Updated May 16, 2022
The “Quad”: Security Cooperation Among the United States,
Japan, India, and Australia
Overview
countries, or open its membership to other countries? Is it
The Biden Administration has boosted the profile of the
durable as a framework even in the face of leadership
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, aka “the Quad,” as a
changes in member countries? Will India remain committed
centerpiece of its Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at
to the group? Can the Quad be effective without a strong
strengthening the United States’ position in and
economic pillar to counter China’s dominance in regional
commitment to the region. The four-country coalition,
trade agreements? These questions may be of critical
comprised of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia,
importance to Congress given its oversight responsibilities,
claims a common platform of protecting freedom of
interest in security alliances, and growing concern about
navigation and promoting democratic values in the region.
China’s power and influence in the Indo-Pacific.
The first leader-level summit, held virtually in March 2021,
produced the first-ever joint leaders’ statement. In
Security Cooperation
September 2021, the four leaders met in person and
The annual Malabar naval exercises have emerged as a
released an expanded statement that outlined four broad
platform for Quad security cooperation. The exercises,
areas of cooperation: vaccine production and distribution;
originally bilateral between the United States and India,
climate change mitigation efforts and clean energy
later added Japan as a permanent member in 2015, and
development; the promotion of transparency and high-
since 2020 have included Australia as well. U.S. Defense
standard governance in the field of critical and emerging
officials say the exercise could be a potent war-fighting
technologies; and the development of a regional
exercise that deepens trust and interoperability among the
infrastructure partnership. Working groups in these areas
four militaries in the air and sea domains. All four militaries
are pushing forward with efforts to flesh out these priorities.
operate compatible anti-submarine warfare systems, making
that a promising area of cooperation.
Since Biden took office, the Quad has focused on areas
outside of hard security, but concerns about China’s
In addition to Malabar, Quad countries are increasing
growing influence and military assertiveness appears to
bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral exercises with one
underlie motivations for the framework. The September
another that may accelerate the ability of the four countries
2021 joint statement—while not explicitly referencing
to build integrated capabilities. Examples of these exercises
China—addressed the concern, reading, “we recommit to
include but are not limited to the India-Australia biennial
promoting the free, open, rules-based order, rooted
AUSINDEX naval exercise, the Japan-India JIMEX
in international law and undaunted by coercion, to bolster
exercise in the North Arabian Sea, and the large multilateral
security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.”
biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) maritime warfare
exercise, which includes all four countries. As U.S. treaty
When the partners first held a series of Quad meetings in
allies, Australia and Japan regularly hold large-scale
2007, China denounced them as an attempt to encircle it.
exercises with the U.S. military.
The effort dissipated amidst member leadership transitions,
concerns about economic repercussions from China, and
Criticisms of the Quad
attention to other national interests. The effort to revitalize
Critics have pointed to questions about the group’s inability
the group, begun in 2017 and accelerated since 2020, is
to speak with one voice on regional issues, absence of
bringing similar accusations from Beijing, crystallizing the
collaborative democracy promotion efforts, dearth of joint
geopolitical and economic risks for the Quad partners.
military operations, and lack of institutional structure as
China is among the top three trading partners for all four
limits on its effectiveness. In the past, India and Australia
countries, which are reliant on Chinese supply chains.
have expressed wariness of provoking China and cornering
it into a defensive posture. Despite Japan’s acute sense of
For Japan, Australia, and India, alarm about China’s
threat from China, it has looked to stabilize relations with
intentions may be coupled with a perception that U.S.
Beijing. All three may be hard-pressed to maintain a
influence in the region is waning. Tokyo, Canberra, and
balance between advancing Quad cooperation and
New Delhi may be motivated to promote the Quad as a way
maintaining ties to China, given that further Quad-based
to keep America engaged in the region.
initiatives are likely to come under more withering criticism
from Beijing.
Questions remain about how the Quad defines itself and its
goals. Will the partners maintain Quad cohesiveness despite
The exclusion of other regional countries and the potential
their different responses to the war in Ukraine or other
marginalization of traditional bilateral alliances also draws
geopolitical shifts? Does it compete or complement other
criticism. U.S. treaty ally South Korea is not in the Quad,
regional groupings? Will it remain limited to the four
despite being a democracy with maritime interests and
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The “Quad”: Security Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia
growing naval capabilities. New President Yoon Suk-yeol
Australia and Japan have solidified security and economic
has indicated he would like to work with the Quad’s
ties with a series of bilateral agreements. In June 2020,
working groups. While the United States professes to
Prime Minister Scott Morrison and Prime Minister
support Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Narendra Modi of India signed a Mutual Logistics Sharing
centrality in regional multilateral efforts, member countries’
Agreement and announced the elevation of their bilateral
varied capabilities and views of China may make ASEAN
ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
members hesitant to cooperate with the Quad.
