Updated May 23, 2022
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions
For over 15 years, the United States has imposed sanctions
result, the United States has prohibited all U.S. commercial
in response to activities of the Venezuelan government and
arms sales and retransfers to Venezuela since 2006.
Venezuelan individuals. The earliest sanctions imposed
related to Venezuela’s lack of cooperation on antidrug and
In 2008, Treasury imposed financial sanctions on two
counterterrorism efforts. The Obama Administration
individuals and two travel agencies in Venezuela for
imposed targeted sanctions against individuals for human
financially supporting the radical Lebanon-based Islamic
rights abuses, corruption, and antidemocratic actions. The
Shiite group Hezbollah. Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.)
Trump Administration expanded economic sanctions in
13224, those sanctions relate to terrorist funding.
response to the increasing authoritarianism of President
Nicolás Maduro (in power since 2013).
Drug Trafficking-Related Sanctions
Since 2005, pursuant to procedures in the Foreign Relations
After recognizing Juan Guaidó, president of the
Authorization Act, FY2003 (P.L. 107-228, §706; 22 U.S.C.
democratically elected, opposition-led National Assembly,
2291j), the President has made an annual determination that
as interim president, the Trump Administration further
Venezuela has failed demonstrably to adhere to its
tightened sanctions on Venezuela’s state oil company
obligations under international narcotics agreements.
(Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., or PdVSA), central bank,
President Biden made the determination for FY2022 in
and government to pressure Maduro to leave power.
September 2021 but waived foreign aid restrictions for
programs that support the interim government.
As of May 23, 2022, the Treasury Department had imposed
sanctions on roughly 166 Venezuelan or Venezuelan-
Treasury has imposed economic sanctions on at least 22
connected individuals and the State Department had
individuals with connections to Venezuela and 27
revoked the visas of more than 1,000 individuals and their
companies by designating them as Specially Designated
families. Despite these actions, Maduro remains firmly in
Narcotics Traffickers pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics
power. While Venezuela is benefitting from high oil prices
Kingpin Designation Act (P.L. 106-120, Title VIII; 21
due to the Ukraine conflict, sanctions on Russian banks
U.S.C. 1901 et seq.). Designated individuals include current
have hurt its ability to access assets stored in those entities.
and former Venezuelan officials, such as Oil Minister
Tareck al Aissami. Should Al Aissami remain in that
The Biden Administration and the Venezuelan opposition
position, it could complicate efforts to lift oil sanctions.
are considering how potential U.S. sanctions relief could
incentivize Maduro to negotiate a path toward free and fair
Targeted Sanctions Related to Antidemocratic
elections. Rising U.S. oil prices also have put pressure on
Actions, Human Rights Violations, and Corruption
U.S. officials to find alternate sources to replace Russian
In response to increasing repression in Venezuela, Congress
oil. In 2021, Guaidó and other opposition leaders formed a
enacted the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil
Unity Platform and began negotiations with Maduro
Society Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-278; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
officials; Maduro suspended these talks in October. After a
Among its provisions, the law required the President to
March 2022 meeting with U.S. officials, Maduro released
impose sanctions against those whom the President
two detained Americans and pledged to restart negotiations
identified as responsible for significant acts of violence,
with the opposition. In mid-May 2022, the Treasury
serious human rights abuses, or antidemocratic actions.
Department reportedly slightly loosened restrictions on
Congress extended this act through 2023 in P.L. 116-94.
Chevron, the last major U.S. oil company operating in
Venezuela, to discuss future operations with PdVSA. U.S.
In March 2015, President Obama issued E.O. 13692 to
officials reportedly are considering other measures to
implement P.L. 113-278, and Treasury issued regulations in
encourage negotiations. Chevron reportedly has requested
July 2015 (31 C.F.R. Part 591). The E.O. targets (for asset
for its current Treasury license, which expires on June 1,
blocking and visa restrictions) those involved in actions or
2022, to be expanded, so Chevron could increase oil
policies undermining democratic processes or institutions;
production at its joint venture projects with PdVSA. It is
serious human rights abuses; prohibiting, limiting, or
reportedly unlikely that Treasury will do so.
penalizing freedom of expression or peaceful assembly; and
public corruption. It includes any person who is a current or
Terrorism-Related Sanctions
former leader of any entity engaged in any of those
Since 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual
activities, as well as current or former government officials.
determination that Venezuela is not “cooperating fully with
United States anti-terrorism efforts” pursuant to Section
As of January 19, 2021, Treasury had imposed financial
40A of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2781). The
sanctions on 113 Venezuelans and at least eight entities
most recent determination was made in May 2022. As a
pursuant to E.O. 13692. The targeted individuals have
included President Maduro; his wife, Cilia Flores, and son,
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Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions
Nicolás Maduro Guerra; Executive Vice President Delcy
In 2019, Treasury sanctioned a Moscow-based bank for
Rodríguez; Diosdado Cabello (Socialist party president);
helping PdVSA funnel revenue from oil sales. Treasury
eight supreme court judges; the leaders of Venezuela’s
then sanctioned Venezuela’s state-owned gold sector
army, national guard, and national police; governors; the
