Updated May 23, 2022
Crisis in Mali
Once seen as a regional democratic leader, Mali has
Figure 1. Mali at a Glance
become an epicenter of conflict and instability over the past
decade. A military junta ousted an elected president in
2020, then overthrew civilian transitional leaders the
following year. Colonel Assimi Goïta now serves as
“Transition President” and populist politician Choguel
Maïga as prime minister. The junta has engaged in an
increasingly bitter confrontation with former colonial power
France—which has led counterterrorism operations in Mali
since 2013—and with other leaders in the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), who have
imposed sanctions in response to Mali’s failure to adhere to
a previously agreed election timeline.
Local insurgent groups affiliated with Al Qaeda and the
Islamic State are active across central and northern Mali.
Other rebel groups, communal militias, and criminal bands
are also active, some with apparent state backing. A 2015

peace deal between Bamako and northern separatist rebels
Source: CRS graphic. Data from CIA World Factbook, IMF.
has not been fully implemented. Insurgents, state security
forces, allied militias, and private military contractors
Background. Mali has been in crisis since 2012, when a
(PMCs) have been implicated in massacres and other
northern separatist rebellion sparked a military coup and an
abuses. Conflict-affected areas are experiencing crisis-level
Islamist insurgent advance. The military collapsed in the
food insecurity in 2022; overall, Mali has one of the
north, where rebels—bolstered by arms from Libya and by
world’s highest rates of acute malnutrition, while global
fighters with ties to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
food and fuel price spikes pose additional burdens. The
(AQIM, an Algerian-led regional network)—declared an
COVID-19 pandemic has compounded hardships.
independent state. By mid-2012, AQIM and two allied local
groups had outmaneuvered the separatists to assert control
While these challenges endure, international stabilization
over much of the north. At Bamako’s request, France
efforts in Mali appear to be at an inflexion point. In late
intervened in early 2013 to oust Islamist armed groups from
2021, the Malian junta reportedly contracted with the
major towns in the north. State personnel returned to some
Wagner group, a U.S.-sanctioned Russian private military
areas, while separatist rebels and other factions reasserted
company (PMC), to aid counterinsurgency operations. In
control in others. The U.N. Security Council established
early 2022, amid rising friction over the scope of French
MINUSMA in mid-2013 to help stabilize the country.
operations, Wagner’s role, and other issues, France and the
Veteran politician Ibrahim Boubacar Kéïta was elected
European Union (EU) announced they would withdraw
president later that year, and donors, including the United
their military forces from Mali, including over 2,000 French
States, normalized relations with Bamako. French forces
troops and hundreds of EU advisors and trainers. Some are
transitioned into Operation Barkhane, a regional
expected to relocate to neighboring countries. Mali then
counterterrorism mission, in 2014.
announced it was withdrawing from defense accords with
France that have underpinned France’s operations in Mali
Under international pressure to reach a peace deal in the
and cooperation with its military. In alleged violation of
north, President Kéïta’s government signed an accord in
Mali’s status-of-forces agreement with the United Nations,
2015 with two armed coalitions: one led by ex-separatists,
the junta has also increasingly restricted access and flights
and the other by pro-unity groups with ties to Bamako.
by the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Mali (MINUSMA),
Mediated by Algeria with international backing, the accord
raising questions about the mission’s future.
aimed to address northern political grievances, reestablish
state authority, demobilize rebel fighters, promote
The United States and other donors have supported efforts
development in the north, and isolate designated terrorist
by a “joint force” of the G5 Sahel (Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
groups, which were not party to the talks.
Burkina Faso, and Chad) to tackle regional threats, but the
force has struggled with gaps in capacity and commitment,
Implementation lagged, however, while conflicts multiplied
and the recent coups in Mali and Burkina Faso (in 2022)
and spread to new areas—notably central Mali. New armed
have sapped its cohesion. In May 2022, Mali stated it would
factions have emerged. State officials remain absent from
withdraw from the G5 Sahel. The U.N. Secretary-General
much of the north and center, while signatory armed groups
has proposed replacing MINUSMA with an African Union
maintain parallel administrations in some areas. Kéïta’s
force, but prospects for such a force to materialize and
administration reportedly obstructed the peace process,
overcome the problems facing the G5 are uncertain.
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Crisis in Mali
while signatory armed groups have been implicated in drug
be hurting Mali’s economy, as well as other member states
trafficking, ethnic violence, and humanitarian aid diversion.
reliant on cross-border trade. Blaming ECOWAS, Bamako
defaulted on a scheduled debt repayment in February 2022.
President Kéïta was reelected in 2018, but opposition
mounted over allegedly fraudulent legislative elections,
U.N. Peacekeeping Operation
corruption, insecurity, and economic hardships. In mid-
MINUSMA is mandated to prioritize implementation of the
2020, a loose coalition of politicians, civil society actors,
2015 peace accord, followed by support for stabilizing
and supporters of a prominent Bamako religious leader held
central Mali, then civilian protection and other tasks. While
