

Updated May 25, 2022
The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV)
Background
Figure 1. The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle
The Army describes the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle
(AMPV) General Purpose Variant
(AMPV), a tracked support vehicle, as follows:
The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is
the replacement for the M113 Family of Vehicles
(FoV) within the Armored Brigade Combat Team
(ABCT), comprising approximately 30% of its
tracked vehicle fleet. Five variants are planned:
The General Purpose (Figure 1) variant
accommodates two crew, six passengers, is
reconfigurable to carry one litter, mount crew
served weapons, and integrates a variety of
communications and battle management systems.
The Mortar Carrier variant accommodates two
Source: United States Army Acquisition Support Center,
crew members, two mortar crew members, one
https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/gcs-ampv/, accessed January
mounted 120 mm mortar, 69 rounds of 120 mm
18, 2021.
ammunition, and communications and fire control
Current Program Status
systems.
The AMPV is currently produced by BAE Systems in York,
The Mission Command variant is the cornerstone
PA. On January 25, 2019, the AMPV entered the low-rate
of the Army’s ABCT Network Modernization
initial production phase (LRIP). The Army originally
Strategy. It is intended to take advantage of
planned for acquiring a total of 2,907 AMPVs, with initial
increased size, weight, power and cooling
vehicle delivery in 2020. The current AMPV program plans
technology and provide a significant increase in
to replace 2,897 M113 vehicles at the brigade and below
command, control, communications and computer
level within the ABCT. There are an additional 1,922
capability. The variant accommodates a driver and
M113s supporting non-ABCT affiliated units (referred to as
Echelons Above Brigade [EAB] units) that are not included
commander and two workstation operators, and its
in the Army’s modernization plan.
red side network provides full Tactical Command
Post capabilities at brigade and battalion levels.
The Medical Evacuation variant includes room for
Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) is a programmatic
three crew members, six ambulatory patients or four
decision made when manufacturing development is completed
litter patients or three ambulatory and two litter
and there is an ability to produce a small-quantity set of
articles. It also establishes an initial production base and sets
patients, and storage for medical equipment.
the stage for a gradual increase in the production rate to
The Medical Treatment variant includes room for
allow for Ful -Rate Production (FRP) upon completion of
four crew members, one litter patient, and a patient
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E).
treatment table.
Full-Rate Production (FRP) is a decision made that allows
for government contracting for economic production
quantities fol owing stabilization of the system design and
validation of the production process.
Testing Deficiencies and Production Problems
During a limited user test (LUT) in FY2019, the
Department of Defense (DOD) Director of Operational Test
and Evaluation (DOT&E) and the Army Test and
Evaluation Command (ATEC) identified 24 items while
testing prototype AMPVs that BAE should correct and have
evaluated during the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation
(IOT&E) by the end of 2021. Reportedly, due to BAE
production challenges and effects of the Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, BAE did not meet
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV)
the July 2020 first vehicle delivery date and was six to eight
M-113s to support Ukraine. It is not known if the M-113s
months behind the original schedule to deliver vehicles to
were taken from operational units or from other M-113s not
support AMPV IOT&E and live-fire test events. BAE
assigned to units. Furthermore, it is not known if the Biden
reportedly delivered its first LRIP AMPV to the Army on
Administration will include additional M-113s in future
August 31, 2020.
Ukraine military aid packages. Given the these
considerations, Congress might examine the potential
AMPV Reaches Low-Rate Initial Production Rates
impacts to the AMPV program in terms of readiness,
In October 2021, it was reported that monthly AMPV
program cost, and schedule resulting from current M-113
production had reached contracted levels for LRIP and the
transfers to Ukraine, as well as potential future M-113
early manufacturing troubles had subsided. Because of
transfers.
earlier delays, total AMPV production remained behind
schedule, but BAE planned to achieve full-rate production
Updated AMPV Program Plans
by the end of FY2022.
As previously noted, the 2020 AMPV production delay has
reportedly resulted in increased per vehicle costs and
Budgetary Information
slower-than-planned-for annual production quantities. If
approved AMPV acquisition quantities remain at 2,897
Table 1. FY2023 AMPV Budget Request
vehicles, there could be cost implications resulting from
Total
higher per-vehicle costs as well as a longer production and
Total Request
Request
fielding timeline needed to fully equip Active and Army
Funding Category
($M)
(Qty.)
National Guard ABCTs. Given these considerations,
RDT&E
—
—
Congress might decide to review the Army’s current
AMPV program plans to determine if an update is required.
Procurement
$380.7
72
TOTAL
$380.7
72
The Way Ahead: Upgraded M-113s at Echelons
Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
Above Brigade (EAB)
(Comptrol er)/Chief Financial Officer, Program Acquisition Cost by
As previously noted, the Army’s current modernization
Weapon System: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year
plans do not include replacing EAB M-113s with AMPVs
2023 Budget Request, April 2022, p. 3-4.
although, originally, the Army had planned to replace all
Notes: RDT&E = Research, Development, Test & Evaluation; $M =
M-113s with AMPVs. Reportedly, on May 21, 2018, the
U.S. dollars in mil ions; Qty. = FY2023 procurement quantities.
Army indefinitely postponed its plans to upgrade EAB M-
113s. Then, in January 2019, the Army reportedly decided
FY2023 AMPV Budget Request and
to cancel all EAB M-113 replacement efforts. Given the
Slowing Production
frequently changing nature of the Army’s plans for
Reportedly, by FY2024, AMPV production rates are
addressing the replacement of legacy M-113s at EAB and
planned to increase to 131 vehicles per year and to continue
the decision to cancel M-113 EAB replacement,
at that level until at least FY2027. Earlier AMPV program
policymakers might question if the Army has a clearly
planning documents issued before the 2020 production
defined “way ahead” for addressing M-113s at EAB. Will
delay had reportedly called for an annual production rate of
the Army “leave” approximately 1,900 M-113s at EAB and
190 AMPVs per year by FY2024. Supposedly, reduced
continue to maintain these Vietnam era vehicles? Will they
production rates and increased commodity prices have
be replaced by another vehicle? Or is the Army still trying
contributed to higher unit costs per vehicle. Unit price
to decide on a course of action and an overall program
increases reportedly are also attributed to strong
strategy?
inflationary pressures on commodity prices, reusable parts
supply expended from vehicles during LRIP, and
For a more detailed historical discussion of the AMPV
purchasing AMPVs at lower production rates.
Program, see CRS Report R43240, The Army’s Armored Multi-
Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress, by
Potential Issues for Congress
Andrew Feickert .
M-113s Provided to Ukraine and
AMPV Procurement
Reportedly, as of April 29, 2022, the Active Army and
Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces
Army National Guard were tasked by DOD to provide 200
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The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV)
Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11741 · VERSION 6 · UPDATED