company, Minerven, for using illicit gold operations to
director of the central bank; and the foreign minister. In
support Maduro. In 2019, Treasury also sanctioned
May 2019, Treasury lifted sanctions against the former
Venezuela’s central bank and several shipping companies
head of Venezuela’s intelligence service, General Manuel
and vessels that transported oil to Cuba and Cuba’s state-
Cristopher Figuera, who broke ranks with Maduro.
run oil import/export company.
Additional Financial Sanctions
In 2020, Treasury began to sanction individuals, companies,
President Trump imposed additional financial sanctions on
and shipping companies for transporting Venezuelan oil in
Venezuela because of the government’s human rights
violation of sanctions. Treasury imposed sanctions on two
abuses and antidemocratic actions. In August 2017, he
subsidiaries of Russia’s state-controlled oil and gas
issued E.O. 13808, which prohibited access to U.S.
company, Rosneft, and sanctioned four foreign shipping
financial markets by the Venezuelan government, including
companies for transporting Venezuelan oil. In June 2020
PdVSA, with certain exceptions to minimize the impact on
and January 2021, Treasury sanctioned individuals,
the Venezuelan people and U.S. interests. In March 2018,
companies, and vessels for sanctions evasion.
President Trump issued E.O. 13827 to prohibit transactions
involving the Venezuelan government’s issuance of digital
Sanctions on the Maduro Government
currency, coin, or token. In May 2018, President Trump
In August 2019, President Trump issued E.O. 13884,
issued E.O. 13835, which prohibited transactions related to
blocking (freezing) the property and interests of the Maduro
purchasing Venezuelan debt, including accounts receivable,
government in the United States and within the control of
and any debt owed to Venezuela pledged as collateral.
U.S. persons. The order prohibited U.S. persons from
engaging in transactions with the Maduro government
Broader Sectoral Sanctions
unless authorized by OFAC. E.O. 13884 also authorized
On November 1, 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13850.
financial sanctions and visa restrictions on non-U.S.
This E.O. set forth a framework to block the assets of, and
persons that assist or support the Maduro government,
prohibit certain transactions with, any person determined by
including foreign energy companies working with PdVSA.
the Secretary of the Treasury to operate in sectors of the
Five individuals and several vessels and aircraft have been
economy or to engage in corrupt transactions with the
sanctioned under E.O. 13884. To allow assistance to the
Maduro government. Some 26 individuals have been
Venezuelan people, OFAC issued licenses authorizing
sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 13850, including people and
transactions involving the delivery of food, agricultural
entities involved in a currency manipulation scheme; those
commodities, and medicine; remittances; international
who siphoned hundreds of millions of dollars from an
organizations; and communications services.
emergency food aid system; and those who have helped
Maduro and PdVSA evade oil sanctions.
Policy Considerations
Congress has maintained bipartisan support for a negotiated
On January 28, 2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, Treasury
solution to the crisis in Venezuela that would pave the way
designated PdVSA as operating in the oil sector of the
for free and fair presidential and legislative elections. In
Venezuelan economy and the Secretary of the Treasury
December 2019, Congress enacted P.L. 116-94, which
determined the company was subject to U.S. sanctions. As a
included provisions from the VERDAD Act (S. 1025). The
result, all property and interests in property of PdVSA
law extended sanctions regarding corruption and
subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and U.S. persons
undemocratic actions through 2023 and stated that U.S.
(companies or individuals) generally are prohibited from
policy supports “diplomatic engagement in order to
engaging in transactions with the company.
advance a negotiated and peaceful solution” to the crisis in
Venezuela.
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has
issued general licenses to allow certain transactions and
Although some in Congress support continued pressure on
activities related to PdVSA and its U.S. subsidiaries. OFAC
the Maduro government, others favor a more targeted
first authorized transactions with U.S.-based PdVSA
approach, arguing that broad sanctions have hurt the
subsidiaries, PDV Holding, Inc. (PDVH) and CITGO
Venezuelan people. A February 2021 Government
Holding, Inc, through July 2019. OFAC extended that
Accountability Office report found U.S. sanctions had
authorization through February 2021. OFAC authorized
worsened Venezuela’s economic decline and hindered some
PDVH, CITGO, and other U.S. companies to import
humanitarian aid delivery. Similarly, some in Congress
petroleum from PdVSA through April 2019, but payments
support U.S. talks with Maduro as rising gas prices have
had to be made to a blocked U.S. account. OFAC initially
created pressure for sanctions relief. Others have introduced
authorized U.S. companies working in Venezuela with
legislation that would prohibit U.S. imports of Venezuelan
PdVSA (including Chevron) to operate through July 2019.
oil (H.R. 6942; H.R. 7012; H.R. 7023; H.R. 7207; S. 3798).
An amended license allows only transactions necessary for
Also see U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Venezuela-
the maintenance of “essential operations” through June 1,
Related Sanctions,” at https://home.treasury.gov/policy-
2022. It is reportedly unlikely that Treasury will expand the
issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-
license as much as Chevron has reportedly requested.
information/venezuela-related-sanctions.
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions

Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Affairs
IF10715


Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10715 · VERSION 36 · UPDATED

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