INSIGHTi
Election Worker Safety and Privacy
Updated June 3, 2022
Concerns about election workers’ safety and privacy have been reported following the 2020 election, in
news reports and testimony before House and Senate committees. Some election workers have raised
concerns about physical safety while performing official duties, as well as more general threats outside
the workplace or related psychological effects. These threats, along with a perceived increase in
politically motivated job scrutiny, have led some to leave, or consider leaving, their roles.
This Insight provides a brief overview of recent developments, legislative proposals, and policy
considerations related to election worker safety and privacy.
Background
Federal law prohibits certain types of intimidation of or interference with election workers, including
intimidation to discourage serving as a poll watcher or election official or intimidation as a result of such
service (18 U.S.C. §245); interference by members of the Armed Forces with election officials’ exercise
of their duties (18 U.S.C. §593); and intimidation for helping voters register (52 U.S.C. §20511) or vote
(52 U.S.C. §§10307, 20511). Many states have laws that address other threats to election workers, such as
through privacy protections for election commissioners. More general laws—such as prohibitions against
voter intimidation (e.g. 52 U.S.C. §§10101, 10307, 20511) or harassing or threatening interstate
communications—might also apply to some conduct.
Some state and local officials have responded to recent reports of threats to election workers with
administrative action or legislative proposals. Election officials have included local law enforcement in
poll worker trainings, for example, and implemented new security measures in their offices. Bills have
been introduced in state legislatures to establish new prohibitions or protections, such as a Michigan
proposal to prohibit intimidation of election workers and a Washington State bill to extend existing
privacy protections to election officials.
Recent Federal Developments
The executive branch has taken recent actions on election worker safety and privacy concerns. On July
29, 2021, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the creation of an Election Threats Task Force
comprised of representatives of DOJ Offices, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and interagency
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partners, such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “to address the rise in threats against
election workers, administrators, officials, and others associated with the electoral process.” The U.S.
Attorney General, DOJ officials, and the Director of the FBI met with more than 1,400 election officials
on August 26, 2021, to discuss these threats. DOJ announced the first indictment and arrest related to the
Task Force on January 21, 2022.
In addition to enforcement efforts, federal agencies have provided resources or support for election
workers. For example, DOJ and the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) permit use of certain
grant funds to address threats to election workers. DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency (CISA) also offers publications and services to help election officials respond to physical and
online threats, the EAC has released a webpage and series of videos about election official security, and
the EAC’s Board of Advisors adopted a resolution condemning threats against election workers and
calling for additional agency resources to help protect them.
There has also been activity on the issue in Congress. Election administrators and other witnesses have
testified about recent threats to election workers in at least three congressional hearings: a Committee on
House Administration hearing on July 28, 2021, and Senate Committee on Rules and Administration
hearinngs on October 26, 2021, and May 19, 2022. Some Senators have also sent letters expressing
concern over the threats to election workers; requesting updates on the DOJ Task Force and making
recommendations for its work with state and local officials and election workers; and requesting EAC
guidance on resources for addressing threats.
Some bills introduced in the 117th Congress would address election worker security directly, including
through provisions that would
prohibit harassment of election workers with intent to interfere with or retaliate for
performance of official duties (H.R. 4064/S. 2155; H.R. 5746; S. 2093; S. 2747);
prohibit intimidation for the purpose of interfering with election administration duties
(H.R. 777);
prohibit physically damaging election infrastructure, with enhanced penalties for certain
types of threats and harms (H.R. 5746; H.R. 6872/S. 3142; S. 4; S. 2928);
extend a prohibition on certain types of intimidation in federal elections to intimidation
for processing ballots or tabulating, canvassing, or certifying votes (H.R. 5053/S. 2626;
H.R. 5746; S. 2747);
extend a prohibition on intimidating poll watchers and election officials to cases
involving violence or threats of harm to people or property and to election agents,
vendors, and contractors (S. 4; S. 2928);
prohibit intimidation of poll watchers, election officials, and election agents, vendors, and
contractors that involves violence or threats of harm, with enhanced penalties for certain
types of threats and harms (H.R. 5746; H.R. 6872/S. 3142);
prohibit removal or suspension of local election administrators except for specified
reasons, such as neglect of duty or malfeasance in office (H.R. 4064/S. 2155; H.R. 5746;
S. 2747);
extend or create privacy protections for election workers and their families (H.R. 4064/S.
2155; H.R. 5314; H.R. 5746; S. 2093; S. 2747); and
establish in statute a DOJ-led election officials security task force with representatives
from the FBI; the U.S. Marshals Service; CISA; the EAC; state and local prosecutors;
election officials; and election officials associations (H.R. 5314).
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Legislation has also been introduced in the 117th Congress that would authorize or appropriate funding
states might choose to use to address threats to election workers. The Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2022 (P.L. 117-103) provided funding for general improvements to the administration of federal elections,
for example, and multiple bills would authorize a grant program for recruiting and training poll workers
(H.R. 1/S. 1 /S. 2093; H.R. 2358/S. 954; H.R. 5746; S. 2747). Another bill (S. 4239) would authorize
funding states could use to recruit, train, retain, and protect election workers and prohibit use of the
funding to intimidate election workers or remove election administrators on grounds other than
negligence, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.
Potential Considerations for Congress
As noted above, states, localities, and federal agencies have taken some steps to address threats to election
workers. Congress might choose to leave any further action to federal agencies under their existing
authorities or to state and local officials.
Members might also see a role for Congress in strengthening protections—or helping states and localities
strengthen protections—for election workers. The following questions might be relevant to Members who
are considering whether or how to engage with this issue.
How might threats be addressed? Would action be aimed at addressing obstacles to
enforcement of existing laws, for example, or at helping fund security efforts or
establishing new penalties, prohibitions, or protections?
What types of threats might be addressed? Would proposed action focus on activities
affecting election workers’ physical, psychological, or economic well-being or a
combination? Would it address threats to election workers while they were conducting
their official duties, in their private lives, or both?
Who might be covered by proposed protections? Would protections apply only to
election officials or also to volunteer workers, vendors and contractors, or family
members?
Author Information
Sarah J. Eckman
Karen L. Shanton
Analyst in American National Government
Analyst in American National Government
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
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