India’s Motivations
Japan’s Role
Delhi’s traditional pursuit of “strategic autonomy” in
Japan has led recent efforts to invigorate the quadrilateral
foreign affairs has led to an aversion to international
arrangement, with former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in
alliances and wariness toward formalized multilateral
particular championing the concept. Japan’s eagerness to
engagements. India is the only Quad member operating
pursue the Quad appears driven above all by its concern
outside of the U.S.-led security alliance system and the only
over China’s increasing power, influence, and assertiveness
to share a land border with China, although the two have no
in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as its own territorial
direct maritime disputes. Delhi’s skepticism about U.S.
disputes and history of conflict with China. Japan is anxious
strategic intent in Asia lingers, and many analysts cast
to establish a regional order that is not defined by China’s
doubt on India’s ability to be a net-provider of security in
economic, geographic, and strategic dominance.
the broad Indo-Pacific region. India’s neutrality on the war
in Ukraine—Russia is a decades-old “strategic partner” to
While the U.S. alliance remains fundamental to its security,
India—makes it an outlier among Quad members, leading
Japan has worked steadily to build closer security ties with
to questions about Delhi’s commitment to the values of
both Australia and India. For the past decade Japan has
territorial integrity and rules-based order that are
deepened defense relations with Australia, and the two
fundamental to the Quad’s conception. These factors led
concluded a Reciprocal Access Agreement (similar to a
some observers label India the “weak link” of the Quad.
Status of Forces Agreement) to define rules and procedures
for visiting troops. As another U.S. treaty ally, Australia
Still, Indian leaders identify China as their primary security
uses similar practices and equipment, which may make
challenge, and relations became more acrimonious after
cooperation with Japan more accessible. Japan has inked an
Indian and Chinese troops clashed along their shared (and
Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement with India,
disputed) frontier in 2020. Two years later, that military
along with agreements concerning the protection of
standoff continues, and Delhi has become more enthusiastic
classified military information and transfer of defense
in joining with external actors to balance against Chinese
equipment and technology. Bilateral exercises with both
“transgressions.” Ongoing Chinese economic and military
countries have grown in number and sophistication.
support for India’s traditional rival, Pakistan, increased
Chinese naval deployments to India’s region, and major
Australia’s Evolving Strategic Posture
Chinese infrastructure investment along India’s periphery
Australia views the Quad as a key pillar of its Indo-Pacific
undergird Delhi’s concerns. India has rejected participation
agenda and a key diplomatic network that complements its
in both Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative and the Regional
other bilateral, regional and multilateral relationships. To
Comprehensive Economic Partnership in apparent
some Australians, the context for the Quad is best
resistance to a China-led Asia order.
understood as being “about the values, norms, rules and
standards that should shape the future” as well as being
India’s strategic partnerships with other Quad members
about securing economic, military, and technological
have deepened significantly in recent years. Major defense
advantage.
purchases from the United States include heavy lift aircraft
and anti-submarine warfare platforms, and 2020 saw the
Australia and the United States also cooperate through the
conclusion of the fourth and final “foundational” U.S.-India
Five Eyes intelligence group, which includes Canada, New
pact to deepen security relations and facilitate defense
Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The 2021 Australia,
trade. India also has inked logistics support and base access
United Kingdom, United States (AUKUS) pact will give
agreements with both Japan and Australia. However, many
Australia access to U.S. and U.K. nuclear propulsion
Indians remain uncertain about how the Quad mechanism
technology for its new fleet of submarines as well as access
will fit into India’s regional strategy. India is likely to
to other weapons systems and military capabilities.
continue moderating the pace at which the grouping
operationalizes its initiatives, particularly in security goals.
Australia is updating its national security posture, including
its relations with allies and partners, in large part because
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Coordinator, Specialist in Asian
relations with Beijing continue to deteriorate due to China’s
Affairs
use of coercive statecraft in an effort to expand its influence
K. Alan Kronstadt, Specialist in South Asian Affairs
in Australia. Australia is concerned about China’s recent
Bruce Vaughn, Specialist in Asian Affairs
security pact with the Solomon Islands, which some fear
will open the way for a PRC military presence in the South
IF11678
Pacific. Australia has responded to growing geopolitical
uncertainty by passing foreign interference legislation,
expanding diplomatic ties, and increasing its defense
budget, with plans to expand the size of its military.
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The “Quad”: Security Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia


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