Updated May 13, 2022
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Cuban Political and Economic Developments
bystanders. Hundreds of the July 11 protestors have been
Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a
tried and convicted, with more than 120 to date receiving
government that has sharply restricted freedoms of
sentences of more than 10 years. As of early May 2022, the
expression, association, assembly, and other basic human
human rights group Cuban Prisoners Defenders (CPD)
rights since the early years of the 1959 Cuban revolution.
reported that Cuba had 1,015 political prisoners (up from
152 on July 1, 2021), of which 776 were imprisoned and
Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro as president in
considered prisoners of conscience by CPD, 209 were
2018 and as head of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) at
under some form of conditional release, and 30 were
its eighth party congress in April 2021. The departure of
imprisoned for other politically motivated acts.
Castro and other older leaders from the PCC’s Politburo
reflects the generational change in Cuban leadership that
U.S. Policy
began several years ago. While in power (2006-2018), Raúl
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
Castro (who succeeded his brother, longtime leader Fidel
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
Castro) began to move Cuba toward a mixed economy with
toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at
a stronger private sector, but his government’s slow,
isolating the Cuban government. In late 2014, the Obama
gradualist approach did not produce major improvements.
Administration initiated a policy shift away from sanctions
Cuba adopted a new constitution in 2019 that introduced
and toward engagement and the normalization of relations.
some reforms but maintained the state’s dominance over the
Changes included the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a
economy and the PCC’s predominant political role.
state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015); the
restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015); and an
The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by the economic
easing of restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
shutdown associated with the Coronavirus Disease 2019
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
(COVID-19) pandemic; Venezuela’s economic crisis,
(2015-2016). The restoration of relations led to increased
which has reduced Venezuelan financial support; and U.S.
government-to-government engagement, with over 20
economic sanctions. The Cuban government reports the
bilateral agreements and numerous dialogues.
economy contracted almost 11% in 2020 and estimates 2%
growth in 2021. Some economists estimate virtually no
President Trump unveiled his Administration’s Cuba policy
growth in 2021 but project over 3% growth in 2022. This
in 2017, issuing a national security presidential
forecast could change due to the impact of Russia’s
memorandum that introduced new sanctions, including
invasion of Ukraine on the global economy and on Russia’s
restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by
economic linkages with Cuba. In early 2021, Cuba unified
the Cuban military. By 2019, the Trump Administration had
its dual currency system; the long-debated reform spurred
largely abandoned engagement and significantly increased
inflation, with some estimates from 300% to 500% in 2021. sanctions, particularly on travel and remittances, to pressure
Cuba on human rights and for its support of the Venezuelan
Cuba’s public health response to the pandemic initially kept
government of Nicolás Maduro.
cases and deaths low, but both increased in late 2020 and
surged until August 2021. The country experienced another
In its initial months, the Biden Administration announced it
surge in cases in January 2022 due to the Omicron variant,
was conducting a review of policy toward Cuba. The White
but deaths remained low because of high vaccination rates.
House press secretary said in March 2021 that the
As of May 12, 2022, Cuba reported 8,529 deaths since the
Administration would make human rights a core pillar of
pandemic began (with one of the lowest mortality rates in
policy and would review policy decisions made in the prior
the hemisphere) and had fully vaccinated almost 88% of its
Administration, including the decision to designate Cuba as
population with its own COVID-19 vaccines.
a state sponsor of terrorism.
Increased Repression. Beginning in November 2020, the
In the aftermath of the Cuban government’s harsh response
government cracked down on the San Isidro Movement
to the July 11 protests, President Biden and other
(MSI), a civil society group opposed to restrictions on
Administration officials expressed solidarity with the
artistic expression. On July 11, 2021, anti-government
protesters and criticized the government’s repression. In
demonstrations broke out in Havana and cities and towns
July and August 2021, the Treasury Department imposed
throughout the country, with thousands of Cubans
four rounds of targeted financial sanctions on Cuban
protesting economic conditions (food and medicine
security entities and officials involved in actions to suppress
shortages, blackouts) and long-standing concerns about the
the protests. In November 2021 and January 2022, the State
lack of freedom of expression. The government responded
Department imposed visa restrictions on officials
with harsh measures, including widespread detentions of
implicated in suppressing a planned civic march and those
more than 1,000 protesters, civil society activists, and
involved in the imprisonment of the July 11 protesters. The
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Administration also established a working group to identify
Intelligence Agency and State Department personnel who
effective ways to get remittances directly to the Cuban
experience certain brain injuries. The National Defense
people and began reviewing plans to increase staffing at the
Authorization Act for FY2022 (P.L. 117-81), approved in
U.S. Embassy in Havana to facilitate consular services.
December 2021, has provisions to address health care and
