Updated May 18, 2022
Iraq and U.S. Policy
Government Formation Impasse Persists against risks to Iraq’s stability posed by the persistence of
Iraq held a national election on October 10, 2021, with
patronage politics, corruption, oil dependence, and armed
voters selecting 329 members for the unicameral
non-state actors.
legislature, the Council of Representatives (COR). The
Challenges Await New Government
COR elects Iraq’s president and approves the prime
minister’s program and cabinet nominees.
Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi remains as a caretaker,
Negotiations
but observers do not expect he will serve a second term. His
among Iraqi political groups since the election have sought
term began in May 2020, after months of political deadlock
to identify the new COR’s “largest bloc,” which under
Iraq’s constitution
following his predecessor’s protestor-demanded resignation
nominates the president who would then
in late 2019. Negotiations leading to Kadhimi’s nomination
designate a prime minister tasked with proposing a cabinet.
occurred during a period of escalating U.S.-Iran tensions in
This ruling party or coalition may or may not include the
Iraq. Attacks by Iran-backed groups targeting U.S. and
coalition or party that actually won the most COR seats. An
Coalition forces—and their Iraqi hosts—continue and have
impasse between competing blocs has delayed the COR’s
tested Prime Minister Al Kadhimi throughout his tenure.
selection of the president since January 2022.
Figure 1. Iraq
Iraq adopted a new electoral law for the 2021 election based
on individual candidacy and local districts, creating new
political opportunities for independents and members of the
protest movement that brought down the government
formed after the 2018 election. Independents and grassroots
candidates won 43 seats in the 2021 election, but
established political forces predominate. Newcomers have
faced unique pressures during the post-election talks, and
several have aligned since with parties or coalitions.
Intra-Shia rivalries have defined post-election politics.
Supporters of Shia cleric Muqtada Al Sadr won 73 of the
329 seats, the most by a single movement. Sadr, long a
critic of the United States and a rival of other Iraqi Shia
leaders with closer ties to Iran, has called for “the formation
of a government of national majority that is neither Eastern
nor Western.” He has been joined by the Taqaddum
(Progress) movement of COR Speaker Mohammed al
Halbousi (37 seats) and other Sunnis, the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) (31 seats), and others. Through
April, their bloc had attempted unsuccessfully to achieve a

required two-thirds quorum for the selection of the
Sources: CRS, using ESRI and U.S. State Department data.
president. Former prime minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of
Law bloc (33 seats), the pro-Iran Fatah (Conquest) coalition
The Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL) group’s control of
(17 seats), and other mostly Shia parties anchor the rival
territory in Iraq ended in 2017, creating space for Iraqis to
bloc to Sadr’s. They seek the formation of a Shia-led
seek more accountable governance, improved service
coalition government that will preserve their influence and
delivery, an end to corruption, and greater economic
interests under the prevailing elite consensus-based system.
opportunity. These demands drove mass protests in 2019
and 2020 that subsided as the Coronavirus Disease-2019
It remains to be seen whether the election result and
(COVID-19) pandemic spread, but resurged in May 2021
formation talks will reduce the formal influence of Iran-
with demonstrators insisting that the government identify
aligned groups who seek to revise or rescind Iraq’s
and prosecute suspects in a series of assassinations and
invitation to U.S. military advisors to remain in Iraq. A
kidnappings of protest leaders, activists, and others. The
compromise coalition government could emerge that
state’s use of force to contain and disperse protests and the
includes or reflects the interests of Iran-backed groups
impunity surrounding violence against activists has
alongside their rivals. Such a government could lower the
intensified public scrutiny of the government’s ability to act
risk of political violence, but also may make systemic
against armed groups operating outside state control.
reforms less likely.
Continued dependence on oil revenues and expansive state
In assessing the government that emerges in Iraq, Congress
liabilities left Iraq vulnerable to financial collapse in 2020,
and the Biden Administration may weigh the benefits of
as the systemic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic
continued security cooperation and other bilateral ties
exacerbated underlying economic and fiscal challenges. Oil
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