large protests. State security forces cracked down on the
not authorized to pursue counterterrorism operations,
protests, while ECOWAS mediators did not achieve a road-
MINUSMA may provide reimbursed logistical support to
map out of the impasse. The 2020 coup d’état followed.
G5 Sahel forces. As of March 2022, eight U.S. staff officers
Criminal proceedings against the coup leader of 2012,
were serving in MINUSMA. The mission’s mandate is up
Captain Amadou Sanogo, were subsequently dropped.
for renewal in June 2022. MINUSMA is among the
Military Rule and an Uncertain Transition
deadliest and most logistically challenging operations for
U.N. peacekeepers. Some European troop contributors are
While the junta has struggled to improve security and
reportedly weighing their continued participation amid the
economic conditions, its leaders appear to have drawn
drawdown of French forces (which provided medical and
popular support from their face-off with France and
casualty evacuations and intelligence sharing) and
ECOWAS. Human rights groups have also accused the
competing security priorities in Europe.
junta of intimidating and repressing critics and journalists,
and have attributed extrajudicial killings and other abuses to
U.S. Policy and Aid
members of the military and associated PMCs. The
The State Department characterizes U.S.-Mali relations as
government has also banned two French-funded global
“based on shared goals of improving stability and reducing
broadcasters. Officials claimed to have foiled a Western-
poverty.” The Biden Administration has called for swift
backed coup in May 2022.
democratic elections and expressed support for ECOWAS’s
leadership and sanctions, albeit without applying analogous
The junta agreed to hold elections by February 2022 during
U.S. measures against the junta. U.S. officials have assailed
initial negotiations with ECOWAS in 2020. In late 2021,
Mali’s decision to contract with the Wagner Group and
however, officials proposed extending the transition period
criticized constraints on MINUSMA’s mobility and access.
for up to five more years. In response, ECOWAS—having
President Biden has pledged ongoing U.S. military support
previously designated junta members for sanctions—
for French-led regional counterterrorism operations, which
imposed broad economic sanctions on Mali, closing their
are expected to continue in neighboring countries. A U.S.
borders with the country, banning commercial transactions
service member was injured in Mali in January 2022,
(exempting essential goods and medications), and freezing
Mali’s sovereign assets held in ECOWAS bank
reportedly while providing such support.
s. (Two of
Mali’s neighbors, Mauritania and Algeria, are not in
Following the 2020 coup, the United States suspended
ECOWAS, while Guinea, which had a coup in 2021, has
certain aid to the government pursuant to a provision in
pledged not to apply the sanctions.) Mali and ECOWAS
annual aid appropriations legislation (§7008, “coups
have since been unable to agree on an electoral timeline.
d’etat”). The prohibition primarily affects military aid and
certain economic aid implemented through state entities;
Russian Presence. Wagner’s reported entry into Mali has
fueled U.S. and European concerns about Russia’s
humanitarian, democracy, and internal security programs
regional
are exempt or authorized to continue “notwithstanding”
influence and the role of unaccountable Russian PMC
restrictions. Mali’s designation under the Child Soldiers
forces in regional conflicts. Street protests increasingly
Prevention Act of 2008 (CSPA, Title IV of P.L. 110-457)
feature pro-Russia, anti-France, and anti-U.N. messages.
has also triggered security assistance restrictions.
U.S. officials suggest that Russia may be following a
similar playbook as in the Central African Republic, where
The United States allocated $139 million in bilateral aid for
Russian PMCs have reportedly led counterinsurgency
Mali in FY2021 (latest available), focusing on health,
operations, provided personal protection to top officials,
education, and agriculture. The Administration has
engaged in human rights abuses, obtained natural resource
proposed $134 million for Mali in FY2023. The United
contracts, and fueled disinformation.
States provided an additional $83 million in humanitarian
Economic and Humanitarian Conditions
aid for Mali in FY2021, along with $346 million toward
MINUSMA’s budget. Funds also have been allocated for
Landlocked and arid with high population growth, Mali is
among the world’s poorest countries. Conflict,
Mali under U.S. regional and global aid initiatives,
insecurity,
including COVID-19 relief and the State Department-led
and the COVID-19 pandemic have further hindered
Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership.
development and humanitarian relief. As of early 2022,
U.N. agencies estimated that some 7.5 million Malians (one
In line with U.N. Security Council actions, the United
in three) were in need of humanitarian assistance; nearly
States has designated five non-government individuals for
363,000 Malians were displaced internally and nearly
financial and travel sanctions under Executive Order 13882
163,000 more were refugees. Gold and cotton exports are
(2019), pertaining to Mali. Other Malian individuals and
the backbone of the formal economy, though most of the
groups are subject to U.S. and U.N. terrorism sanctions.
labor force is engaged in farming, livestock herding, and/or
fishing. The economy shrank by 1% in 2020 before
Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs
rebounding to 3% growth in 2021, a rate unlikely to
IF10116
outpace population growth. ECOWAS sanctions appear to
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Crisis in Mali


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10116 · VERSION 16 · UPDATED

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