional 
background on this topic and citations to relevant sources, please see the Constitution of the United 
States, Analysis and Interpretation. 
The political question doctrine has its origins in the foundational case for judicial review, Marbury v. 
Madison. Marbury involved a suit seeking to force Secretary of State James Madison to deliver a signed 
commission to a newly appointed official, William Marbury. The commission had been signed by the 
previous Administration but not delivered. Following the change in presidential Administrations, Madison 
refused to deliver it. Among the issues presented in that case was whether the Court even had the 
authority to adjudicate the legality of Madison’s refusal to deliver the commission. That question, 
according to Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court, turned on “the nature” of the government 
action in question. As the Court explained, “Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the 
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.” Thus, if the act of an 
official is one in which the “executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more 
perfectly clear that their acts are only politically examinable.” However, if a “specific duty is assigned by 
law, and individual rights depend on the performance of that duty,” then injured individuals have a right 
to resort to the courts. According to the Chief Justice, “[t]he power of nominating to the senate, and the 
power of appointing the person nominated” were political questions, and fundamentally unreviewable. By 
contrast, “if, for example, Mr. Marbury had taken the oaths of a magistrate, and proceeded to act as one; 
in consequence of which a suit had been instituted against him, in which his defense had depended on his 
being a magistrate, the validity of his appointment must have been determined by judicial authority.” 
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the question of whether to deliver Marbury’s commission was not a 
political one, as Marbury had a legal right in the appointment.  
Congressional Research Service 
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
LSB10757 
CRS Legal Sidebar 
Prepared for Members and  
 Committees of Congress 
 
  
 
Congressional Research Service 
2 
Although the Court in Marbury opined that it could not decide “[q]uestions[] in their nature political,” 
that case did not articulate the political question doctrine as the concept is understood today—a rule that 
deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear certain cases, including cases involving claims of 
constitutional rights. Rather, Marbury indicated only that some decisions are inherently discretionary and 
are therefore immune from judicial scrutiny because there is no enforceable legal right at stake. 
In the years following Marbury, the Court invoked the political question doctrine when deferring to the 
factual or policy determinations of the other branches in certain categories of cases. For example, the 
Court held in the 1827 case Martin v. Mott that the legality of the President’s decision to call out the 
militia in response to a supposed national emergency was beyond judicial scrutiny. Similarly, in Williams 
v. Suffolk Insurance Co., an 1839 case raising the question of who ruled the Falkland Islands, the Court 
concluded that the executive had the final word on questions of foreign sovereignty. In another case, the 
Court concluded that this deference in the realm of foreign affairs applied to the President’s authority to 
enter into treaties. In several cases from the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Court also expressed a 
willingness to defer to Congress with respect to certain legal questions. For example, the Court concluded 
that the judiciary was required to defer absolutely to congressional recognition of Indian tribes, as well as 
congressional determinations of when wars begin and when they conclude.  
In 1849, in the case Luther v. Borden, the Court expanded the political question doctrine and took another 
step toward the modern judicial approach to political questions. Luther arose out of a rebellion against the 
government of Rhode Island due to the state constitution, which significantly limited the right to vote. 
Rhode Island citizens who had become dissatisfied with the existing regime held a constitutional 
convention, called elections, and declared the winners the valid government of Rhode Island. When the 
existing “charter government” opposed these efforts and declared the conduct illegal, the newly elected 
governor of the rebel government, Thomas Dorr, gathered an armed force to assert the legitimacy of his 
government and its constitution. In response, the charter government called the militia and declared 
martial law. In the course of events, charter government agents broke into plaintiff Luther’s house in order 
to arrest him for his support of Dorr. Luther then sued for trespass. The question of the legitimacy of the 
home break-in necessarily gave rise to the question of which government—the charter government or the 
rebel government—was the legitimate government of the state at the time of the break-in. 
Luther alleged that the charter government that authorized the break-in was unconstitutional, in part 
because the voting restrictions in the Rhode Island constitution violated the U.S. Constitution’s Guarantee 
Clause, which states that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican 
Form of Government.” The Supreme Court refused to reach the question, instead concluding that the 
question of which government was lawful, and whether a government was a “republican” one, was a 
political question for Congress to decide and entirely outside the purview of the judiciary. In an opinion 
by Chief Justice Roger Taney, the Court held that courts were not institutionally competent to judge 
republicanism or governmental legitimacy because judicial standards were lacking. Further, an attempt to 
judge whether a government was legitimate could undermine other branches and ultimately cast all the 
acts of the questioned government into doubt. The Court concluded that while a court should “always be 
ready to meet any question confided to it by the Constitution, it is equally its duty not to pass beyond its 
appropriate sphere of action.” Since deciding Luther, the Court has routinely held that cases involving the 
Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable political questions.
  
Congressional Research Service 
3 
 
Author Information 
 
Joanna R. Lampe 
   
Legislative Attorney 
 
 
 
 
Disclaimer 
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff 
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of 
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of 
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. 
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United 
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, 
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the 
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. 
 
LSB10757 · VERSION 1 · NEW