treatment, national security challenges, and U.S.
Driven by Cuba’s difficult economic conditions and
government coordination of the response to the incidents.
political repression, irregular Cuban migration to the United
States has surged over the past year. In FY2021, U.S.
117th Congress: Legislative Action on Cuba
Customs and Border Protection reported 39,303 border
For FY2022, the Biden Administration requested $20
enforcement encounters of Cubans at the Southwest border.
million for Cuba democracy programming (same as
In the first six months of FY2022, Cuban encounters rose to
provided annually since FY2014) and $12.973 million for
79,835. U.S. maritime interdiction of Cubans also has
the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, or OCB (same baseline as
increased but at lower levels, with the Coast Guard
appropriated in FY2021). In the Consolidated
reporting 838 interdicted in FY2021 and 1,536 in the first
Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division K), and
seven months of FY2022. U.S. and Cuban officials held
its explanatory statement, Congress fully funded the
migration talks in April 2022 (the first such talks since
Administration’s OCB request, although it did not specify
2018) on the implementation of bilateral migration accords.
an amount for Cuba democracy programming. The
In early May 2022, the U.S. Embassy in Havana resumed
explanatory statement included several directives and
limited immigrant visa services.
reporting requirements on Cuba and directed Federal
agencies and departments to comply with directives and
Selected U.S. Sanctions Imposed Since 2017
reporting requirements included in H.Rept. 117-84 to H.R.
Transactions with the Cuban Military. In 2017, the State
4373 (the House-passed foreign aid appropriations bill). For
Department published a list of entities controlled by the
FY2023, the Administration requested $20 million for Cuba
Cuban military, intelligence, or security services with
democracy funding and $13.432 million for the OCB.
which direct financial transactions would disproportionately
benefit those services or personnel at the expense of the
On human rights, the House and Senate approved H.Res.
Cuban people or private enterprise. This “Cuba restricted
760 and S.Res. 310, in November and August 2021,
list” includes 231 entities (ministries, hotels, businesses).
respectively; both resolutions expressed solidarity with
Cubans demonstrating peacefully, condemned Cuba’s acts
Travel and Remittances. Since 2019, increased U.S.
of repression, and called for the immediate release of
restrictions have included eliminating people-to-people
arbitrarily detained Cuban citizens. The Senate also passed:
educational travel, prohibiting travel by cruise ships and
S.Res. 37 in April, expressing solidarity with the MSI;
private and corporate aircraft, suspending commercial
S.Res. 81 in May, honoring Las Damas de Blanco, a
flights to cities other than Havana, and prohibiting U.S.
woman-led human rights group; S. 2045 in July, which
travelers from staying at over 400 hotels and private
would rename the street in front of the Cuban Embassy
residences identified as owned or controlled by the Cuban
after a democracy activist; and S.Res. 489 in January 2022,
government. In 2020, a prohibition against processing
commending Cuban pro-democracy and human rights
remittances through “Cuba restricted list” entities resulted
activists, including José Daniel Ferrer Garcia.
in Western Union terminating services to Cuba.
Among other bills, H.R. 198 would permit Cuban nationals
Terrorism Designations. Since May 2020, pursuant to the
to play U.S. professional baseball; H.R. 287, S. 689, and S.
Arms Export Control Act, the Secretary of State has
3468 would prohibit the rescission of Cuba’s designation as
included Cuba on an annual list of countries certified as not
a state sponsor of terrorism until Cuba satisfies certain
cooperating fully with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. In early
conditions; H.R. 6907 would direct the Secretary of
January 2021, pursuant to several laws, the Secretary of
Homeland Security to reinstate the processing of
State designated Cuba as a state sponsor of international
applications for parole under the Cuban Family
terrorism, citing its harboring of several U.S. fugitives and
Reunification Parole Program, and H.R. 2684 would
members of Colombia’s National Liberation Army.
establish such a program in U.S. immigration law; S. 249
and H.R. 3625 would lift economic sanctions; S. 1694
Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel
would lift trade restrictions; S. 2138 would allow certain
Between late 2016 and May 2018, 26 U.S. Embassy
Cuban medical personnel working in third countries
Havana community members suffered a series of
admission into the United States; H.R. 5069 would direct
unexplained injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive
the Secretary of State to facilitate unrestricted internet
issues. In December 2020, the National Academies of
access in Cuba; and H.R. 5557/S. 2990, among its
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine released a report
provisions, would impose sanctions on foreign persons for
concluding the most plausible mechanism for the source of
engaging in certain transactions related to Cuba.
the health symptoms was directed pulsed radio frequency
energy. U.S. officials maintain that investigations into the
Also see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on
cause or source of these anomalous health incidents have
Travel and Remittances; and CRS Report R45657, Cuba:
not reached a conclusion. A number of U.S. government
U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress and Through the Trump
and military officials worldwide have reported these
Administration.
symptoms since 2016. Congress enacted legislation (P.L.
117-46) in September 2021 authorizing payment to Central
Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
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Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview

IF10045


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 94 · UPDATED

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