Iraq and U.S. Policy
prices in 2022 have been higher than expected, though the
subsequent convictions and sentencing of individuals
International Monetary Fund (IMF) reports Iraq’s non-oil
reporting on corruption and protests among Kurds.
sector growth has slowed. The IMF describes the improved
In February 2022, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court found the
fiscal picture as an opportunity for change and has
recommended “civil service reform
KRG’s oil and gas sector law unconstitutional. A series of
… and containing the
attacks without definitive attribution have targeted energy
wage bill, reducing inefficient energy subsidies,
infrastructure in the Kurdistan region in 2022.
diversifying fiscal revenues, stemming losses in the
electricity sector, [and] strengthening governance.” All of
Partnership with the United States
these efforts could prove politically sensitive. The Biden
After a two-year bilateral strategic dialogue, U.S. and Iraqi
Administration renewed a sanctions waiver on specific Iraqi
leaders agreed in July 2021 on the transition of the U.S.
energy purchases from Iran in March 2022; Iraq withholds
military presence in Iraq to a non-combat advisory mission.
the proceeds in accordance with the waiver.
In December 2021, U.S. and Iraqi officials confirmed
Islamic State Remnants and Militias Pose Threats
that all U.S. military personnel with a combat role
Iraqi forces continue to combat remaining Islamic State
have been withdrawn from Iraq, with an undisclosed
insurgents, who retain an ability to operate in rural areas,
number remaining at the invitation of the Iraqi
especially in under-secured, disputed territories between the
government with “a mission limited to advising,
Kurdistan region and areas to the south secured by national
assisting and enabling the Iraqi Security Forces to
government forces. In February 2022, U.S. officials
ensure ISIS can never resurge.”
reported that IS fighters in Iraq had “a larger presence and
greater capability” than their IS counterparts in Syria.
U.S. assessments note that Iraq’s security forces depend on
In 2019, Iran-backed groups expanded attacks on U.S.
coalition support for some operations. Congress has
targets, and in 2020, a U.S. strike in Iraq killed Iranian
authorized U.S. train and equip programs for Iraq through
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force
December 2022, and appropriated funds available through
Commander Qassem Soleimani and Iraqi Popular
September 2023, including aid to KRG forces subject to the
Mobilization Forces (PMF) leader Abu Mahdi al Muhandis.
Iraqi government’s approval. Since 2014, Congress has
Iran retaliated with attacks on Iraqi sites hosting U.S.
appropriated more than $7.4 billion for train and equip
forces. Intermittent rocket, drone, and improvised explosive
programs for Iraqis. The Administration’s FY2023 defense
device (IED) attacks continue against U.S. and Iraqi targets.
request seeks an additional $358 million, including funds
COVID-19 and Iraq
for aid to the Iraqi military, Counter Terrorism Service, and
Iraq’s public and private health systems have significant
selected Ministry of Interior forces, and $265 million for
shortcomings and limited capacity. Data is incomplete, but
KRG Peshmerga stipends, sustainment, and equipment. Iraq
as of May 18, Iraq had recorded more than 2.3 million
also began receiving aid through the Department of Defense
COVID-19 cases with more than 25,200 deaths. Iraq’s total
Global Train and Equip (10 U.S.C. §333) program in 2021.
population is more than 41 million people; caseloads are
Since March 2020, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad has
likely underestimated due to limited testing. As of
operated under ordered departure rules because of “security
November 2021, the United States had provided more than
conditions and restricted travel options as a result of the
$60 million to support the COVID-19 response in Iraq. Iraq
COVID-19 pandemic.” The U.S. Consulate in Erbil remains
has received more than 500,000 U.S. vaccine doses among
open; the State Department suspended operations at the
more than 6 million doses received through the COVAX
U.S. Consulate in the southern city of Basrah in 2018. The
initiative and others. As of May 2022, more than 18 million
Biden Administration is requesting $743.3 million in
vaccine doses had been administered in Iraq.
worldwide security protection funds for Iraq in FY2023.
Views from the Kurdistan Region
U.S. aid in Iraq supports de-mining, public sector financial
The United States partners with the Kurdistan Regional
management reform, U.N.-coordinated stabilization, and
Government (KRG) of Iraq and supports the federal
other goals. The U.S. government has obligated more than
region’s efforts to resolve differences with the national
$405 million for stabilization of liberated areas since 2016,
government over oil production, the budget, disputed
including funds for religious and ethnic minority
territories, and security. Following a 2017 KRG-sponsored
communities. Congress allocated $448.5 million for U.S.
independence referendum, the national government
aid programs in Iraq in FY2022. President Biden is
reasserted control over some disputed territories and has
maintained conditions on the transfer of funds to the KRG,
requesting $355.3 million for FY2023, including $100
contributing to the KRG’s fiscal strains.
million less in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) aid. The
United States has provided more than $294.8 million in
The Erbil-based Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the
humanitarian aid for Iraq in FY2021 and FY2022. Nearly
Suleimaniyah-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
1.2 million Iraqis are internally displaced and more than 1.4
are the largest Kurdish parties in the COR and won the
million have returned to areas labelled “hotspots.” Social
most seats in the KRG’s 2018 regional election. KDP leader
discord, a lack of services, and poverty complicate returns.
Masrour Barzani serves as KRG Prime Minister. His cousin
Nechirvan Barzani is KRG President. Factional struggles in
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
the PUK’s leading Talibani family may affect prospects for
Affairs
the party’s relations with the KDP and parties in Baghdad.
Human rights in the Kurdistan region have come under
IF10404
international scrutiny since the October 2020 arrests and
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

Iraq and U.S. Policy


Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10404 · VERSION 37 · UPDATED

---